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Chapter 13
Executive Summary
This chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation to address global 
climate change have been and can be organized and implemented, 
drawing upon evidence and insights found in the scholarly literature. 
The retrospective analysis of international cooperation in the chapter 
discusses and quantiﬁes what has been achieved to date and surveys 
the literature on explanations of successes and failures.
International cooperation is necessary to signiﬁcantly miti-
gate climate change impacts (robust evidence, high agreement). 
This is principally due to the fact that greenhouse gases (GHGs) mix 
globally in the atmosphere, making anthropogenic climate change a 
global commons problem. International cooperation has the potential 
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their 
perceptions of the costs and beneﬁts of collective action, emissions 
sources that are unevenly distributed, heterogeneous climate impacts 
that are uncertain and distant in space and time, and mitigation costs 
that vary. [Section 13.2.1.1, 13.15]
International cooperation on climate change has become more 
institutionally diverse over the past decade (robust evidence, high 
agreement). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) remains a primary international forum for climate 
negotiations, but other institutions have emerged at multiple scales: 
global, regional, national, and local, as well as public-private initiatives 
and transnational networks. [13.3.1, 13.4.14, 13.5, 13.12] This insti-
tutional diversity arises in part from the growing inclusion of climate 
change issues in other policy arenas (e. g., sustainable development, 
international trade, and human rights). These and other linkages cre-
ate opportunities, potential co-beneﬁts, or harms that have not yet 
been thoroughly examined. Issue linkage also creates the possibility of 
forum shopping and increased negotiation costs, which could distract 
from or dilute the performance of international cooperation toward cli-
mate goals. [13.3, 13.4, 13.5]
Existing and proposed international climate agreements vary 
in the degree to which their authority is centralized (robust 
evidence, high agreement). The range of centralized formalization 
spans: strong multilateral agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets), harmonized national policies (such as the Copenhagen / Cancún 
pledges), and decentralized but coordinated national policies (such 
as planned linkages of national and sub-national emissions trading 
schemes). [13.4.1, 13.4.3] Additionally, potential agreements vary in 
their degree of legal bindingness [13.4.2.1]. Three other design ele-
ments of international agreements have particular relevance: goals 
and targets, ﬂexible mechanisms, and equitable methods for effort 
sharing. [13.4.2] 
The UNFCCC is currently the only international climate policy 
venue with broad legitimacy, due in part to its virtually univer-
sal membership (robust evidence, medium agreement). The UNFCCC 
continues to develop institutions and systems for governance of cli-
mate change. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]
Non-UN forums and coalitions of non-state actors, such as pri-
vate businesses and city-level governments, are also contrib-
uting to international cooperation on climate change (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). These forums and coalitions address 
issues including deforestation, technology transfer, adaptation, and 
fossil fuel subsidies. However, their actual mitigation performance is 
unclear. [13.5.1.3, 13.13.1.4] 
International cooperation may have a role in stimulating pub-
lic investment, ﬁnancial incentives, and regulations to promote 
technological innovation, thereby more actively engaging the 
private sector with the climate regime (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Technology policy can help lower mitigation costs, thereby 
increasing incentives for participation and compliance with interna-
tional cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. Equity issues can 
be affected by domestic intellectual property rights regimes, which can 
alter the rate of both technology transfer and the development of new 
technologies. [13.3, 13.9, 13.12]
In the absence of — or as a complement to — a binding, inter-
national agreement on climate change, policy linkages among 
existing and nascent regional, national, and sub-national cli-
mate policies offer potential climate change mitigation and 
adaptation beneﬁts (medium evidence, medium agreement) [13.3.1, 
13.5.1.3]. Direct and indirect linkages between and among sub-
national, national, and regional carbon markets are being pursued 
to improve market efﬁciency. Yet integrating climate policies raises a 
number of concerns about the performance of a system of linked legal 
rules and economic activities. Linkage between carbon markets can 
be stimulated by competition between and among public and private 
governance regimes, accountability measures, and the desire to learn 
from policy experiments. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.6, 13.7, 13.13.2.3, Figure 
13.4] 
While a number of new institutions are focused on adaptation 
funding and coordination, adaptation has historically received 
less attention than mitigation in international climate policy, 
but inclusion of adaptation is increasingly important to reduce 
damages and may engage a greater number of countries (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). Other possible complementarities and 
tradeoffs between mitigation and adaptation, particularly the temporal 
distribution of actions, are not well-understood. [13.2, 13.3.3, 13.5.1.1, 
13.14]
Participation in international cooperation on climate change 
can be enhanced by monetary transfers, market-based mecha-
nisms, technology transfer, and trade-related measures (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). These mechanisms to enhance partici-
pation, along with compliance, legitimacy, and ﬂexibility, affect the 
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institutional feasibility of international climate policy. [13.2.2.4, 13.3.3, 
13.8.1, 13.9.2]
International trade can offer a range of positive and negative 
incentives to promote international cooperation on climate 
change (robust evidence, medium agreement). Three issues are key to 
developing constructive relationships between international trade and 
climate agreements: how existing trade policies and rules can be modi-
ﬁed to be more climate friendly; whether border adjustment measures 
(BAMs) or other trade measures can be effective in meeting the goals 
of international climate agreements; whether the UNFCCC, World 
Trade Organization (WTO), hybrid of the two, or a new institution is the 
best forum for a trade-and-climate architecture. [13.8]
Climate change policies can be evaluated using four criteria: 
environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance, 
distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility. These criteria 
are grounded in several principles: maximizing global net beneﬁts; 
equity and the related principles of distributive justice and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC); 
precaution and the related principles of anticipation, and prevention of 
future risks; and sustainable development. These criteria may at times 
conﬂict, forcing tradeoffs among them. [13.2.1, 13.2.2]
International cooperation has produced political agreement 
regarding a long-term goal of limiting global temperature 
increase to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, but 
the overall level of mitigation achieved to date by cooperation 
appears inadequate to achieve this goal (robust evidence, medium 
agreement). Mitigation pledges by individual countries in the Copen-
hagen-Cancún regime, if fully implemented, will help reduce emissions 
in 2020 to below the projected business-as-usual level, but are unlikely 
to attain an emission level in 2020 consistent with cost-effective path-
ways, based on the immediate onset of mitigation, that achieve the 
long-term 2 °C goal with a greater than 50 % probability. The contribu-
tion of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC is largely not 
quantiﬁed. [13.2.2.1, 13.13.1]
The Kyoto Protocol was the ﬁrst binding step toward imple-
menting the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC, but 
it has had limited effects on global emissions because some 
countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not meet 
their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a por-
tion of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement). 
The Parties collectively surpassed their collective emission reduc-
tion target in the ﬁrst commitment period, but the Protocol credited 
emissions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence. 
The Kyoto Protocol does not directly inﬂuence the emissions of non-
Annex  I countries, which have grown rapidly over the past decade. 
[13.13.1.1]
The ﬂexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have gener-
ally helped to improve its economic performance, but their envi-
ronmental effectiveness is less clear (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created a mar-
ket for emissions offsets from developing countries, generating credits 
equivalent to nearly 1.4 billion tCO2eq as of October 2013, many of 
which have been generated by low-cost mitigation technologies. The 
CDM showed institutional feasibility of a project-based market mecha-
nism under widely varying circumstances. The CDM’s environmental 
effectiveness has been mixed due to concerns about the additionality 
of projects, the validity of baselines, the possibility of emissions leak-
age, and recent price decreases. Its distributional impacts were limited 
due to the concentration of projects in a limited number of countries. 
The Protocol’s other ﬂexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation and 
International Emissions Trading, have been undertaken both by gov-
ernments and private market participants, but have raised concerns 
related to government sales of emission units. [13.7.2, 13.13.1.2]
Recent UNFCCC negotiations have sought to include more 
ambitious mitigation commitments from countries with com-
mitmments under the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation contributions 
from a broader set of countries, and new ﬁnance and technol-
ogy mechanisms (medium evidence, low agreement). Under the 
2010 Cancún Agreement, developed countries formalized voluntary 
pledges of quantiﬁed, economy-wide emission reduction targets and 
some developing countries formalized voluntary pledges to mitigation 
actions. The distributional impact of the Agreement will depend in part 
on the magnitude and sources of ﬁnancing, including the successful 
fulﬁlment by developed countries of their expressed joint commit-
ment to mobilize 100 billion USD per year by 2020 for climate action 
in developing countries. Under the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, delegates agreed to craft a future legal regime that would be 
‘applicable to all Parties … under the Convention’ and would include 
substantial new ﬁnancial support and technology arrangements to 
beneﬁt developing countries, but the delegates did not specify means 
for achieving those ends. [13.5.1.1, 13.11, 13.13.1.3] 
The Montreal Protocol, aimed at protecting the stratospheric 
ozone layer, has also achieved signiﬁcant reductions in global 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). The Montreal Pro-
tocol set limits on emissions of ozone-depleting gases that are also 
potent GHGs, such as chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochloroﬂuo-
rocarbons (HCFCs). Substitutes for those ozone-depleting gases (such 
as hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), which are not ozone-depleting) may 
also be potent GHGs. Lessons learned from the Montreal Protocol, for 
example, about the effect of ﬁnancial and technological transfers on 
broadening participation in an international environmental agreement, 
could be of value to the design of future international climate change 
agreements. [13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.13.1.4]
Assessment of proposed cooperation structures reinforces the 
ﬁnding that there will likely be tradeoffs between the four cri-
teria, as they will inevitably conﬂict in some elements of any 
agreement (medium evidence, high agreement). Assessment of pro-
posed climate policy architectures reveals important tradeoffs that 
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depend on the speciﬁc design elements and regulatory mechanisms 
of a proposal. For example, there is a potential tradeoff between broad 
participation and the institutional feasibility of an ambitious environ-
mental performance goal. The extent of this tradeoff may depend on 
ﬁnancial transfers, national enforcement mechanisms, and the distri-
bution and sharing of mitigation efforts. [13.2.2.5, 13.3.3, 13.13.1.4, 
13.13.2] 
Increasing interest in solar radiation management (SRM) and 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as strategies to mitigate the 
harms of climate change, pose new challenges for international 
cooperation (medium evidence, high agreement). Whereas emissions 
abatement poses challenges of engaging multilateral action to cooper-
ate, SRM may pose challenges of coordinating research and restrain-
ing unilateral deployment of measures with potentially adverse side-
effects. [13.4.4]
Gaps in knowledge and data: (1) comparisons among proposals in 
terms of aggregate and country-level costs and beneﬁts per year, with 
incorporation of uncertainty; (2) assessment of the overall effect of 
emerging intergovernmental and transnational arrangements, includ-
ing ‘hybrid’ approaches; (3) understanding of complementarities and 
tradeoffs between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation; (4) 
understanding how international cooperation on climate change can 
help achieve co-beneﬁts and development goals, including capacity 
building approaches; (5) understanding the factors that affect national 
decisions to join and form agreements.
13.1 Introduction
Due to global mixing of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, 
anthropogenic climate change is a global commons problem. For this 
reason, international cooperation is necessary to achieve signiﬁcant 
progress in mitigating climate change. Drawing on published research, 
this chapter critically examines and evaluates the ways in which agree-
ments and instruments for international cooperation have been and 
can be organized and implemented. The retrospective analysis of inter-
national cooperation in the chapter quantiﬁes and discusses what has 
been achieved to date, and surveys the literature on explanations of 
successes and failures.
The scope of the chapter is deﬁned by the range of feasible interna-
tional agreements and other policy instruments for cooperation on cli-
mate-change mitigation and adaptation. The disciplinary scope spans 
the social sciences of economics, political science, international rela-
tions, law, public policy, psychology, and sociology; relevant humani-
ties, including history and philosophy; and — where relevant to the 
discussion — the natural sciences. Where appropriate, the chapter 
synthesizes literature that utilizes econometric modelling, integrated 
modelling, game theory, comparative case studies, legal analysis, and 
political analysis. This chapter focuses on research and policy develop-
ments since the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007).
13.2 Framing concepts for an 
assessment of means for 
international cooperation
This section introduces the concept of a global commons problem to 
frame the challenge of international cooperation on climate change, 
principles for designing effective international climate policy, and crite-
ria for evaluating these policies.
13.2.1 Framing concepts and principles
13.2.1.1 The global commons and international climate 
cooperation
Climate change is a global commons problem, meaning reduction in 
emissions by any jurisdiction carries an economic cost, but the ben-
eﬁts (in the form of reduced damages from climate change) are spread 
around the world — although unevenly — due to GHG emissions mix-
ing globally in the atmosphere. Mitigation of climate change is non-
excludable, meaning it is difﬁcult to exclude any individual or institu-
tion from the shared global beneﬁts of emissions reduction undertaken 
by any localized actor. Also, these beneﬁts are non-rival, meaning they 
may be enjoyed by any number of individuals or institutions at the 
same time, without reducing the extent of the beneﬁt any one of them 
receives. These public good characteristics of climate protection (non-
excludability and non-rivalry) create incentives for actors to ‘free ride’ 
on other actors’ investments in mitigation. Therefore, lack of ambition 
in mitigation and overuse of the atmosphere as a receptor of GHGs are 
likely.
Incentives to free ride on climate protection have been analyzed exten-
sively and are well-understood (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Stavins, 
2011). The literature suggests that in some cases, effective common 
property management of local open-access resources can limit or even 
eliminate overuse (Ostrom, 2001; Wiener, 2009). Effective common 
property management of the atmosphere would require applying such 
management at a global level, by allocating rights to emit and provid-
ing disincentives for overuse through sanctions or pricing emissions 
(Byrne and Glover, 2002; Wiener, 2009). 
Enhancing production of public goods may be achieved by internaliz-
ing external costs (i. e., those costs not incorporated into market prices) 
or through legal remedies. Economic instruments can incorporate 
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external costs and beneﬁts into prices, providing incentives for private 
actors to more optimally reduce external costs and increase external 
beneﬁts (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Nordhaus, 2006; Buchholz et  al., 
2012). Legal remedies may include seeking injunctive relief or com-
pensatory payments (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13; Faure and Peeters, 2011; 
Haritz, 2011)
International cooperation is necessary to signiﬁcantly mitigate climate 
change because of the global nature of the problem (WCED, 1987; 
Kaul et al., 1999, 2003; Byrne and Glover, 2002; Barrett, 2003; Stew-
art and Wiener, 2003; Sandler, 2004) Cooperation has the potential 
to address several challenges: multiple actors that are diverse in their 
perceptions of the costs and beneﬁts of collective action; emissions 
sources that are unevenly distributed; heterogeneous climate impacts 
that are uncertain and distant in space and time; and mitigation costs 
that vary (IPCC, 2001, pp. 607 – 608).
In the absence of universal collective action, smaller groups of indi-
vidual actors may be able to organize schemes to supply public goods, 
particularly if actors know each other well, expect repeated interac-
tions, can exclude non-members, and can monitor and sanction non-
compliance in the form of either overconsumption or underproduction 
(Eckersley, 2012; McGee, 2011; Nairn, 2009; Ostrom, 1990, 2010a; 
b, 2011; Weischer et  al., 2012). Some authors are optimistic regard-
ing such ‘minilateralism’ (e. g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; on the term, 
see Eckersley, 2012) and others are more sceptical (e. g., Depledge and 
Yamin, 2009; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010) . Section  13.3 discusses 
the literature on coalitions in more detail.
Because there is no world government, each country must volun-
tarily consent to be bound by any international agreement. If these 
are to be effective, the agreements must be attractive enough to gain 
broad participation (Barrett, 2003, 2007; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; 
Schmalensee, 2010; Brousseau et al., 2012). Considering the relation-
ship between mitigation costs and climate beneﬁts discussed above, 
there is insufﬁcient incentive for actors at any level to reduce emissions 
signiﬁcantly in the absence of international cooperation. Behavioural 
research, however, indicates that individuals are sometimes motivated 
to cooperate (and to punish those who do not) to a degree greater 
than strict rational choice models predict (Camerer, 2003; Andreoni 
and Samuelson, 2006). This may explain some of the observed policies 
being adopted to reduce GHG emissions at the national, subnational, 
ﬁrm, and individual level. Moreover, even under the assumption of 
rational action, some emission reductions can occur without coopera-
tion due to positive externalities of otherwise self-beneﬁcial actions, 
or co-beneﬁts, such as actions to reduce energy expenditures, enhance 
the security of energy supply, reduce local air pollution, improve land 
use, and protect biodiversity (Seto et al., 2012). Co-beneﬁts of climate 
protection are receiving increasing attention in the literature (Rayner, 
2010; Dubash, 2009; UNEP, 2013b). However, policies designed to 
address climate change mitigation may also have adverse side-effects. 
See Section 4.8 and 6.6 for an overview of the discussion of co-bene-
ﬁts and adverse side-effects throughout this report. 
13.2.1.2 Principles
Several principles have been advanced to shape international climate 
change policies. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC, 2001) 
discusses principles and mentions some criteria for evaluation of poli-
cies, whereas the AR4 (IPCC, 2007), clearly differentiates principles 
from criteria. Principles serve as guides to design climate policies, 
while criteria are speciﬁc standards by which to evaluate them. The 
roles and applications of principles and criteria are further elaborated 
in Chapter 3 of this report.
Sets of principles are enumerated and explained in multiple interna-
tional climate change fora, including the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development (UNEP, 1992) and the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC, 1992). In the 
latter, the principles listed explicitly include: ‘equity’ and ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC) 
(Article 3(1)), relative needs, vulnerability, burdens in countries of dif-
fering wealth (Article 3(2)), precaution and ‘cost-effective[ness] so as 
to ensure global beneﬁts at the lowest possible cost’ (Article 3(3)), 
‘sustainable development’ (Article 3(4)), and cooperation (Article 3(5)). 
Principles of climate change policy relevant for international coopera-
tion can be grouped into several broad categories. First, the principle 
of maximizing global net beneﬁts makes the tradeoff between aggre-
gate compliance costs and aggregate performance beneﬁts explicit. 
The principle also incorporates the notion of maximizing co-beneﬁts 
of climate action (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti et  al., 2010; 
Rayner, 2010; Dubash, 2009) (see also Section 3.6.3). A related concept 
is that of cost-effectiveness, which allows for policies with the same 
level of performance in terms of aggregate beneﬁts to be compared on 
the dimension of aggregate cost (IPCC, 2001, 2007, Chapter 13). See 
Section 6.6 for applied scenario studies.
Second, equity is a principle that emphasizes distributive justice across 
and within countries and across and within generations (Vanderheiden, 
2008; Baer et al., 2009; Okereke, 2010; Posner and Sunstein, 2010; Pos-
ner and Weisbach, 2010; Somanathan, 2010; Cao, 2010c). It includes 
evaluating the procedures used to reach an agreement as well as the 
achieved outcomes. This principle may also apply in a broader assess-
ment of well-being (Sen, 2009; Cao, 2010a). The principle of CBDRRC 
has been central in international climate negotiations (Rajamani, 2006, 
2011a; Gupta and Sanchez, 2013). The literature refers to the varied 
historic responsibility — and current capability and capacity — of coun-
tries with regard to impacts of and action to address climate change 
(Jacoby et al., 2010; Rajamani, 2006, 2012b; Höhne et al., 2008; Del-
link et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2013b). Some literature assesses how 
the principle might be applied to actors’ diverse needs (Jonas, 1984; 
Dellink et  al., 2009), including the speciﬁc needs and vulnerabilities 
of developing countries (Rong, 2010; Smith et al., 2011; Bukovansky 
et  al., 2012). Recent literature suggests that this principle’s applica-
tion may be more nuanced as patterns of development, emissions, 
and impacts evolve (Bukovansky et al., 2012; Deleuil, 2012; Müller and 
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Mahadev, 2013; Winkler and Rajamani, 2013). The literature describes 
competing views regarding the meaning of this principle in terms of its 
legal status, operational signiﬁcance, and the obligations it may entail 
(Höhne et  al., 2006; Halvorssen, 2007; O’Brien, 2009; Winkler et  al., 
2009; Winkler, 2010; Hertel, 2011). The principle of CBDRRC is further 
analyzed in Sections 3.3 and 4.6. 
Third, the principle of precaution emphasizes anticipation and preven-
tion of future risks, even in the absence of full scientiﬁc certainty about 
the impacts of climate change (Bodansky, 2004; Wiener, 2007; Urueña, 
2008). Some see precaution as a strategy for effective action across 
diverse uncertain scenarios (Barrieu and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2006; World 
Bank, 2010), although the application of precaution varies across risks 
and countries (Hammitt, 2010). A key ongoing debate concerns whether 
or not this principle implies the need for stringent climate change poli-
cies as an insurance against potentially catastrophic outcomes, even 
if they may have very low probability (Weitzman, 2007, 2009, 2011; 
Pindyck, 2011; Nordhaus, 2011). The application of the precautionary 
principle to climate risk is further discussed in Section 2.5.5.
Fourth, the principle of sustainable development, broadly deﬁned, 
emphasizes consideration of the socioeconomic needs of future gen-
erations in making decisions about current resource use (IPCC, 2007, 
Chapter 12; World Bank, 2010). For a detailed discussion of the litera-
ture on sustainable development, see Section 4.2.1.
13.2.2 Potential criteria for assessing means of 
international cooperation
The principles elaborated above can be translated into criteria to eval-
uate forms of international cooperation, thereby assisting in the design 
of a distribution of efforts intended to solve the collective action prob-
lem of climate protection. The AR4 put forth one set of criteria: environ-
mental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional considerations, 
and institutional feasibility (IPCC, 2007, pp. 751 – 752). As ‘metrics of 
success’, these evaluation criteria can be applied in the context of 
both ex-post evaluations of actual performance and ex-ante assess-
ments of proposed cooperation (Hammitt, 1999; Fischer and Morgen-
stern, 2010). Below, this section describes four evaluation criteria that 
are applied in Section 13.13 to assess existing and proposed forms of 
international cooperation to address climate change mitigation. These 
criteria are subject to caveats, which are detailed in Section 13.13.
13.2.2.1 Environmental effectiveness
The environmental effectiveness of a climate change mitigation policy 
is the extent to which it achieves its objective to reduce the causes 
and impacts of climate change. Environmental effectiveness can be 
achieved by reducing anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions, remov-
ing GHGs from the atmosphere, or reducing the impacts of climate 
change directly through increased resilience. A primary objective of 
international cooperation has been to stabilize GHG concentrations 
at levels sufﬁcient to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system,” in the words of the UNFCCC Article 
2 (1992). This would require action within a time-frame sufﬁcient to 
“allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC, 1992), Article 2). 
The Kyoto Protocol established speciﬁc emission-reduction targets for 
developed countries, while the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agree-
ments expressed the environmental objective in terms of global aver-
age temperature increase. In addition to endorsing mitigation targets 
by developed countries and mitigation actions by developing countries, 
the Copenhagen and Cancún agreements recognized a goal of limiting 
increases in average global temperature to 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2010, 2011a).
13.2.2.2 Aggregate economic performance
Measuring the aggregate economic performance of a climate policy 
requires considering both its economic efﬁciency and its cost-effec-
tiveness. Economic efﬁciency refers to the maximization of net ben-
eﬁts, the difference between total social beneﬁts and total social costs 
(Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; Bosetti et al., 2010). 
Cost-effectiveness refers to the ability of a policy to attain a pre-
scribed level of environmental performance at least cost, taking 
into account impacts on dynamic efﬁciency, notably technological 
innovation (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). Unlike net beneﬁt assessment, 
cost-effectiveness analysis takes the environmental performance of a 
policy as given and seeks the least-cost strategy to attain it (Ham-
mitt, 1999). While analysis of a policy in terms of its cost-effectiveness 
still requires environmental performance of the policy to be quanti-
ﬁed, it does not require environmental performance beneﬁts to be 
monetized. Thus, analysis of a policy’s cost-effectiveness may be more 
feasible than analysis of a policy’s economic efﬁciency in the case of 
climate change, as some social beneﬁts of climate-change mitigation 
are difﬁcult to monetize.
13.2.2.3 Distributional and social impacts
Distributional equity and fairness may be considered important attri-
butes of climate policy because of their impact on measures of well-
being (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) and political feasibility (Jacoby 
et al., 2010; Gupta, 2012). Distributional equity relates to burden- and 
beneﬁt-sharing across countries and across time. Section 4.2.2 puts for-
ward three justiﬁcations for considering distributional equity — legal, 
environmental effectiveness, and moral. The framing in Section 4.2 also 
identiﬁes a relatively small set of core equity principles: responsibil-
ity, capacity, the right to sustainable development, and equality. These 
may be modelled with quantitative indicators, as discussed in Section 
6.3.6.6. The moral justiﬁcation draws on ethical principles, which are 
WGIII_ch13_DTP.indd   1009 20.11.2014   12:34:36
1010
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
reﬂected in the principles of the Convention (see Section 13.2.1.2; and 
detailed treatment of the literature on ethics in Section 3.2).
Another dimension of distributional equity is the possibility for miti-
gation actions in one jurisdiction to have positive or negative conse-
quences in another jurisdiction. This phenomenon, sometimes referred 
to as ‘response measures’ or as ‘spillover effects’ (see WGIII AR4 Glos-
sary), can lead to an unequal distribution of the impacts of climate 
change mitigation actions themselves. A plausible example of a spill-
over effect is the impact of emissions reductions in developed countries 
lowering the demand for fossil fuels and thus decreasing their prices, 
leading to more use of such fuels and greater emissions in developing 
nations, partially off-setting the original cuts (Bauer et  al., 2013) This 
dynamic can also be important for countries with large endowments 
of conventional oil and gas that depend on export revenues. These 
countries may lose energy export revenue as a result of climate poli-
cies enacted in other countries (Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013; Bauer et al., 
2013). Additionally, climate policies could also reduce international coal 
trading (Jewell et al., 2013). See also Sections 6.3.6, 14.4.2, and 15.5.2 
for further discussion of spillover effects. 
13.2.2.4 Institutional feasibility
The institutional feasibility of international climate policy may depend 
upon agreement among national governments and between govern-
ments and intergovernmental bodies (Wiener, 2009; Schmalensee, 
2010). Institutional feasibility is closely linked to domestic political 
feasibility, because domestic political conditions affect participation 
in, and compliance with, international climate policies. This has been 
addressed in the literature on ‘two-level’ games (Kroll and Shogren, 
2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Four sub-criteria of institutional fea-
sibility can also be considered: participation, compliance, legitimacy, 
and ﬂexibility. 
First, participation in an international climate agreement might refer 
to the number of parties, geographical coverage, or the share of global 
GHG emissions covered. Participating parties might vary with regard 
to the nature and speciﬁcity of their commitments (e. g., actions ver-
sus quantitative emissions-reduction targets). Sovereign states are not 
bound by an international treaty or other arrangement unless they 
consent to participate. The literature has examined a broad array of 
incentives to promote breadth of participation in international agree-
ments (Barrett, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 
2003; Hall et al., 2010; Victor, 2010; World Bank, 2010; Olmstead and 
Stavins, 2012). These incentives can be positive (e. g., ﬁnancial sup-
port or technology transfers) or negative (e. g., trade sanctions). Some 
authors have suggested that participation limited to countries with the 
highest emissions enhances institutional feasibility (Leal-Arcas, 2011) 
and that incentive-based emissions-permit allocations, or rules requir-
ing participation of key players, may enable larger coalitions (Dellink 
et al., 2008; Dellink, 2011).
Second, institutional feasibility is also partly determined by the com-
pliance of participating countries with an agreement’s provisions. 
Mechanisms to ensure compliance, in turn, affect decisions to partici-
pate, as well as long-term performance (Barrett, 2003). Incentives for 
encouraging compliance can be built into ﬂexible mechanisms, such 
as tradable permit systems (Wiener, 2009; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009; 
Keohane and Raustiala, 2010). Compliance is fundamentally prob-
lematic in international agreements, as it is difﬁcult to establish an 
authority that can legitimately and effectively impose sanctions upon 
sovereign national governments. Despite that, indirect negative con-
sequences of non-compliance can arise within the regime established 
by the agreement, or in other regimes, for example, adverse voting 
behaviour in international forums or reduction in foreign aid (Heitzig 
et al., 2011).
Third, legitimacy is a key component of institutional feasibility. Parties 
to a cooperative agreement must have reason to accept and imple-
ment decisions made under the agreement, meaning they must believe 
that the relevant regime represents them fairly. Legitimacy depends on 
the shared understanding both that the substantive rules (outputs) and 
decision-making procedures (inputs) are fair, equitable, and beneﬁcial 
(Scharpf, 1999), and thus that other regime members will continue to 
cooperate (Ostrom, 1990, 2011). In practice, the legitimacy of substan-
tive rules is typically based on whether parties evaluate positively the 
results of an authority’s policies, while procedural legitimacy is typi-
cally based on the existence of proper input mechanisms of partici-
pation and consultation for the parties participating in an agreement 
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). 
Finally, the institutional feasibility of international climate policy 
depends in part on whether the institutions relevant for a policy can 
develop ﬂexibility mechanisms — which typically require that the 
institutions themselves are ﬂexible or adjustable. It may be important 
to be able to adapt to new information or to changes in economic 
and political circumstances. The institutionalization of learning among 
actors, which is referred to as ‘social learning’ in the literature of envi-
ronmental governance (Pahl-Wostl et  al., 2007), is an important 
aspect of success, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances. 
While institutional arrangements that incorporate a purposive pro-
cess of experimentation, evaluation, learning, and revision may be 
costly, policies that do not incorporate these steps may be overly rigid 
in the face of change and therefore potentially even more costly 
(Greenstone, 2009; Libecap, 2011). Another area of current debate 
and research is the question of whether increased ﬂexibility in design-
ing obligations for states helps them align their international obliga-
tions more readily with domestic political constraints (von Stein, 
2008; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). This suggests that designing inter-
national climate policies involves a balance between the beneﬁts of 
ﬂexibility and the costs of regulatory uncertainty (Goldstein and Mar-
tin, 2000; Brunner et  al., 2012). Chapter 2, for example in Section 
2.6.5.1, goes into more depth on problems related to regulatory 
uncertainty.
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Box 13.1 | International agreements and developing countries
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is a statement of aspirations, principles, goals, and the 
means to meet commitments. The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC 
included, for the ﬁrst time, binding mitigation commitments — for 
nations listed in its Annex B. Other countries may assist Annex B 
Parties in meeting their mitigation commitments via the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), under the Protocol’s Article 12.
Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, which include all Annex 
B countries under the Kyoto Protocol, are largely the wealthi-
est countries and largest historical emitters of GHGs. However, 
Annex I countries’ share of historical cumulative GHG emissions 
in 2010 is close to the share of the non-Annex I countries (Section 
13.13.1.1). Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s mitigation commitments 
were initially consistent with the UNFCCC principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDRRC). However, since the UNFCCC divided countries into two 
categories in 1992, both income patterns and the distribution of 
GHG emissions have changed signiﬁcantly, even as variations in 
income and per capita responsibility for emissions remain sub-
stantial both within and between countries. Between Conference 
of Parties (COP)-13 (Bali) in 2007 and COP-16 (Cancún) in 2010, 
many developing countries put forward quantiﬁable mitigation 
actions (as contrasted with quantiﬁed, economy-wide emissions 
reductions targets assumed by Annex B parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol) and agreed to more frequent reporting and enhanced 
transparency of those actions. Further pledges of actions have 
been made since Cancún. (Section 13.13) 
For many developing countries, adaptation can have comparable 
priority to mitigation. This may be because countries are especially 
vulnerable to climate change damages or they lack conﬁdence in 
progress with mitigation efforts. These countries are often the least 
able to ﬁnance adaptation, leaving cooperative agreements to 
attempt to identify sources of support. (See Chapter 16 for detail.) 
International collaboration regarding public climate ﬁnance under 
the UNFCCC dates back to 1991, when the Climate Change Pro-
gram of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established. The 
literature reﬂects mixed evidence on the scale and environmental 
effectiveness of such funding. Funding for reporting and mitigation 
ﬂows through four primary vehicles: the GEF, which focuses on 
mitigation; the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), created in 2001 for adaptation 
purposes and operated by the GEF; the Adaptation Fund set up in 
2008; and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010 for 
mitigation and adaptation. (Section 13.11, see also Section 16.2) 
The Copenhagen Accord set a goal to jointly mobilize 100 billion 
USD / yr by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. 
(Section 13.11) Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC also calls for technology 
transfer from developed to developing countries. The Technology 
Mechanism, with an Executive Committee and Climate Technology 
Centre and Network, is seeking to fulﬁl this goal. 
Research indicates that adaptation assistance, such as that pro-
vided by the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, can be crucial for 
inclusion of developing countries in international climate agree-
ments. Further research into the distribution of adaptation ﬁnance 
across countries from both UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC sources 
is required to assess the equity, efﬁciency, effectiveness, and 
environmental impacts of the Adaptation Fund and other funding 
mechanisms. Many developing countries have created institutions 
to coordinate adaptation ﬁnance from domestic and international 
funding sources. (Sections 13.3, 13.5)
The literature identiﬁes several models for equitable burden 
sharing — among both developed and developing countries in 
international cooperation for climate change mitigation. The prin-
ciples on which burden sharing arrangements may be based are 
described in Section 4.6.2, and the implications of these arrange-
ments are discussed in Section 6.3.6.6. Distributional impacts from 
agreements will depend on the approach taken, criteria applied 
to operationalize equity, and the manner in which developing 
countries’ emissions plans are ﬁnanced; studies suggest potential 
approaches (Section 13.4, UNFCCC Secretariat 2007b, 2008). A 
major distributional issue is how to account for emissions from 
goods produced in a developing country, but consumed in an 
industrialized country. Such emissions have increased rapidly since 
1990, as developed countries have typically been importers of 
embodied emissions, while many developing countries have large 
shares of emissions embodied in exports. (Sections 13.8, 14.3.4)
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. 
Several distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to 
negotiate their divergent priorities. Examples include the Group of 
77 (G-77) and China, which contains sub-groups such as the Afri-
can Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab Group; 
the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states; 
and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included China, 
India, and Saudi Arabia. Other coalitions organized to inﬂuence 
UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS); various groupings of industrialized countries, including 
the Umbrella Group; the Environmental Integrity Group; the BASIC 
countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); the Coalition of 
Rainforest Nations; and other active coalitions not limited to the 
climate context, for example, the Comision Centroamericana de 
Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.
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13.2.2.5 Conﬂicts and complementarities
Criteria may be mutually reinforcing (Cao, 2010a; c), but there may 
also be conﬂicts, forcing tradeoffs between and among them. For 
example, maximizing global net beneﬁts or attaining cost-effective-
ness may lead to actions that decrease distributional equity (van Asselt 
and Gupta, 2009), which could lead to low participation. Posner and 
Weisbach (2010) and Baer (2009) argue that efﬁciency and distribution 
can be reconciled by either normatively adjusting the net beneﬁt or 
cost calculations to account for changes in relative utility, or by adopt-
ing redistributive policy in addition to cost-effective climate policy. 
Different approaches to meet the same criteria (for example, equity) 
may also conﬂict with each other when operationalized (Fischer and 
Morgenstern, 2010) or lead to different results (Dellink et al., 2009). 
Simultaneously, there are relations among sub-criteria: excessive 
ﬂexibility may undermine incentives to invest in long-term solutions, 
and may also increase the likelihood of participation. Compromises 
to enable institutional feasibility of an agreement may weaken per-
formance along other dimensions. The environmental performance of 
an international agreement depends largely on tradeoffs among the 
ambition of an agreement with regards to mitigation goals and par-
ticipation, and compliance (Barrett, 2003; Bodansky, 2011a; Rajamani, 
2012a). For further discussion of potential tradeoffs between participa-
tion and environmental effectiveness, see Section 13.3.3.
13.3 International agreements: 
Lessons for climate policy
Several lessons from research on existing international agreements, as 
well as game-theoretic models of such agreements, can be applied to 
climate change institutions. This section brieﬂy summarizes some of 
the key lessons, which are addressed in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions of this chapter.
13.3.1 The landscape of climate agreements 
and institutions
Since the publication of IPCC AR4 in 2007, the landscape of interna-
tional institutions related to climate policy has become signiﬁcantly 
more complex. Climate change is addressed in a growing number of 
fora and institutions and across a wider range of scales (Keohane and 
Victor, 2011; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Biermann et al., 2009, 2010; Barrett, 
2010; Abbott, 2011; Hoffmann, 2011; Zelli, 2011; Rayfuse and Scott, 
2012). 
Figure 13.1 illustrates the variety of international, transnational, regional, 
national, sub-national, and non-state agreements and other forms of 
cooperation, many of which have emerged since the mid-2000s. Some 
regimes that previously focused on other issues, e. g., trade (see Sec-
tion 13.8), energy (see Chapter 7), biodiversity, and human rights have 
begun to address climate change. For a more detailed discussion of 
these initiatives, see also Section 13.5.
Future efforts for international cooperation on climate policy will need 
to account for this wide variety of agreements and institutions. Careful 
design of linkages and cooperative arrangements will be needed to 
manage the increasingly fragmented regime complex to prevent con-
ﬂicts among institutions (Biermann et  al., 2010; Keohane and Victor, 
2011; Zelli, 2011), avoid gaps or loopholes (Downs, 2007), and maxi-
mize potential institutional synergies (Hoffmann, 2011; Rayfuse and 
Scott, 2012). 
13.3.2 Insights from game theory for climate 
agreements
Game theory provides insights into international cooperation on cli-
mate policy, from research communities in environmental economics 
(Ward, 1993; Finus, 2001, 2003; Wagner, 2001; Barrett, 2003, 2007) 
and in the rationalist school of political science (Sjostedt, 1992; Downs 
et  al., 1996; Underdal, 1998; Koremenos et  al., 2001; Avenhaus and 
Zartman, 2007; Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). These researchers analyze 
the incentives and motivations of actors to join and comply with inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs). 
The game-theoretic literature on climate change agreements has 
grown substantially in the last two decades (Barrett, 2007; Rubio 
and Ulph, 2007; Chambers, 2008; Froyn and Hovi, 2008; Bosetti et al., 
2009a; Asheim and Holtsmark, 2009; Dutta and Radner, 2009; Muñoz 
et al., 2009; Carbone et al., 2009; Weikard et al., 2010; Bréchet et al., 
2011; Wood, 2011; Heitzig et al., 2011; Dietz and Zhao, 2011; Bréchet 
and Eyckmans, 2012; Pittel and Rübbelke, 2012). It is important, how-
ever, to treat with caution any general conclusions from recent game 
theory literature on climate change agreements, as many have been 
criticized for their simplicity. In this section, we refrain from listing 
assumptions in detail, and restrict attention to the most general and 
policy-relevant discussions. See Finus (2001, 2003) for a more detailed 
review of the relevant game theory literature.
By and large, the game-theoretic literature assumes actors to be states 
that are maximizing the welfare of their citizens (Ward, 1993; Carraro 
and Siniscalco, 1998; Grundig, 2006). A central premise is that there 
is currently no supranational institution that can impose an IEA on 
governments and subsequently enforce it (see Section 13.2.1.1). Thus, 
IEAs must be self-enforcing to engage and maintain participation 
and compliance (Finus, 2001; Barrett, 2007; Dutta and Radner, 2009; 
Rubio and Casino, 2005; Heitzig et al., 2011). Nevertheless, in theory 
and practice, international institutions can help to promote, negotiate, 
and administer an IEA. They can do so by serving to coordinate and 
moderate negotiations and implementation, reducing transaction costs 
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UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, International Emissions Trading
Other UN Intergovernmental 
organizations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UN Development Programme, UN Environment Programme, UN Global Compact, International Civil Aviation 
Organization, International Maritime Organization, UN Fund for International Partnerships
Non-UN IOs World Bank, World Trade Organization
Other environmental treaties Montreal Protocol, UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Environmental Modiﬁ cation Treaty, Convention on Biological Diversity
Other multilateral ‘clubs’ Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, G20, REDD+ Partnerships
Bilateral arrangements e. g., US-India, Norway-Indonesia
Partnerships Global Methane Initiative, Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁ ciency Partnership, Climate Group
Offset certiﬁ cation systems e. g., Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon Standard
Investor governance initiatives Carbon Disclosure Project, Investor Network on Climate Risk
Regional governance e. g., EU climate change policy
Subnational regional initiatives Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California emissions-trading system
City networks US Mayors’ Agreement, Transition Towns
Transnational city networks C40, Cities for Climate Protection, Climate Alliance, Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network
NAMAs, NAPAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of developing countries; National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
Figure 13.1 | The landscape of agreements and institutions on climate change. Lines connecting different types of agreements and institutions indicate different types of links. In 
some cases, lines represent a formal agreement of a division of labour (e. g. between the UNFCCC and ICAO concerning aviation emissions). In other cases, lines represent a more 
simple mutual recognition (e. g. the accreditation of C40 cities by the UNFCCC). In others still, lines represent a functional linkage without any formal relationship (e. g. the relation-
ship between the CDM and the NGO certiﬁ cation of carbon offsets). This is a rapidly-changing landscape and not all links may be captured.
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of negotiations, and generating trust (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Finus and 
Rundshagen, 2006); changing the interests of actors by providing new 
information or building capacity (Haas et al., 1993); enlisting actors in 
domestic politics within and across states (Abbott and Snidal, 2010; 
Hafner-Burton et al., 2012); and inculcating norms (Bodansky, 2010a). 
Alternative perspectives on game theory weaken the assumption of 
rationality and emphasize the roles of legitimacy, norms, and accul-
turation in shaping behaviour under international law and institutions 
(Goodman and Jinks, 2004; March and Olsen, 2008; Brunnée and 
Toope, 2010; Bernauer et  al., 2010; Hafner-Burton et  al., 2012). See 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of behavioural approaches in the literature.
13.3.3 Participation in climate agreements
Greater participation in climate change agreements, all else equal, 
improves environmental effectiveness by covering a larger share of 
global emissions and reducing potential leakage to non-participating 
areas. Greater participation may also improve aggregate economic 
performance by enabling lower-cost emissions abatement and reduc-
ing leakage. An international climate agreement regime might achieve 
depth (ambition of emissions reduction) and breadth (of participation) 
in different sequence. Schmalensee (1998) argues for breadth of par-
ticipation ﬁrst, with less emphasis on ambition. He argues that this 
approach allows time to develop correspondingly broad-based insti-
tutions that can potentially facilitate substantial aggregate emissions 
reductions over time (Schelling, 1992; Barrett, 2003). Conversely, pur-
suing an arrangement with depth before breadth can be motivated 
by the urgency of the climate-change problem. However, such an 
approach may make broadening participation more difﬁcult later on 
(Schmalensee, 1998), and this type of agreement could induce emis-
sions leakage, undermining effectiveness (Babiker, 2005).
In the theoretical literature, the tradeoff between the level of abate-
ment by a sub-set of actors and participation in an IEA has been ana-
lyzed as a comparison between an ‘ambitious versus a modest treaty’ 
(Finus and Maus, 2008; Courtois and Haeringer, 2011) or between a 
focal (deep and narrow) versus a consensus (broad but shallow) treaty 
(Barrett, 2002; Hafner-Burton et  al., 2012). Scholars conclude that, 
overall, a consensus treaty may achieve more in terms of emission 
reductions and global welfare than a focal treaty. Further analysis has 
investigated the tradeoff between breadth and depth, and how broad 
participation can increase environmental effectiveness (by covering 
more emissions and reducing leakage), and reduce costs (by encom-
passing more low-cost abatement options in a larger market). Through 
these plausible mechanisms, greater breadth enables greater ambition 
(subject to the costs of attracting participants) (Battaglini and Harstad, 
2012).
While most existing IEAs feature open membership, some theoretical 
literature ﬁnds that exclusive membership can help to stabilize IEAs, 
prevent defection, and lead to better environmental outcomes, even 
in the context of a global public good such as climate protection (Car-
raro and Marchiori, 2003; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Finus, 2008a; 
Finus and Rundshagen, 2009). In practice, exclusive membership may 
reduce supply of a public good such as global emissions abatement, 
may increase emissions leakage (unless non-members are covered by 
their own coalition in a system of multiple agreements), and may con-
ﬂict with norms of institutional legitimacy. Multiple agreements (i. e., 
multiple coalitions) may be a pragmatic, short- to mid-term strategy 
for achieving more effective cooperation if a universal treaty of all 
countries to limit emissions is not stable or attainable in the short-run 
(Finus and Rundshagen, 2003; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Asheim et al., 
2006; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Bosetti et  al., 2009b; Bréchet and 
Eyckmans, 2012). Multiple coalition agreements involving all major 
emitters could potentially achieve better environmental effectiveness 
than a partial coalition acting while other countries do not act at all. 
However, for protecting a global public good, separate coalitions could 
forego some of the cost-effectiveness gains of a broader regime, and 
they could face questions of legitimacy (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
McGee, 2013). It remains unclear whether partial coalitions for climate 
policy will accelerate momentum for a more universal global agree-
ment in the future, or undermine such momentum (Brewster, 2010).
International transfers can also attract participation in climate agree-
ments, balancing the asymmetric gains from cooperation. These 
transfers can either be direct monetary transfers (e. g., contributions 
to a fund from which developing countries can draw), in-kind trans-
fers (e. g., technology transfer), or indirect transfers via market-based 
mechanisms (e. g., through the initial allocation of tradable emission 
permits) (Carraro et al., 2006; Barrett, 2007; Bosetti et al., 2009a; Fuen-
tes-Albero and Rubio, 2010; Bréchet and Eyckmans, 2012; Stewart and 
Wiener, 2003). Historically, transfers have been important for building 
participation in past international agreements (Hafner-Burton et  al., 
2012; Bernauer et al., 2013). The experience of the Montreal Protocol 
illustrates how transfers can engage participation by major develop-
ing countries through ﬁnancial and technological assistance (Sandler, 
2010; Kaniaru, 2007; Zhao, 2005, 2002; Andersen et  al., 2007). The 
role of technology transfer in international cooperation is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 13.9, and the role of ﬁnance is discussed in 
Section 13.11. 
Linkages across issues may also help encourage participation. Many 
linkages exist between climate change and other issues, such as 
energy, water, agriculture, sustainable development, poverty allevia-
tion, public health, international trade, human rights, foreign direct 
investment, biodiversity, and national security (see Sections 3.4, 5.7, 
6.6, and Section 13.2.1.1). Such linkages may create opportunities, co-
beneﬁts, or adverse side-effects, not all of which have been thoroughly 
examined. However, the advantages of issue linkage may diminish as 
the number of parties and issues increase, raising the transaction costs 
of negotiations (Weischer et al., 2012). 
A different instrument to encourage participation is trade sanctions 
against non-parties to an IEA. The threat of trade sanctions can moti-
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vate participation (Barrett, 2003; Victor, 2011), as exempliﬁed by the 
Montreal Protocol. However, since participation in an international 
treaty is voluntary, sanctions for non-participation may be difﬁcult to 
justify (see Section 13.3.4). Similar to trade sanctions are ‘offsetting 
border adjustment measures’ (BAMs) (see Section 13.8 for further dis-
cussion). 
Particularly vulnerable countries may be more likely to participate in 
agreements that address and fund adaptation activities (Huq et  al., 
2004; Mace, 2005; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Denton, 2010; Smith et al., 
2011). Beneﬁts of adaptation are often local, and these local beneﬁts 
may be more effective incentives for countries vulnerable to climate 
damages to participate in an IEA relative to the beneﬁts of mitiga-
tion and support for technological development or deployment. Both 
of these alternative possible incentive mechanisms are less-excludable 
and are of potentially less value to lower-emitting countries, compared 
with adaptation beneﬁts. Recent game theoretic analyses suggest 
that private co-beneﬁts from mitigation actions may not substantially 
increase participation in international climate agreements (Pittel and 
Rübbelke, 2008; Finus and Rübbelke, 2012).
A ﬁnal key issue related to participation is the role played by uncer-
tainty. Earlier research suggested that reducing uncertainty about 
the beneﬁts and costs of mitigation can render IEAs less effective, 
showing that as parties learn of the actual costs and beneﬁts of 
mitigation, their incentive to participate may shrink (Na and Shin, 
1998; Kolstad, 2005; Kolstad and Ulph, 2008). However, more recent 
work (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2012, 2013; Dellink and Finus, 2012) has 
qualiﬁed this conclusion by showing that removing uncertainty only 
has a negative impact on cooperation in certain cases. Recent experi-
mental evidence suggests that if there is uncertainty in the likelihood 
of tipping points of disastrous climate change impacts, this may 
reduce the success of cooperation (Dannenberg et  al., 2011); con-
versely, reducing uncertainty about the likelihood of tipping points 
can increase prospects for collective action (Barrett and Dannenberg, 
2012).
13.3.4 Compliance
As noted in Section 13.2.1.1, in the absence of a supranational author-
ity, compliance with international agreements must be veriﬁed by 
parties to the agreement or through a related collaborative body they 
perceive as legitimate. Barrett (2003) sees compliance as a dimension 
of participation, in the sense that incentives to comply are incentives 
to continue participating in the agreement. The reputational costs 
of being a non-compliant party may differ from those of withdraw-
ing altogether, but the magnitude of the difference is not clear. For 
example, there is only one case of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 
that of Canada in December 2011, but more than one case in which 
countries have not met their agreed emission targets (see Section 
13.13.1.1).
Compliance does not necessarily equate with success — because coun-
tries choose whether to become party to an agreement, compliance 
may only reﬂect what countries would have done without the agree-
ment (Downs et al., 1996). One measure of effectiveness is the extent 
to which the agreement changed countries’ behaviour, compared to 
what they would have done in the absence of the agreement (the 
counterfactual baseline scenario) (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012). Evaluat-
ing an agreement’s effectiveness is difﬁcult because the counterfactual 
is not observed (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Mitchell, 2008; Hafner-
Burton et al., 2012).
A necessary condition for successful compliance strategies is an inde-
pendent and effective regime of ‘measurement (or monitoring), report-
ing, and veriﬁcation’ (MRV) with a high frequency of reporting (as 
documented in the IPCC TAR; see also Section 2.6.4.3). Provisions for 
greater transparency in MRV are being developed with regard to (1) 
countries’ GHG emissions, and (2)  international ﬁnancial ﬂows from 
developed countries to developing countries for mitigation and adap-
tation measures (Winkler, 2008; Breidenich and Bodansky, 2009; Ellis 
and Larsen, 2008; Ellis and Moarif, 2009; Clapp et al., 2012). Lessons 
on MRV from other multilateral regimes — such as International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) consultations, Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) economic policy reviews, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) trade policy reviews, and arms control agree-
ments — include attention to accuracy, evolution over time, combining 
self-reporting with third-party veriﬁcation, including independent tech-
nical assessment as well as some form of political or peer review, the 
potential use of remote sensing or other technical means, and public 
domain outputs (Cecys, 2010; Pew Center, 2010; Bell et al., 2012).
Technical capabilities for monitoring emissions now include remote 
sensing from satellites  which themselves pose new issues about the 
availability, diffusion, and governance of MRV capabilities for greater 
transparency. Greater transparency about ﬁnancial ﬂows requires 
detailed analysis of donor government budgeting in their legislative 
and administrative processes (Clapp et al., 2012; Falconer et al., 2012; 
Brewer and Mehling, 2014). 
Measurement, reporting, and veriﬁcation may be beneﬁcially comple-
mented by enforcement strategies, which are comprised of positive 
inducements — such as international transfers, ﬁnancing, capacity-
building, and technology transfer — and credible threats of sanctions 
for violating emissions commitments or reporting requirements. From 
a rationalist perspective, compliance will occur if the discounted net 
beneﬁts from cooperation (including direct climate beneﬁts, co-bene-
ﬁts, reputation, transfers, and other elements) exceed the discounted 
net beneﬁts of defection (including avoided mitigation costs, avoided 
adverse side-effects, and expected sanctions). The institutional and 
behavioural reality of ensuring compliance can be more complicated. 
Moreover, the theoretical literature has stressed the difﬁculty of 
designing credible sanctions that are renegotiation-proof (Finus, 2001, 
2003; Barrett, 2002; Asheim et al., 2006; Froyn and Hovi, 2008).
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Some research suggests that the Kyoto Protocol is unusual among 
IEAs in that it established an ‘elaborate and multifaceted’ compli-
ance system, which has been successful in assuring compliance with 
MRV requirements (Finus, 2008b; Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010; Brunnée 
et al., 2012), while many other IEAs rely on self-reporting of domes-
tic actions. Compliance with MRV requirements can in turn improve 
detection of other forms of noncompliance. Even if the Kyoto Protocol 
compliance regime has been imperfect, it can offer lessons for future 
regimes, in particular with regard to MRV. The design of sanction mech-
anisms currently in place under the Kyoto Protocol, however, has also 
been criticized for not being fully credible (Halvorssen and Hovi, 2006; 
Barrett, 2009; Vezirgiannidou, 2009), though possibilities for improve-
ment through modiﬁcation have been identiﬁed (Finus, 2008b). For 
example, a sanction could take the form of a temporary suspension of 
monetary and technological transfers if recipient countries are found in 
non-compliance (Finus, 2008b). It has also been shown that a deposit 
system can be effective to enforce compliance: treaty members lodge 
a deposit into a fund from which they receive interest as long as they 
comply. In case of non-compliance, parts of the deposit are forfeited to 
compliant countries (Gerber and Wichardt, 2009, 2013). 
Trade sanctions, such as those employed under the Montreal Protocol, 
are frequently put forward as a possible compliance mechanism (Bar-
rett, 2003; Victor, 2011) (see Section 13.8 for institutional details and 
further discussion). A general reservation about trade sanctions is that 
they often not only affect the agreement-violator but also compliant 
countries, and hence this threat is not credible. Barrett (2009), Victor 
(2010), and others argue that trade sanctions are neither a feasible nor 
a desirable option for enforcing compliance with a climate agreement 
because trade sanctions may not be compatible with WTO rules. A WTO-
compatible design may be feasible in the case of border adjustments 
with obligations to buy allowances (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Monjon 
and Quirion, 2011). Meanwhile, imposition of trade sanctions would 
pose some risks of reducing cooperation by undermining capacity for 
compliance in targeted countries and could be burdensome to low-
income populations in targeted countries (Murase, 2011). Especially 
if applied to embedded carbon (carbon from energy used to produce 
traded goods), the number of goods affected by the sanctions could 
be large, potentially fuelling a trade war that may negatively affect 
even those countries that intend to be the punishers (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 2009) (see Sections 13.8 and 5.4.1 for further discussion). 
Finally, there is a considerable literature on the potential use of legal 
remedies (such as civil liability) to address climate damages (Penalver, 
1998; Grossman, 2003; Allen, 2003; Gillespie, 2004; Hancock, 2004; 
Burns, 2004; Verheyen, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; Smith and Shearman, 2006; 
Lord et  al., 2011; Farber, 2011; Faure and Peeters, 2011). There has 
been little suggestion that such liability remedies be formally incorpo-
rated into climate agreements as compliance mechanisms, and there 
would be signiﬁcant obstacles to doing so (including the lack of a 
robust international civil liability system). Nonetheless, this is a poten-
tial avenue for encouraging compliance, perhaps indirectly. The IPCC 
AR4 (IPCC, 2007) reported on evidence from various legal actions and 
potential actions that have been considered in the theoretical litera-
ture. Haritz (2011) has argued, based on an analysis of the literature 
and court cases, that it is theoretically possible to link the IPCC scale 
of likelihood with a scale based on legal standards of proof required 
for various kinds of legal action. Liability for climate change damage 
at the supranational level (de Larragán, 2011; Gouritin, 2011; Peeters, 
2011), and at the national level in the United Kingdom (Kaminskaite-
Slaters, 2011), the United States (Kosolapova, 2011), and the Nether-
lands (van Dijk, 2011), has been explored. Climate litigation and legal 
liability may put additional pressure on corporations and govern-
ments to be more accountable (Smith and Shearman, 2006; Faure and 
Peeters, 2011). However, there are key analytical hurdles to establish-
ing important legal facts, such as causation and who is to be held liable 
(Gupta, 2014). While not framed in terms of liability or compensation, 
the UNFCCC negotiations in Doha decided to establish institutional 
arrangements associated with Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2013a).
13.4 Climate policy 
architectures
‘Policy architecture’ for global climate change refers to “the basic 
nature and structure of an international agreement or other mul-
tilateral (or bilateral) climate regime” (Aldy and Stavins, 2010a). 
The term includes the sense of durability, with regard to both policy 
structure and the institutions to implement and support that struc-
ture (Schmalensee, 1998, 2010), which is appropriate to the long-term 
nature of the climate-change problem.
13.4.1 Degrees of centralized authority
Absent the emergence of a global authority that has the capacity to 
impose an allocation of emissions rights on countries, as advocated 
by Tickell (2008), approaches to international cooperation all arise out 
of negotiated agreements among independent participants. However, 
they vary in the degree to which they confer authority on multilateral 
institutions to manage the rules and processes agreed to. On one end 
of the spectrum of possible approaches, referred to by some as ‘top-
down’ (Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), actors agree to a high degree of 
mutual coordination of their actions with, for example, ﬁxed targets 
and a common set of rules for speciﬁc mechanisms, such as emissions 
trading. On the other end of the spectrum, sometimes known as ‘bot-
tom-up’ (Victor et al., 2005; Dubash and Rajamani, 2010), national pol-
icies are established that may or may not be linked with one another. 
Figure 13.2 illustrates how existing and proposed international agree-
ments can be placed on this spectrum (see IPCC, 2007, pp. 770 – 773 for 
a detailed list of many proposals that could be placed in this grid). The 
level of centralization refers to the authority an agreement confers on 
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an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agree-
ment. It shows that many proposals can be more or less centralized 
depending on the speciﬁ c design. It also shows that the three idealized 
types discussed in the following sections have more blurred boundar-
ies than their titles suggest. The ﬁ gure also divides them into agree-
ments focused on speciﬁ c ends (emissions targets, for example) — and 
those that focus on means (speciﬁ c policies, or technologies, for exam-
ple). Finally, it should be understood that these are idealized types, and 
in practice there will be considerable additional complexity in how the 
basic design of agreements connect the actions of the various actors 
that make them up. There are distinct limits to what can be gleaned 
from the ‘top-down vs bottom-up’ metaphor or the degrees-of-central-
ization notion employed here (Dai, 2010) as, for example, emphasized 
in Ostrom’s (2012) accounts of ‘polycentric governance’.
As one prominent example, the Cancún Agreements are a ‘hybrid’ of 
top-down and bottom-up. They include voluntary mitigation pledges 
from many (but not all) UNFCCC parties, together with additional or 
elaborated common goals and centralized UNFCCC functions (e. g., 
with regard to adaptation, see Part II of the Cancún Agreements 
(UNFCCC, 2010)). It is quite possible that the agreement mandated by 
the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action, to be completed by 2015, 
will also be such a hybrid.
Figure 13.2 | Alternative forms of international cooperation. The ﬁ gure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey 
of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agree-
ments. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particu-
lar agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement.
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Other IO GHG Regulation
Linked Cap-and-Trade Systems
and Harmonized Carbon Taxes
Multilateral Clubs Green Climate
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Bilateral Financial/
Technology Transfers
International Cooperation
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Targets
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Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); 
R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), 
or Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: 
examples include the Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
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13.4.1.1 Centralized architectures and strong 
multilateralism
A centralized architecture, such as that generated by strong commit-
ments to multilateral processes and institutions, is an agreement that 
establishes goals, targets, or both which are generally binding, for par-
ticipating countries, within a speciﬁc time-frame, and establishes col-
lective processes for monitoring progress towards meeting those goals. 
The Kyoto Protocol adopted targets and timetables for participating 
Annex B countries, one realisation of strong multilateralism (Bodan-
sky, 2007). Other centralized approaches to international cooperation 
could expand on targets-and-timetables by also specifying the mecha-
nism for implementation of the goals and / or targets of the agreement. 
Such an approach could establish, for example, a global cap-and-trade 
system or global carbon tax.
In the literature, targets-and-timetables have been coupled with spe-
ciﬁc notions of fairness, prospective conditions for political acceptance, 
or both — to establish quantitative targets and timetables for all coun-
tries and all years in a potential international agreement (Agarwala, 
2010; Frankel, 2010; Höhne et al., 2008; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011; Cao, 
2010c; IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13).
13.4.1.2 Harmonized national policies
A less-centralized approach would be to structure international cooper-
ation around policies that would be harmonized, such as via collective 
monitoring, but where relatively little centralized authority is estab-
lished or employed. In this class of approaches, aspects of national 
policies are made similar or even equivalent to one another. Examples 
include the G20 and Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) agree-
ment in 2009 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies that encourage waste-
ful consumption (Barbier, 2010); the EU’s use of private certiﬁcation 
schemes for biofuels to link to its import policies for such fuels; efforts 
to harmonize private carbon-accounting systems, such as in the Carbon 
Disclosure Standards Board (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011); hypothetical 
national carbon taxes that would be harmonized internationally (Coo-
per, 2010); adjusting design details of cap-and-trade schemes that are 
to be linked; and implementation of similar technology or performance 
standards. Many of these involve — or would involve — relatively lim-
ited numbers of actors, compared to UNFCCC agreements, reﬂecting 
the ‘minilateralism’ discussed in Section 13.2.1.1.
The so-called ‘pledge and review’ approach, exempliﬁed to some 
degree by the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements, is 
an architecture in which a participating nation or region voluntarily 
registers to abide by its stated domestic reduction targets or actions 
(pledges). The degree of centralization generated by this approach 
could vary considerably (see Figure 13.2), depending on the particular 
arrangement. If a pledge and review system, such as that represented 
by the Cancún Agreements, involved cooperation in forging an agree-
ment that provided some centralized administration or monitoring 
(in addition to the voluntary announcement of pledges by individual 
countries), it could be considered an example of strong multilateral-
ism, although perhaps with less centralized authority than the Kyoto 
Protocol or of coordinated national policies.
13.4.1.3 Decentralized approaches and coordinated 
policies
Finally, even more decentralized architectures may arise out of dif-
ferent regional, national, and sub-national policies, and subsequently 
vary in the extent to which they are connected internationally (Victor 
et al., 2005; Hoffmann, 2011). One form of decentralized architecture is 
linked regional, national, or sub-national tradable permit systems (Jaffe 
et al., 2009; Ranson and Stavins, 2012; Mehling and Haites, 2009). In 
such a system, smaller-scale tradable permit systems can be linked 
directly (e. g., through mutual recognition of the permits from other 
systems) or indirectly (e. g., through mutual recognition of an emission 
reduction credit system such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM). In practice, 
such a system of linkage is already emerging. However, there remains 
the challenge of harmonizing the design details of the various trading 
systems, as discussed above (e. g., emissions reductions requirements, 
proportions of target emissions that may be covered by offset credits, 
use of ceiling or ﬂoor prices, and accounting units (Jaffe et al., 2009; 
Bernstein et al., 2010).
Similarly, heterogeneous regional, national, or sub-national policies 
could be linked either directly or indirectly (e. g., cap and trade in one 
jurisdiction linked with a tax in another) (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). 
Linkage of heterogeneous policies can occur through trade mecha-
nisms (e. g., import allowance requirements or border adjustments) 
or via access to a common emission reduction credit system (e. g., the 
CDM, as with indirectly linked tradable permit systems).
13.4.1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of different 
degrees of centralization
Some authors conclude, particularly post-Copenhagen, that attempts 
to develop a comprehensive, integrated climate regime have failed, 
due to resistance to costly policies in both developed and developing 
countries and lack of political will (Michonski and Levi, 2010; Keo-
hane and Victor, 2011), or alternatively because of the complexity that 
characterizes the problem (Hoffmann, 2011). Other analyses empha-
size the legitimacy of the UN, particularly citing its universal member-
ship (Hare et al., 2010; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010; Müller, 2010; La 
Viña, 2010) and noting that fragmentation of the climate regime could 
create opportunities for forum shopping, a loss of transparency, and 
reduced ambition (Biermann et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2010; Biermann, 
2010). Other studies have examined (1) the evolution of multilateral-
ism (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010) and possible transitional arrange-
ments from fragmentation to a comprehensive agreement (Winkler 
and Vorster, 2007), and (2) how to manage fragmentation so that it 
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may become synergistic rather than prone to conﬂict (Biermann et al., 
2009; Oberthür, 2009).
13.4.2 Current features, issues, and elements of 
international cooperation
The policy architecture for climate change raises a number of speciﬁc 
questions about the structure of international cooperation. Four spe-
ciﬁc elements are of particular contemporary relevance: legal binding-
ness; goals, actions, and metrics; ﬂexibility mechanisms; and participa-
tion, equity, and effort-sharing methods. These four elements deal with 
the key questions of how much an agreement insists on compliance 
with its obligations, what obligations it establishes, how ﬂexible the 
implementation of the obligations may be, and how the obligations 
may vary across actors and situations. The discussion below focuses on 
mitigation of GHG emissions, but the four key elements apply as well 
to adaptation, ﬁnancing, and other potential topics of international 
agreements on climate change. For example, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) 
(UNFCCC, 1992) calls on “all parties” to formulate and implement 
both “measures to mitigate climate change” by reducing net GHG 
emissions, and “measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate 
change.” Understanding what is meant by such obligations requires 
examining these four key elements. 
13.4.2.1 Legal bindingness
States choose whether to join an agreement, and can withdraw from 
an agreement, so international agreements exist by consent of the 
parties (Waltz, 1979; Thompson, 2006). Having said this, international 
agreements among states (national governments) may be more or less 
‘legally binding’ on their parties. The degree of ‘bindingness’ depends 
on both the legal form of the agreement and the costs to the state of 
noncompliance.
Among the indicators of legal bindingness in the agreement itself are 
(1) legal type (e. g., treaty, protocol to a treaty, decision of the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties, and political declaration); (2)  mandatory 
commitments, i. e., whether a commitment is ‘expressed in obliga-
tory language’ (e. g., ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ vs. ‘should’ or ‘aim’) (Werksman, 
2010)(Werksman, 2010)(Werksman, 2010); (3) speciﬁcity, i. e., “…
whether [commitments] are expressed in sufﬁcient detail to accu-
rately assess compliance”; and (4) the type of enforcement procedures, 
mechanisms, and sanctions designed to implement an agreement by 
monitoring, reviewing, and encouraging compliance with commit-
ments (Werksman, 2010).
International agreements may be labelled ‘hard law’ (such as trea-
ties, their protocols, and contracts) that are legally binding on the 
Table 13.1 | Taxonomy of legal bindingness: examples of commitments in international agreements for climate change.
Legal character (noting 
relevance of indicators 1 – 4 
discussed in the text)
Description Example
Mandatory provision in a 
legally binding agreement with 
enforcement mechanisms. (1) – (4)
A legally binding commitment can be subject to a 
compliance regime, with authority to sanction non-
compliant parties. Enforcement can also come in the 
form of reciprocity for non-compliant actions.
The targets and timetables in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) and the Marrakech Accords 
(UNFCCC, 2001), with speciﬁc quantitative emissions limits, a compliance system that sanctions non-
compliance, and ﬂexibility mechanisms. (Outside the climate arena, the World Trade Organization is 
the most prominent example of this type.)
Mandatory provision in a legally 
binding agreement without 
enforcement mechanism. (1) and 
(2); possibly (3); but not (4)
‘Legally binding,’ but subject only to self-enforcement. Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC (1992), mandating, inter alia, national emissions inventories, measures to 
mitigate, and measures to facilitate adaptation.
Non-mandatory provision in a 
legally binding agreement. (1), but 
not (2) – (4)
Such a provision does not demand compliance, 
but carries somewhat more weight than a political 
agreement.
Article 4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC (1992) commit developed countries to adopt policies and 
measures to limit their net GHG emissions (a mandatory provision); 4.2(a) then ‘recognizes’ that 
returning these emissions to earlier levels by the year 2000 would be desirable, and 4.2(b) provides 
the ‘aim’ of returning to 1990 levels (both non-mandatory provisions).
Mandatory provision in a 
non-legally binding (‘political’) 
agreement. (2), possibly (3); but 
not (1) or (4)
Such a provision may induce the party to act, through 
norms, reputation, and reciprocity. 
The pledges on targets and actions submitted by states pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 
2009a) and Cancún Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010). (Outside the climate arena, the moratorium on high 
seas driftnet ﬁshing is treated as binding by many states, even though United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolutions are not binding.)
Non-mandatory provision in a 
non-legally binding (‘political’) 
agreement.
None of (1) – (4)
An aim or aspiration, expressed in hortatory, non-
binding language. This type of provision typically 
includes one or more statements of principles or norms.
Targets set in the Noordwijk Declaration (1989), at a ministerial conference on climate change held 
prior to the 1992 Rio summit.
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parties, or ‘soft law’ (such as declarations, resolutions, and guide-
lines) that are not legally binding. But the reality is more complex 
(Baxter, 1980; Abbott et  al., 2000; Bodansky, 2010a; Guzman and 
Meyer, 2010). Across types of agreements, commitments may be 
more or less legally binding; for example, although treaties often 
contain mandatory commitments, a treaty may also contain horta-
tory provisions, such as aims and pledges, which are understood to 
be aspirational; while a political declaration may nonetheless con-
tain provisions that raise strong expectations and consequences for 
failure (Raustiala, 2005). Some commitments may be speciﬁc and 
subject to monitoring and accountability, while others are vague 
and difﬁcult to verify (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Further, across types 
of agreements, the enforcement mechanism may be weak or rigor-
ous, ranging from inaction to admonishments to trade sanctions to 
military force.
The bindingness of an agreement depends on the costs to a state of 
nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal — as well as to legal 
form. These costs include, as discussed above (see Section 13.3.4), 
not only the costs of sanctions imposed by the agreement’s enforce-
ment mechanism, but also the costs incurred from the state’s loss of 
reputation and from the loss of mutual cooperation by other states. 
Reputational costs and lost-cooperation costs can inﬂuence states to 
adhere to (initially informal) norms; hence strong norms with high 
costs of violation are sometimes called ‘binding’ (Hoffmann, 2005, 
2011; MacLeod, 2010). 
Table 13.1 provides a taxonomy of the bindingness of international 
agreements (Bodansky, 2003, 2009). The usage of ‘mandatory’ in the 
table refers to the speciﬁc wording of the commitment — not to a 
state’s choice of whether to participate or not. 
Research has not resolved whether or under what circumstances a 
more binding agreement elicits more effective national policy. In gen-
eral, a more legally binding commitment is more subject to monitoring 
and enforcement (both internationally and domestically), is more likely 
to require ratiﬁcation by domestic institutions, and signals a greater 
seriousness by states (Bodansky, 2003; Rajamani, 2009). These factors 
increase the costs of violation (through enforcement and sanctions 
at international and domestic scales, the loss of mutual cooperation 
by others, and the loss of reputation and credibility in future negotia-
tions).
On the other hand, there may be situations where there is a tradeoff 
between legal bindingness and ambition (stringency of commitments). 
Because greater legal bindingness implies greater costs of violation, 
states may prefer more legally binding agreements to embody less 
ambitious commitments, and may be willing to accept more ambi-
tious commitments when they are less legally binding. (Rajamani, 
2009; Raustiala, 2005; Guzman and Meyer, 2010; Albin, 2001; Grasso 
and Sacchi, 2011; Bodansky, 1999; Bernstein, 2005; See also Sections 
13.2.2.5 and 13.3.3) 
13.4.2.2 Goals and targets
Most agreements that advance international cooperation to address 
climate change incorporate goals. ‘Goals’ are ‘long-term and systemic’ 
(as contrasted with absolute emissions-reduction ‘targets,’ which may 
ﬂow logically from the goals but which are ‘near-term and speciﬁc’) 
(IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). The goals of an international agreement 
might include, for example, stabilization levels (or a reduction in a 
previously agreed stabilization level) of atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs — or reductions in impacts of climate change. 
Targets can be classiﬁed according to whether they require absolute 
GHG cuts relative to a historical baseline, or reductions relative to 
economic output, population growth, or business-as-usual projections 
(intensity targets). In recent literature on targets´ metrics, there has 
been a focus on whether or not intensity targets are superior to ﬁxed 
ones when there is uncertainty about the future (Jotzo and Pezzey, 
2007; Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010; Sue Wing et al., 2009; Conte 
Grand, 2013). There are tradeoffs between reduced uncertainty about 
the cost of abatement, associated with intensity targets, and reduced 
uncertainty about environmental effectiveness, associated with abso-
lute targets (Ellerman and Wing, 2003; Herzog, Timothy et al., 2006). 
In the UNFCCC climate negotiations, examples of ﬁxed targets are 
Kyoto Annex B country-emission reductions by 2008 – 2012 with 
respect to 1990 levels, and Copenhagen pledges (Some of the devel-
oped countries propose emissions reductions by 2020 with respect to 
some base year — 1990, 2000, or 2005 — while some of the develop-
ing economies suggest reductions by 2020 with respect to their busi-
ness-as-usual trends). On the other hand, intensity targets have been 
proposed by China and India: their pledge is a reduction of carbon 
intensity (i. e., emissions / gross domestic product (GDP)) between 40 
and 45 % and 20 and 25 % respectively by 2020 with respect to 2005 
(Steckel et al., 2011; Zhang, 2011; Yuan et al., 2012; Cao, 2010b; Gov-
ernment of India, 2012). Another carbon target linked to GDP was the 
one planned by Argentina in 1999 (Barros and Conte Grand, 2002).
13.4.2.3 Flexible mechanisms
One focus of international negotiations has been enabling states to 
have ﬂexibility in meeting obligations. In principle, there are numerous 
ways this could be achieved. For example, there could be provisions 
for renegotiating targets. The most often-cited beneﬁt of ﬂexibility 
is reduction in the costs associated with GHG-emissions reductions. 
However, Hafner-Burton et al. (2012) explore whether increased ﬂex-
ibility in designing obligations for states helps them align their inter-
national obligations more readily with domestic political constraints. 
In existing interstate agreements, ﬂexibility has been pursued princi-
pally through mechanisms that create markets. The rationale for these 
is to lower the cost of reducing emissions, relative to traditional regula-
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tory regimes, as they direct investments in emissions reductions toward 
lower-cost abatement opportunities available in various jurisdictions. 
Such ﬂexible mechanisms can involve trading emissions allowances 
under a ﬁxed overall cap, generating offset credits, or combinations of 
the two. Generally, offset credits can be generated through project-based 
mechanisms or crediting of policies and sectoral actions. The former have 
been developed since the mid-1990s, with the CDM as by far the larg-
est programme (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012); the literature assessing 
the CDM is reviewed in Section 13.13.1.1.) The latter are still being dis-
cussed with regards to post-2012 climate policies in the context of ‘new 
market mechanisms’ related to mitigation policies in developing coun-
tries (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)). Additionally, 
inter-temporal ﬂexibility may be added to an allowance-trading regime 
through banking and borrowing of allowances, by which regulated enti-
ties may transfer current obligations to the future or vice versa. However, 
the environmental effectiveness and distributional impact of carbon mar-
kets have also raised concerns (Lohmann, 2008; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009).
The Kyoto Protocol provides three ﬂexible mechanisms: Joint Imple-
mentation (JI), the CDM, and international emissions trading (IET) (in 
Articles 6, 12, and 17, respectively). Joint Implementation and CDM 
both generate offset credits from projects that reduce GHG emissions, 
and IET allows for government-to-government trading of Kyoto emis-
sions allowances. Most attention in the research on these mechanisms 
has focused on the CDM, in part because of the volume of trading 
compared to the others (on the relatively small volume in Kyoto emis-
sions trading, see Aldrich and Koerner, 2012).
The credits from JI and CDM may be used by Annex B countries to 
meet their emissions-reduction obligations. In practice, the key 
driver of investment in CDM projects has been the European Union 
(EU) Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which allows regulated entities 
(companies or installations) to use credits from the CDM (referred to 
as ‘Certiﬁed Emission Reductions’ (CERs) and from JI (referred to as 
‘Emissions Reduction Units’ or ERUs) to meet a portion of their ETS 
obligations (see Sections 13.6.1 and 14.4.2.1 for details). The EU ETS 
has accounted for about 84 % of demand for CERs and ERUs from 
2008 – 2012. The next largest source of demand for CERs and ERUs 
comes from Japan, at 15 % of demand (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012).
Market-based ﬂexibility mechanisms are evolving. Japan is pursu-
ing bilateral crediting approaches under its Joint Crediting Mecha-
nism / Bilateral Offset Crediting Mechanism (Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, Government of Japan, 2012). COP-17 in Durban in 2011 
mandated two approaches be pursued in the UNFCCC negotiations 
leading to a new international agreement in late 2015: (1) top-down, 
operating under authority of the COP (‘new market-based mecha-
nism’), which, as noted, focuses in large part on sectoral crediting; 
and (2) bottom-up, developed by countries ‘in accordance with their 
national circumstances’ (‘framework for various approaches’), which 
attempts to coordinate heterogeneous policies across countries. 
COP-18 in Doha, Qatar, in 2012 reiterated and developed further 
details regarding these two approaches (UNFCCC, 2013b).
13.4.2.4 Equitable methods for effort sharing 
While universal participation might be desirable in principle, actors 
participate in a context of heterogeneity in both economic capacity 
and emissions levels. Variations in both wealth and emissions have 
evolved over time; for example, many countries classiﬁed in the 1992 
UNFCCC as developing (non-Annex I) have since experienced increas-
ing incomes and increasing emissions (in some cases exceeding the 
incomes and / or emissions of some countries classiﬁed in 1992 as 
developed (Annex  I)). These variations and continued differences are 
discussed further in Section 4.1.2.2. As to participation in international 
agreements, in general, a country is less likely to participate in an inter-
national agreement the more the country perceives the agreement to 
be unfair to its own economic and environmental interests. Addressing 
climate change equitably can thus be central to pursuing broad partici-
pation in climate agreements.
There is disagreement, however, about how to put equity principles 
into practice in international agreements. The UNFCCC adopted the 
principle of CBDRRC of parties (Article 3.1) (UNFCCC, 1992). Several 
different approaches have been advanced for putting this principle into 
practice. Deleiul (2012) argues that CBDRRC initially facilitated agree-
ment and participation in the UNFCCC, but has become more conten-
tious as national variations in income and emissions have evolved over 
time (hence Deleiul sees promise in the Durban Platform, which calls 
for mitigation contributions from all parties in a new treaty concluded 
by 2015, to take effect by 2020).
Section 4.6.2 elaborates these different approaches in detail, and sug-
gests they can be broadly divided into those that start with the sta-
tus quo of emissions, that thus focus on the question of ‘effort-shar-
ing’ or ‘burden sharing,’ and those that start with a speciﬁc account 
of ‘rights’ to GHG emissions (such as equal per capita or equal per 
GDP emissions) and derive targets for countries from that formula 
(known as ‘resource-sharing’). Rao (2011) refers to these as burden 
sharing vs. resource-sharing equity principles. Burden sharing methods 
are reviewed in (Jotzo and Pezzey, 2007; den Elzen and Höhne, 2008, 
2010; Winkler et al., 2009; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Mearns and Nor-
ton, 2010; Frankel, 2010; Ekholm et al., 2010; Marschinski and Eden-
hofer, 2010; Cao, 2010c; Tavoni et al., 2013; den Elzen et al., 2013b; 
Höhne et  al., 2013). ‘Resource-sharing’ approaches are examined in 
(Höhne et al., 2006; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Baer et al., 2009; Kanitkar 
et al., 2010; Jayaraman et al., 2011; Rao, 2011; Kartha et al., 2012).
Section 6.3.6.6 elaborates a wide range of possible approaches and 
quantiﬁes them in terms of levels of emissions reductions for various 
world regions. One recent example is Winkler et al. (2013), which eval-
uates several approaches for mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change, and suggests that these call for more mitigation in wealth-
ier countries. Recent research is also comparing various measures of 
equity for climate policy within developing countries (Casillas and 
Kammen, 2012). Section 13.13 assesses existing and proposed agree-
ments in light of these criteria. 
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Table 13.2 | Description of recent proposals for climate change policy architectures.
Proposed Architecture (recent references) Description
Strong multilateralism
Indicator-linked national participation and commitments  
(Baer et al., 2009; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and 
Frankel, 2011; WBGU, 2009; Cao, 2010c; BASIC Project, 2007; Winkler 
et al., 2011)
All countries adopt emissions targets and timetables, with time of participation and / or target levels based on one or more 
indicators (per capita income, economic cost as percentage of national income, historical emissions). Targets can both be 
reductions in emissions growth rates as well as absolute reductions.
Per capita commitments  
(Agarwala, 2010)
Countries implement equal per capita emissions targets, resulting in signiﬁcant emissions increases for many developing 
countries, and signiﬁcant decreases for industrialized countries.
Top-down burden sharing  
(Baer et al., 2009; Kartha et al., 2012; Cao, 2010c; Kanitkar et al., 2010; 
Jayaraman et al., 2011)
Emissions targets based on equal per capita emissions, mitigation burden proportional to cumulative emissions and ability 
to pay, countries with similar economic circumstances have similar burdens, and poorest countries and individuals exempt 
from obligations. 
Sectoral approaches  
(Sawa, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2008; Barrett, 2010; den Elzen et al., 2008)
Countries develop national emissions targets by sector, and governments make international commitments to implement 
policies to achieve targets (Sawa, 2010) or based on staged sectoral approach (den Elzen et al., 2008); can be developed 
in a portfolio of treaties (Barrett, 2010). Alternatively, developing countries pledge to meet voluntary sectoral targets; 
reductions beyond targets can be sold to industrialized countries (Schmidt et al., 2008).
Portfolio system of treaties  
(Barrett, 2010; Stewart et al., 2012)
Separate international treaties concluded for different sectors, different GHGs. Treaty obligations apply globally, and 
developing countries offered ﬁnancial assistance to aid compliance and induce participation. Trade restrictions used to 
enforce agreements in trade-sensitive sectors.
Harmonized national policies
Global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010) The EU ETS serves as prototype for a global emissions trading system. Design informed by EU ETS experience, which has a 
central coordinating institution (the European Commission), mechanisms to expand participation to new Member States, 
and effective ﬁnancial ﬂows resulting from trading. Distributional impacts addressed by speciﬁc design features.
International carbon tax  
(Cooper, 2010; Nordhaus, 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009)
A common charge levied on all global GHG emissions, most practically upstream (at oil reﬁneries, gas pipelines, mine 
mouths, etc.). Each country collects and keeps its own revenues. Charges rise over time according to schedule to induce 
cost-effective technological change. Distributional impacts addressed by allocation of revenues.
Hybrid market-based approaches (Fell et al., 2012) A tradable emissions permit system includes a price ceiling, a price ﬂoor, or a combination of the two (a price collar). 
System functions like a hybrid of a tax and a tradable permit system. The price ceiling (often called a ‘safety valve’) can take 
the form of unlimited allowances sold at a ﬁxed price or a limited allowance reserve.
Decentralized architectures and coordinated national policies
Linked domestic cap-and-trade systems 
(Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Jaffe et al., 2009; Bernstein et al., 2010; Metcalf 
and Weisbach, 2012; Ranson and Stavins, 2013)
Domestic and international emissions trading and emissions reduction credit systems linked, directly or indirectly, to 
achieve cost savings. Direct linkages require more coordination, while indirect linkages (of cap-and-trade systems through 
a common credit system, for example) require less. Linkage achieved independently (as a bottom-up architecture), as a 
transition to a new top-down architecture, or as an element of a broader climate agreement.
Linked heterogeneous policy instruments 
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012)
Domestic and international emissions trading systems linked with carbon tax systems, allowing emissions permits from 
one country to be remitted as tax payments, and / or allowing payments in excess of the tax in one country to satisfy the 
requirement to own a permit in another. Alternatively, ﬁxed emissions standards (or even technology standards) linked with 
taxes or tradable permit systems across countries or regions.
Technology-oriented agreements 
(Newell, 2009, 2010a; de Coninck et al., 2008)
International climate change agreements to cover issues such as knowledge sharing and coordination, joint research and 
development, technology transfer, and / or technology deployment mandates or incentives. Distributional impacts affected by 
intellectual property sharing rules.
13.4.3 Recent proposals for future climate 
change policy architecture
An extensive literature has examined what options could be pursued 
‘post-2012’, after the end of the ﬁrst commitment period (CP1) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The literature now contains several surveys of diverse 
proposals (see summaries of pre-2007 literature in Höhne et al., 2008; 
Moncel et al., 2011; Aldy and Stavins, 2010b; Rajamani, 2011b, 2012a; 
IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13). Table 13.2 describes recent proposals for cli-
mate policy architectures. Qualitative and quantitative performance 
assessments of these proposals, where available, are surveyed in Sec-
tion 13.13. 
13.4.4 The special case of international 
cooperation regarding carbon 
dioxide removal and solar radiation 
management
Since the publication of AR4, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar 
radiation management (SRM) have received increasing attention as a 
means to address climate change, distinct from mitigation and adapta-
tion. These two approaches are often collectively referred to as ‘geoen-
gineering’ or ‘climate engineering’ (for more detail, see Working Group 
(WG) I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Sec-
tion 6.9). Carbon dioxide removal refers to techniques to extract GHGs 
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directly from the atmosphere and store them in sinks, or to directly 
enhance such sinks. Solar radiation management aims to reduce the 
amount of solar radiation absorbed by the Earth’s surface. Proposed 
SRM projects can be atmospheric (e. g., cloud brightening or adding 
reﬂective sulphate particles to the lower stratosphere), terrestrial (e. g., 
enhancing the albedo of the ground, or painting pavements and roof 
materials white to reﬂect solar radiation) and space-based (e. g., plac-
ing mirrors in space). See WGI report, Section 7.7, for details of these.
Some SRM options (e. g., injecting sulphate particles into the lower 
stratosphere) may be inexpensive enough for individual states (Bar-
rett, 2008a) and even non-state actors, such as wealthy individuals, to 
undertake (Barrett, 2008a; Victor, 2008; Lin, 2009; Victor et al., 2009; 
Bodansky, 2011b). CDR and other SRM approaches might need to be 
implemented by numerous countries in order to be effective (Hum-
phreys, 2011). Some SRM options may also have speciﬁc regional 
impacts (e. g., regional temperature and precipitation effects, leaf 
albedo enhancement, or ocean circulation modiﬁcation), providing 
direct and perhaps excludable beneﬁts to actors undertaking them 
(Millard-Ball, 2012) and external costs to others (Ricke et  al., 2010, 
2013). See also WGII 19.5.4 for detailed discussion of the risks of SRM.
Smaller-scale actors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change 
impacts may perceive advantages to be ﬁrst-movers with SRM, in 
order to ensure both global climate protection and a favourable dis-
tribution of regional impacts from their selected SRM projects (Ricke 
et  al., 2010; Millard-Ball, 2012). Hardly any cooperation might be 
needed for SRM’s development and deployment — indeed, countries 
facing severe impacts might rush to launch a preferred SRM project 
(Millard-Ball, 2012). If the beneﬁts of such an SRM project outweigh 
the adverse side-effects, and its costs are indeed low, then such an 
SRM project might be desirable. But such unilateral action could also 
produce signiﬁcant adverse side-effects and costs for other actors, if 
the SRM option chosen is one that secures climate beneﬁts for one 
part of the world while creating climate or other damages in other 
parts (Lin, 2009). Solar radiation management may also be ineffective 
in mitigating some climate impacts, for example the acidiﬁcation of 
oceans from absorption of excessive CO2 (Humphreys, 2011). Further, 
SRM does not reduce concentrations of atmospheric GHGs, and inter-
rupting SRM after concentrations have risen signiﬁcantly could allow 
temperatures to rise rapidly (see also Smith and Rasch, 2012).
Solar radiation management poses the converse of the collective 
action and governance challenges arising from emissions-reduction 
efforts: rather than mobilizing hesitant action to limit emissions, SRM 
governance involves restraining hasty unilateral action (Victor, 2008; 
Victor et al., 2009; Virgoe, 2009; House of Commons Science and Tech-
nology Committee, 2010; Lloyd and Oppenheimer, 2014; Millard-Ball, 
2012; Bodansky, 2011b). One of the main issues for international 
cooperation will be to develop institutions and norms to address 
potential negative consequences of SRM in other social or environ-
mental ﬁelds, or for parts of the world either not protected or nega-
tively affected by the SRM option chosen. Thus, some analysts have 
recommended that international governance be organized for SRM 
research and testing, to learn about the beneﬁts and side-effects of 
SRM options, to develop institutions to decide if and when to deploy 
SRM, to learn how to maintain SRM capabilities, and to monitor and 
evaluate this research and its use (Victor et al., 2009; Blackstock and 
Long, 2010; Lin, 2009; Solar Radiation Management Governance ini-
tiative, 2011). 
Some existing international agreements may be relevant to geoengi-
neering. The UNFCCC already includes a provision, Article 4.1(f), requir-
ing assessment of the adverse impacts of mitigation measures. The 
UN Convention on Law of the Sea contains important provisions on 
environmental protection (Redgwell, 2006), and may have increased 
signiﬁcance with regards to the governance of marine-based carbon 
dioxide storage or geo-engineering options (Virgoe, 2009). Under the 
London Convention and Protocol, the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO) held that, given the uncertainty surrounding negative 
impacts, ocean fertilization other than ‘legitimate scientiﬁc research’ 
ought not be permitted (Reynolds, 2011; IMO resolution LC-LP.1, 2008 
and LC-LP.2, 2010). Several multilateral fora have recently taken up 
the issue of SRM. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
adopted a decision calling for a moratorium on ‘geo-engineering 
activities that may affect biodiversity’ (Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, 2010; Tollefson, 2010). Other existing multilateral treaties and 
agreements that may relate to geo-engineering include: the 1977 UN 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modiﬁcation Techniques (the ENMOD Convention) 
(though it restricts only ‘hostile’ actions); the convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (UNECE, 1991); 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (US Department of State, 2002); and 
ongoing developments in human rights law and in environmental law 
(Reynolds, 2011; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012). Further, 
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002) may apply to the use of sun-
deﬂecting mirrors in space.
13.5 Multilateral and 
bilateral agreements 
and institutions across 
different scales
This section builds on the description of the climate policy landscape 
in Section 13.3.1 and plausible climate policy architectures in Section 
13.4. It considers the experience and evolution of international and 
transnational cooperation on climate change between states and non-
state actors since 2007 when the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC was published. 
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13.5.1 International cooperation among 
governments
13.5.1.1 Climate agreements under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC’s universal membership provides it with a high degree 
of legitimacy among parties around the world (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 
and McGee, 2013). Steps taken under the Convention and its Kyoto 
Protocol have led to more extensive action than under other forms of 
international cooperation on climate change.
Evolution of the multilateral climate regime since AR4 
At COP-13 in Bali in 2007, discussions on long-term cooperative action 
under the Convention turned into negotiations under the Bali Action 
Plan (UNFCCC, 2007a). Also in Bali, countries agreed to MRV of mitiga-
tion commitments or actions by developed countries and mitigation 
actions by developing countries and support for those. Under the 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009a) and Cancún Agreements 
(UNFCCC, 2010), Forty-two developed countries (including the 27 EU 
member states) submitted absolute reduction commitments against 
various base years in the form of quantiﬁ ed economy-wide emissions 
targets for 2020. Fifty-ﬁ ve developing countries and the African Union 
submitted information on NAMAs to the UNFCCC (as of May 2013), 
which are subject to domestic and international MRV. These 55 devel-
oping countries expressed their proposed goals in a variety of ways 
(e. g., relative emission reductions, deviation below business-as-usual, 
absolute reductions, and goals related to carbon neutrality); 16 pro-
posed economy-wide goals for mitigation of GHGs. Since 2010, no 
major economy has signiﬁ cantly changed its emission reduction pro-
posal under the UNFCCC, though some countries have clariﬁ ed their 
assumptions and business-as-usual emission levels (UNEP, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013b; den Elzen et  al., 2013a; Sharma and Desgain, 2013; 
UNFCCC, 2013c). Figure 13.3 displays the different categories of 
actions and pledges taken by countries under the Cancún Agreements 
and the Kyoto Protocol as of September 2013.
 
Figure 13.3 | Global map showing the different categories of reduction proposals or commitments for 2020 under the Cancún Agreements and Kyoto Protocol, based on UNEP 
(2012, 2013b) with underlying data supported by UNFCCC (2011b, 2012d, 2013c).
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, termed as policy-, sectoral-, 
and project-level actions 
Countries with no pledges
Developed countries with Quantiﬁed Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments (QELROs) 
under the Kyoto Protocol and Cancún agreements
Developed countries with Quantiﬁed Economy-Wide Emission Reduction Targets (QEERTs) 
under Cancún agreements
Developing countries with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions stating their impact on greenhouse gas emissions 
(Reduction relative to BAU; Reduction in carbon intensity of GDP, compared to 2005 levels)
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COP-17 in Durban in 2011 produced the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (UNFCCC, 2011a), in which the delegates agreed 
“to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instru-
ment or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011a) and “complete its work 
as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force at the twenty-ﬁrst session of the Conference of the Parties and 
for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020” (UNFCCC, 
2011a).
Evolution of coalitions among UNFCCC parties 
New and existing coalitions of countries have engaged in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, each presenting coordinated positions. Several 
distinct coalitions of developing countries have formed to negotiate 
their divergent priorities. Examples include the G77 & China, which 
represents 131 developing countries operating in the UNFCCC and 
the UN system more broadly and which contains sub-groups such 
as the African Group, the Least Developed Countries, and the Arab 
Group; the Alliance of Independent Latin American and Caribbean 
states; and a ‘like-minded developing country’ group that included 
China, India, and Saudi Arabia (Grubb, 2013). Other coalitions orga-
nized to inﬂuence UNFCCC negotiations include the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), which has played a signiﬁcant role in UNFCCC 
negotiations since the early 1990s; various groupings of industrial-
ized countries, including the Umbrella Group; the Environmental 
Integrity Group, which was the ﬁrst coalition to include both indus-
trialized and developing countries; the BASIC countries (Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China) (Olsson et  al., 2010; Rong, 2010; Nhamo, 
2010); the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which has increased the 
salience of forests in climate negotiations; and other active coalitions 
not limited to the climate context, for example the Comision Cen-
troamericana de Ambiente y Desarollo and the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Americas. 
Negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol
Negotiations on a second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol were launched in Montréal in 2005. These negotiations 
concluded in late 2012 at COP-18 in Doha, Qatar with a decision 
and amendment establishing the second commitment period of the 
Protocol for 2013 – 2020. However, a number of Annex  I countries 
(Belarus, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, the United States, 
and Ukraine) decided not to participate in the second commitment 
period. The other Annex I countries (Australia, the EU and its member 
states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Swit-
zerland, and Ukraine) adopted quantiﬁed emission reduction com-
mitments (Figure 13.3), covering 13 % of global GHG emissions at 
2010 emission levels (UNFCCC, 2012d; JRC / PBL, 2013). At COP-18 
in Doha in 2012, parties also agreed upon rules for transferring sur-
plus Kyoto emissions allowances from the ﬁrst to the second period. 
These rules are assessed in Section 13.13.1.1, and the evolution of 
market-based ﬂexibility mechanisms in the UNFCCC negotiations is 
discussed in Section 13.4.2.3.
New institutions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have brought about a number 
of new institutions focused on adaptation (funding and coordina-
tion), ﬁnance, and technology. The Adaptation Fund was established 
to provide direct access to ﬁnancing for developing countries and is 
governed by a majority of developing countries. The Adaptation Com-
mittee was established to coordinate previously fragmented aspects 
of adaptation policy under the Convention, with modalities and link-
ages to other institutions to be deﬁned (UNFCCC, 2011c) (see Section 
13.11.1.1). The GCF is accountable to the Conference of the Parties, 
and, when it is fully operational, may be a major channel for the provi-
sion of climate ﬁnance (Brown et al., 2011). The Standing Committee 
on Finance supports the parties in coordinating and providing account-
ability for the ﬁnancial mechanism of the Convention. The Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), together with the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC), was established to exchange information 
regarding technology development and transfer for adaptation and 
mitigation (UNFCCC, 2011c). 
13.5.1.2 Other UN climate-related forums
Acting on climate change may require functions other than negotiation 
under the UNFCCC or other forms of high-level cooperation, such as 
analytical support and implementation assistance for mitigation and 
adaptation efforts. A diverse set of forums both within and outside the 
UN system has taken up the issue of climate change since AR4, pos-
sibly contributing to broader institutional learning and effectiveness 
(Depledge, 2006; Stewart et al., 2012).
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has had a natural 
concern with climate change for many years, given its mission, and it 
collaborates closely with the UNFCCC. Since AR4, UNEP has provided 
increasingly signiﬁcant analytical support to the international process, 
in part through its emissions-gap reports (UNEP, 2010, 2012, 2013b; 
Höhne et al., 2012b; Hof et al., 2013), but also through a wide range of 
other analytical efforts and support for institution building.
United Nations forums beyond the UNFCCC are increasingly address-
ing funding for adaptation and mitigation. Fragmentation in the vari-
ous objectives, conditions, and eligibility requirements of the different 
funds may make it difﬁcult for developing countries to identify and 
access appropriate funding (Czarnecki and Guilanpour, 2009). The lit-
erature examines the relationship between adaptation and develop-
ment ﬁnance, including concerns about measuring ofﬁcial develop-
ment assistance (ODA) and how much adaptation funding is ‘new and 
additional’ (Stadelmann et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011). A number of 
developing countries have established “national funding entities to 
coordinate domestic and international funding for adaptation with 
development funding” (Smith et al., 2011). 
Other UN agencies have also addressed the connections of climate 
change with human development (UNDP, 2007; UNDESA, 2009), the 
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CO2 emissions gap (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012; Höhne 
et  al., 2012b), ﬁnance (AGF, 2010), and human rights (see Section 
13.5.2.2).
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric 
Ozone Layer (concluded in 1987 under UN auspices) — and the Pro-
tocol’s subsequent amendments, adjustments, and decisions — have 
also contributed to reductions in GHGs. One notable proposed amend-
ment would accelerate the phaseout of substitutes of ozone depleting 
substances that are also strong GHGs (Mauritius & Micronesia, 2009; 
Velders et al., 2012). 
13.5.1.3 Non-UN forums
Climate change is increasingly addressed in forums for international 
cooperation outside of the UN. The AR4 (IPCC, 2007, Chapter 13) 
assessed several partnerships focused on particular themes, technolo-
gies, or regions. 
Some international partnerships have deﬁned themselves as comple-
ments to the UNFCCC rather than as alternatives. For example, the 
REDD+ Partnership helps coordinate measures for reducing emissions 
from deforestation and degradation (REDD) in the UNFCCC process. 
The Partnership focuses on conservation, sustainable forest man-
agement, and forest carbon stock enhancement. In 2010, more than 
50 countries signed a non-binding agreement to pledge more than 
4 billion USD to REDD+ (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010). Michaelowa 
(2012a) and Stewart el al. (2009) describe multiple avenues for cli-
mate change ﬁnancing to assist transitions to low-carbon technolo-
gies, such as through the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA). Established in 2009, IRENA seeks to advance the develop-
ment and transfer of renewable energy technologies, with a focus on 
ﬁnancing renewable energy in its 163 member and signatory states 
(plus the European Union) (Florini, 2011; International Renewable 
Energy Agency, 2013).
The MEF, organized by the United States, provides a forum for informal 
consultation. Its members — Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the Euro-
pean Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Repub-
lic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States — together account for about 70 % of global GHG 
emissions (JRC / PBL, 2013). Its meetings are intended to advance dis-
cussion of international climate change agreements (MEF, 2009), and 
it has generated a related Clean Energy Ministerial. MEF participants 
recognize the group as a venue for discussion rather than a forum for 
negotiating binding agreements. The MEF produces a chairs’ summary 
instead of formally agreed text (Leal-Arcas, 2011). The existence of the 
MEF may be evidence of an overall increase in the fragmentation of 
global environmental governance (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Bier-
mann, 2010). Some may also be concerned about a small set of large 
countries reaching even informal decisions that affect a much larger 
set, and some may not be comfortable with a process chaired by a 
single nation (Stavins, 2010).
The Group of Twenty (G20) ﬁnance ministers from industrialized 
and developing economies could have the capacity to address cli-
mate ﬁnance, building on its core mission to discuss economic and 
ﬁnance policy. The make-up of the G20 is similar to that of the MEF, 
with the addition of Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Houser 
(2010) ﬁnds that the G20 might help to accelerate the deployment of 
clean energy technology, help vulnerable countries adapt to climate 
change impacts, and help phase out inefﬁcient fossil-fuel subsidies. 
At its meeting in Pittsburgh in 2009 (G20, 2009), the G20 gave con-
siderable attention to climate change policy issues, in particular to 
fossil-fuel subsidies. Likewise, since 2005, the smaller Group of Eight 
(G8) heads of state and government have held a series of meetings 
relating to climate change and recognized the broad scientiﬁc view 
that the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial 
levels ought not exceed 2 °C (G8, 2009). Van de Graaf and Wsetphal 
(2011) explore both opportunities for and constraints on the G20 and 
G8 with regard to climate.
Two forums of growing importance, providing analytical support for 
international cooperation on climate change, are the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD. While the IEA has limited its mem-
bership to industrialized oil-importing countries (Scott, 1994; Goldthau 
and Witte, 2011), the OECD has granted membership to advanced 
developing countries. Both institutions have received increasingly 
strong mandates by their members to provide analytical support for 
climate change mitigation decisions. The OECD has a unit for eco-
nomic analysis of climate policy and impacts, and already plays a role 
in building knowledge (OECD, 2009). The IEA could play a key role to 
reduce uncertainty about countries’ performance by collecting, analyz-
ing, and comparing energy and industry-related emissions data (Har-
vard Project on Climate Agreements, 2010). The IEA and OECD have 
formed and jointly manage the Climate Change Expert Group, whose 
explicit mission is to provide analytical support on technical issues to 
the international negotiations.
The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action includes around 30 
industrialized and developing countries, which have met both dur-
ing and between formal sessions since 2009. The Dialogue is open to 
countries working toward an ambitious, comprehensive, and legally 
binding regime in the UNFCCC, and who are committed to domestic 
policy to reduce emissions. The aim of the Dialogue is to openly dis-
cuss positions, to increase understanding, and to explore areas where 
convergence and enhanced joint action could emerge (Oberthür, 
2011).
In February 2012, a group of seven partners (Bangladesh, Canada, 
Ghana, Mexico, Sweden, and the United States, together with the 
UNEP) launched a new ‘Climate and Clean Air Coalition’ as a forum 
for dialogue among state and non-state actors outside the UNFCCC 
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process. The goal of the Coalition is to reduce levels of black carbon, 
methane, and hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs) among its 34 state members 
(including the European Commission) in collaboration with nine inter-
national organizations and 29 non-state partners (as of September 
2013). The Coalition has received funding from a number of countries, 
including Canada, Japan, and the United States to implement projects 
(Blok et al., 2012; UNEP, 2013a). 
New initiatives on international cooperation for adaptation and its 
funding have also been created, such as the World Bank’s Pilot Pro-
gram on Climate Resilience, and the European Commission-established 
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which pledges regional and 
country-speciﬁc ﬁnance. 
13.5.2 Non-state international cooperation
13.5.2.1 Transnational cooperation among sub-national 
public actors
A prominent development since AR4 is the emergence of a large 
number of international agreements between non-state entities (den 
Elzen et al., 2011a; Höhne et al., 2012b; Hare et al., 2012). These are 
most commonly referred to as ‘transnational climate governance ini-
tiatives’ (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; 
Andonova et  al., 2009; Bulkeley et  al., 2012). In the most compre-
hensive survey, (Bulkeley et  al., 2012) document 60 of these initia-
tives, which can be grouped into four principal types: public-private 
partnerships, private sector governance initiatives, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) transnational initiatives, and sub-national trans-
national initiatives. The ﬁrst two, involving private actors, are dis-
cussed in Section 13.12. 
NGO transnational initiatives attempt to inﬂuence the activities of 
corporations directly through transnational partnerships, some of 
which involve collaboration with the private sector. They have set up 
certiﬁcation schemes for carbon offset credits, such as the Gold Stan-
dard, which is limited to renewable energy and demand-side energy 
efﬁciency projects, and the Community Carbon and Biodiversity Asso-
ciation standard, which aims to increase the quality of forestry credits 
(Bayon et al., 2007; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Certiﬁed offset cred-
its have commanded a price premium above other (‘standard’) credits 
(Sterk and Wittneben, 2006; Ellis et al., 2007; Nussbaumer, 2009; New-
ell and Paterson, 2010). These certiﬁcation schemes have been used 
for the Voluntary Carbon Market as well as for the CDM (Conte and 
Kotchen, 2010).
Sub-national transnational initiatives involve sub-national actors, 
such as city-level governments, collaborating at an international 
scale. One example of this form of cooperation is the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) — Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability network. This organization has taken action 
through its Cities for Climate Protection programme from 1993 and 
more recently through a partnership the C40 Cities Climate Leader-
ship Group (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Román, 2010; Bulkeley et al., 
2012). A World Mayors Summit in November 2010 had participation 
from 138 cities and agreed on a Global Cities Covenant on Climate, 
otherwise known as the Mexico City Pact. A related initiative, the 
‘carbonn’ Cities Climate Registry, is an effort of local governments to 
regularly measure, report, and verify cities’ actions on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (Chavez and Ramaswami, 2011; Ibrahim 
et al., 2012; Otto-Zimmermann and Balbo, 2012; Richardson, 2012). 
Recognition of local governments as governmental stakeholders in 
paragraph I.7 of the Cancún Agreements is a reﬂection of the grow-
ing role of sub-national transnational cooperation in the UNFCCC 
processes. 
Larger sub-national units have developed transnational collaborative 
schemes. Most notable are the North American sub-federal cap-and-
trade schemes, including the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The WCI 
was originally envisaged to link state and provincial cap-and-trade 
systems in seven western U. S. states and four Canadian provinces 
beginning in 2012. The original aim of the initiative was reducing 
GHG emissions by the member states and provinces to 15 % below 
2005 levels by 2020 (Rabe, 2007; WCI, 2007; Selin and VanDeveer, 
2009; Bernstein et al., 2010). While the U. S. state of California’s ETS 
began operating in January 2013, the launch of the WCI system has 
been delayed. The WCI currently includes only California and Québec, 
although Ontario, British Columbia, and Manitoba are considering 
accession. 
13.5.2.2 Cooperation around human rights and rights of 
nature
Human rights law could conceivably frame an approach to climate 
change (Bodansky, 2010b; Bell, 2013; Gupta, 2014). Some recent lit-
erature argues that a human rights framing helps ‘to counteract gross 
imbalances of power’ between states and individuals (Sinden, 2007; 
Bratspies, 2011; Akin, 2012). The human rights approach to climate 
change has been acknowledged by the UN Human Rights Council in 
its Resolution 7 / 23 and the Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights (UNHRC, 2008; Limon, 2009; OHCHR, 
2009). The literature discusses a variety of speciﬁc issues, including the 
implications for climate adaptation; the impacts of climate change on 
human rights to water, food, health, and development; obligations to 
undertake mitigation actions; and whether human rights law implies 
an obligation to receive climate refugees.
Refugees displaced from their homes due to climate change may strain 
the capacity of existing institutions (Biermann and Boas, 2008). How-
ever, policies to address climate refugees face legal hurdles, includ-
ing the issue of causality: who is to be held responsible, who is the 
rights-bearer, and the issue of standing (Limon, 2009). Proposals have 
been made in the literature for a new protocol to the UNFCCC, a new 
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convention, and funding mechanisms to address the issues associ-
ated with climate refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2008; Docherty and 
Giannini, 2009). Such efforts could build on the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the absence of coordinated 
efforts, the Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review of 
the Human Rights Council are advancing the human rights and climate 
change agenda (Cameron and Limon, 2012). 
In 2010, the government of Bolivia convened government and non-
government representatives in the World People’s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which culminated 
in a People’s Agreement (WPCCC and RME, 2010). The participation 
of social movements in international cooperation on climate change 
may enhance recognition of ‘radical climate justice’ (Roberts, 2011) 
and an approach to law that seeks to establish ‘rights of nature’ 
(Cullinan, 2002; Sandberg and Sandberg, 2010; Aguirre and Cooper, 
2010).
13.5.3 Advantages and disadvantages of 
different forums
The literature has considered the strengths and weaknesses of nego-
tiating climate policy across multiple forums and institutions. Some 
studies suggest that, in addition to its own action, the UNFCCC effect 
of catalyzing efforts by others and providing coherence to multiple ini-
tiatives may result in greater aggregate impact (Moncel and van Asselt, 
2012). Other literature suggests that ‘regime complexes’ may emerge 
from smaller ‘clubs’ and then expand (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Vic-
tor, 2011). Regimes need (external) incentives for participation and 
(internal) incentives for compliance (Aldy and Stavins, 2010c). A key 
advantage of smaller forums or ‘clubs’ may be greater efﬁciency in 
the negotiation process, as emphasized in the general political science 
literature on negotiations (for example, Oye, 1985). But the literature 
also reﬂects key disadvantages, including that such clubs lack univer-
sality and hence legitimacy (Moncel et al., 2011), and that the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of clubs may be undercut by leakage of emis-
sions sources to other countries outside the club (Babiker, 2005). Some 
have suggested clubs as a way forward outside the UNFCCC, while 
others suggest they could contribute to the UNFCCC, for example by 
assisting in catalyzing greater ambition (Weischer et  al., 2012). Sev-
eral smaller ‘clubs’ that cut across categories (e. g., public / private) and 
scales (from international to local) are assessed in Section 13.5.1.2. 
Flexibility is another advantage cited for smaller clubs. Climate change 
mitigation through ‘clubs’ is not necessarily superior (Keohane and Vic-
tor, 2011) and action through this form of cooperation has to date not 
brought about high levels of participation and action. Smaller clubs 
must address conﬂicts where the climate change regime intersects 
with other major policy regimes (Michonski and Levi, 2010). Analysis of 
existing clubs suggests they enable incremental change and suggests 
that a set of incentives (related to trade, investment, labour mobility, 
or access to ﬁnance) could turn these into ‘transformational clubs’ 
(Weischer et al., 2012).
In a fragmented world, linking multiple agreements into a coherent 
whole is a major challenge. The aggregate effectiveness (in terms of 
the criteria discussed in Section  13.2) of the landscape of climate 
agreements and related institutions (Figure 13.1) can be enhanced 
by coordinated linkages among multiple elements. The actual forms 
and effects of policy linkages, existing or future, must be evaluated in 
each context. Policy linkages across the landscape of agreements on 
climate change might take several forms, such as mandated action 
and reporting by subsidiary bodies, agreed links between institutions 
(e. g., memoranda of understanding), loose coordination, informa-
tion sharing, and delegation. The literature on transnational gover-
nance acknowledges a gap in that “interactions are understudied in 
all areas of transnational governance” (Weischer et al., 2012). Some 
characteristics of potential linkages may stimulate their formation, 
for example, competition among public and private governance 
regimes (Helfer and Austin, 2011), accountability (Bäckstrand, 2008; 
Ballesteros et  al., 2010), learning (Kolstad and Ulph, 2008), and 
experimentation. Related literatures suggest that other important 
characteristics of linkages across regime components may be reci-
procity (Saran, 2010), relationships of conﬂict or interpretation (ILC, 
2006), collaboration (Young, 2011), the catalytic role of the UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC, 2007a), NGOs as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sik-
kink, 1998), evaluation of policy approaches (Stewart and Wiener, 
2003; Greenstone, 2009), and delegation to other institutions (Green, 
2008). 
13.6 Linkages between 
international and 
regional cooperation
13.6.1 Linkages with the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
Due to the scale effects that occur when carbon markets are enlarged, 
market-based mechanisms may be an important means of regional 
policy integration. The largest carbon market is the EU ETS, which 
began operating in 2005, and now includes all 28 European Union 
member states and is linked with the Norwegian system. The EU ETS is 
described and evaluated in detail in Section 14.4.2.1.
The EU ETS interacts with international carbon markets through the 
project-based Kyoto mechanisms. Import of units through international 
emissions trading is not allowed, but companies covered by the EU 
ETS can import CDMs and JI credits. A relatively liberal import regime 
for the pilot phase was established in a ‘Linking Directive’ approved 
in 2004 (Flåm, 2009). Forestry credits were banned and additional 
criteria for large hydropower projects were set. For the EU ETS’s sec-
ond phrase, which corresponded to the Kyoto Protocol’s ﬁrst com-
mitment period, 2008 – 2012, countries proposed import thresholds; 
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several proposals were adjusted downwards by the Commission. For 
the third phase, 2013 – 2020, imports were limited to credits from CDM 
projects registered before 2013 in the absence of an international cli-
mate change agreement. New (2013 inception or later) CDM projects 
can only be used in the EU ETS if located in least developed countries 
(LDCs) (Skjærseth, 2010; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010). However, 
CDM credits from new projects in non-LDCs can be accepted after 
2013 if the EU has concluded a bilateral agreement with the country in 
question regulating their level of use. 
The European Union could potentially link the EU ETS to other schemes, 
and legislation for the period until 2020 allows negotiation of such 
bilateral treaties. The EU and Australia have already agreed to a one-
way indirect link to commence on 1 July 2015, meaning that EU credits 
will be allowed for compliance under the Australia system (European 
Commission, 2012). This agreement will transition to a two-way direct 
link by no later than 1 July 2018, provided that the Australian system 
goes forward. 
13.6.2 Linkages with other regional policies
The Asia-Paciﬁc Partnership for Clean Development and Climate, 
which was time-limited and has now concluded, involved about 
50 % of the world population, GHG emissions, and world economic 
output (Kelly, 2007). The partnership included countries that had 
not ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol, and while it was ‘soft’ in terms of 
legal bindingness, it may have had a modest impact on governance 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee and Taplin, 2009) 
and encouraged voluntary action (Heggelund and Buan, 2009). After 
the end of the Partnership, the Global Superior Energy Performance 
Partnership (GSEP) Clean Energy Ministerial took over some of the 
Partnership’s activities. 
In addition to coordination by international organizations, such as 
ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability, voluntary mitigation 
action of cities is taking a regional / global character (Kern and Bulke-
ley, 2009). In Europe, the Climate Alliance has about 1700 member 
cities from a number of countries. The Climate Alliance has supported 
rainforest conservation projects in the Amazon region (Climate Alli-
ance, 2013).
13.7 Linkages between 
international and 
national policies
As the landscape of multilateral and other international agreements 
on climate has become more complex, the interactions between inter-
national and national levels have become more varied. 
13.7.1 Inﬂuence of international climate 
policies on domestic action
International policy may trigger more ambitious national policies. Trea-
ties provide greater certainty that others will act, thus addressing key 
concerns that countries will free ride. International climate policy can 
shape domestic climate discourse, even if it may not be the main inspi-
ration for proactive action (Tompkins and Amundsen, 2008). 
National policies also affect the effectiveness of international poli-
cies. The implementation of international policy is affected by national 
political structure. Examples of studies on how varying domestic 
political structures affect the implementation of international policies 
include studies in: Italy (Massetti et al., 2007), France (Mathy, 2007), 
Canada (Harrison, 2008), China (Teng and Gu, 2007), the UK (Barry 
and Paterson, 2004; Compston and Bailey, 2008) and the Netherlands 
(Gupta et al., 2007). National and sub-national settings, where actions 
may be less risky or more politically feasible, may also provide useful 
‘laboratories’ to test policy instruments before implementation at the 
international level (Michaelowa et al., 2005; Moncel et al., 2011; Zelli, 
2011).
13.7.2 Linkages between the Kyoto 
mechanisms and national policies
Linking national policies with international policies may provide ﬂex-
ibility by allowing a group of parties to meet obligations in the aggre-
gate. The Kyoto Protocol (Article 4) provides for such inter-regional 
ﬂexibility, and the European Union has taken advantage of the Proto-
col’s provision through its internal burden sharing decision. This deci-
sion allowed the EU’s Kyoto commitment of an 8 % emissions reduc-
tion below 1990 for the 2008 – 2012 period to be redistributed among 
EU-15 member states; commitments of these states range from – 28 % 
(Luxembourg) to +27 % (Portugal) (Michaelowa and Betz, 2001; 
Hunter et al., 2011). 
Use of the CDM and JI Kyoto mechanisms has been driven by national 
mitigation policies to achieve developed countries’ emissions commit-
ments. While governments of some developed countries buy emissions 
credits directly, others introduce instruments with emissions commit-
ments for private companies, like the EU ETS; some countries, such as 
Denmark, have done both. These companies can then use emissions 
credits generated under the Kyoto Protocol to satisfy part of their com-
mitments (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Another example is Japan’s 
Industry Voluntary Action Plan that includes diverse sectors, each of 
which has its own target set either in absolute terms, in emissions´ 
intensity, or in terms of energy consumption (Mitsutsune, 2012).
Many industrialized countries limit imports of credits generated by the 
Kyoto mechanisms for various reasons; two have been posited in the 
literature: (1) to keep the domestic carbon price high to induce techno-
logical diffusion and possibly innovation; and (2) to avoid diminishing 
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environmental effectiveness by allowing required emissions-reduction 
to occur in other jurisdictions because of concerns about the quality 
of credits (‘additionality’). For example, the European Union has pro-
hibited the import of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) into the EU-ETS to 
prevent the use of surplus units from countries in transition, colloqui-
ally called ‘hot air’ (Michaelowa and Buen, 2012). Japanese companies 
have used AAUs from Green Investment Schemes for meeting their 
targets (Tuerk et al., 2010). In 2011, credits from certain CDM project 
types were banned for use in the EU-ETS from 2013 onwards (Schnei-
der, 2011). The ban includes CERs generated from projects involving 
destruction of triﬂuoromethane (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) from 
adipic acid production.
The Kyoto mechanisms also interact with the national policies of coun-
tries in which projects are implemented. However, the CDM Execu-
tive Board decided that the effects of new policies implemented in 
host countries that reduce emissions should not be considered when 
assessing the additionality of new projects to avoid perverse incentives 
not to adopt mitigation policies (Winkler, 2004; Michaelowa, 2010). 
Instead, countries may subsidize renewable energy while generating 
CDM credits. There are indications that the availability of CDM credits 
has accelerated the introduction of feed-in tariffs in China (Schroeder, 
2009). Freeing emission units for sale under international emissions 
trading requires national mitigation policies unless there is a surplus 
of units in a business-as-usual situation, as in countries in transition 
(Böhringer et al., 2007). 
Investment law, deﬁned through private international law and more 
than 3000 multilateral and bilateral investment treaties (UNCTAD, 
2013), applies to the CDM and emissions trading contracts. Proposed 
standardized contracts link the CDM to investment law by covering the 
choice of language and the process and forum for dispute resolution. 
These contracts could expose contractors to the costs associated with 
international arbitration (Gupta, 2008; Klijn et al., 2009). 
13.7.3 International linkage among regional, 
national, and sub-national policies
International linkages can be established among regional, national, or 
sub-national policies. These can be direct or indirect. Under direct 
linkage, the same units are valid throughout the linked systems. 
Under indirect linkage, a unit in a certiﬁed emission reduction credit 
system is accepted by multiple systems. Figure 13.4 shows sub-
national, national, and regional GHG cap-and-trade schemes and 
existing and planned linkages between them. The only formal direct 
linkage between two trading schemes is that arranged between the 
Australian ETS and the EU ETS, which was ofﬁcially announced in 
August 2012. A strong indirect linkage between carbon markets 
exists through the CDM, whose credits are accepted under the EU-
ETS, the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, and the New Zealand 
ETS. Naziﬁ (2010) ﬁnds that EU demand has driven the price for CDM 
credits. 
Review of unilateral and bilateral direct linkages demonstrates that 
bilateral direct linkage reduces mitigation costs, increases credibility 
of the price signal, and expands market size and liquidity (Anger, 2008; 
Flachsland et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 2009; Dellink et al., 2010; Cason 
and Gangadharan, 2011; Lanzi et  al., 2012). However, direct linkage 
also raises a variety of concerns (Jaffe et  al., 2009), including that 
linking can lead to a dilution of mitigation achieved through trading 
schemes, as linked systems are only as environmentally effective as the 
weakest among them (e. g., the one that allows imports of offsets with 
the lowest standards). Grubb (2009) also warns that countries may be 
unwilling to accept an increase of carbon prices that would result from 
linking with a more ambitious system.Tuerk et al. (2009) see the big-
gest challenges to linking in differential stringencies of targets in each 
system, varying degrees of enforcement, differences in eligible project-
based credits, and the existence of cost-containment measures, such as 
price ceilings. Haites and Mehling (2009) highlight that only bilateral 
links (or reciprocal unilateral links) yield the full beneﬁts of linkage. 
Bilateral links often face lengthy adoption procedures as well as legal 
and procedural constraints, whereas reciprocal unilateral links, possibly 
framed by an informal agreement, are often easier to implement and 
provide more ﬂexibility for almost the same beneﬁts. 
Also attractive are indirect linkages among regional, national, or sub-
national cap-and-trade systems, an approach that maintains the ben-
eﬁts of linkage without much of the downside. Such indirect linkages 
achieve cost savings and avoid risk diversiﬁcation without the need 
for deliberative harmonization of emerging and existing cap-and-
trade systems. Indirect linkage is attractive because de facto linkages 
limit potential distributional concerns and preserve a high degree of 
national control over allowance markets (Jaffe et al., 2009).
In addition, both direct and indirect linkages can occur among het-
erogeneous regional, national, and sub-national policy instruments 
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). Some such linking would be relatively 
straightforward, such as forming a link between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a carbon tax. Other links would be more challenging, such 
as between a cap-and-trade system and a quantity standard. Others 
would be even more difﬁcult, such as between a cap-and-trade sys-
tem and a technology mandate, and some linkages between hetero-
geneous policy instruments would simply not be possible (Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2012).
13.8 Interactions between 
climate change mitigation 
policy and trade
Research on interactions between climate change mitigation policy 
and trade indicates a diversity of compatibilities, synergies, conﬂicts, 
and cooperative arrangements (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cosbey, 
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2007; ICTSD, 2008; Cottier et al., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010; Rao, 
2012; Leal-Arcas, 2013). Consideration of these and other issues and 
options needs to take into account the context of the provisions of 
the principal existing multilateral climate change framework (Yamin 
and Depledge, 2004) and multilateral trade framework (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009). Negotiators acknowledged the opportuni-
ties for international cooperation on interactions between climate 
change and trade in both the UNFCCC (1992) and in a Ministerial 
Decision at the time of the negotiations of the Marrakech Agreement 
establishing the WTO (1994). But there is also a potential for con-
ﬂ ict between climate and trade issues. According to Article 3.5 of the 
UNFCCC, “Measures taken to combat climate change, including uni-
lateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁ -
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”. 
The Kyoto Protocol notes in Article  2.3 that Annex  I Parties “shall 
strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such 
a way as to minimize adverse effects, including … effects on inter-
national trade.”
Trade and climate policy interact at many levels (Copeland and Taylor, 
2005; Tamiotti et al., 2009; UNEP, 2009; UNCTAD, 2010; World Bank, 
2010). For instance, on the one hand, according to Peters and Hertwich 
(2008), “almost one-quarter of carbon dioxide released to the atmo-
sphere is emitted in the production of internationally traded goods 
and services” (see also Peters et al., 2011). Transportation associated 
with trade is another related issue (Conca, 2000). On the other hand, 
various climate change policies currently in place affect the relative 
prices of goods and services, which thereby affect trade ﬂ ows and the 
total volume of traded goods (Whalley, 2011). Moreover, trade barri-
ers and obligations regarding intellectual property (IP) rights of ‘green 
technology’ as well as many other WTO obligations impinge on climate 
policy (Thomas, 2004; Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). Victor 
(1995) suggested that lessons from the trade regime could be used in 
the development of the climate regime, but comparative governance 
studies of the trade and climate regimes have not been thoroughly uti-
lized to gain insights into how the two regimes might address trade-
climate interactions (Bell et al., 2012 an exception).
Figure 13.4 | Cap-and-trade schemes with existing and planned linkages. Linkage through proposed acceptance of offsets and Joint Implementation projects not displayed. In 
some cases, countries otherwise eligible to host CDM projects must ﬁ rst establish a Designated National Authority. Accurate as of March 2014.
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The production of internationally traded goods gives rise to a ‘label-
ling’ issue, a problem for accounting purposes and also for possible 
policy intervention. The issue arises because a proportion of a country’s 
GHG emissions resulting from the production of goods and services in 
one country may be ‘embedded’ in traded products that are consumed 
in other countries. At issue is whether to attribute the emissions to the 
producing (exporting) country or consuming (importing) country (Kai-
numa et al., 2000; Peters and Hertwich, 2008) (see also Sections 5.4.1 
and 14.3.4.2). There is an ethical and equity issue about how to deﬁne 
climate responsibility and allocate climate mitigation costs (discussed 
in detail in Sections 3.3, 4.1, and 4.2). There is also a political and 
economic issue whether climate policy instruments ought to address 
production- or consumption-induced GHGs (Droege, 2011a, b; see also 
Section 14.3.4). Finally, there is a technical issue as territorial measure-
ment is the current GHG accounting practice under the UNFCCC, and 
switching to consumption-induced measurement may be technically 
more difﬁcult (Droege, 2011a; b; Peters et al., 2011; Caldeira and Davis, 
2011). 
There are signiﬁcant differences among researchers and policymakers 
in their perspectives on the relationship between climate change and 
trade. These differences include fundamental empirical assumptions 
and policy preferences concerning the roles of markets and govern-
ments (Bhagwati, 2009), speciﬁcally concerning whether government 
measures are required to address market failures that produce cli-
mate change (Stern, 2007), or government regulations tend to create 
inefﬁciencies and distort trade (Krugman, 1979; Rodrik, 2011). Trade 
measures (e. g., trade sanctions, trade enticements, and trade-rele-
vant domestic product standards; see Section 13.8.1 below) could be 
used to address free-rider problems of international agreements, spe-
ciﬁcally participation and / or compliance problems (Victor, 2010), and 
some (e. g., Victor, 2011) suggest these may be useful in achieving an 
effective climate agreement. However, there are also some who con-
clude that trade measures are an inappropriate tool to pursue climate 
change policy objectives, pointing to the possibility of ‘green protec-
tionism’ (Khor, 2010a; Johnson and Brewster, 2013). The potential use 
of trade measures to enhance participation and / or compliance poses 
major institutional design questions (see Section 13.4).
13.8.1 WTO-related issues
A central issue for WTO members is whether policies are consistent 
with principles of non-discrimination. Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
prohibits favourable treatment of the goods, services, or corporations 
of any one member as compared with other members, while National 
Treatment prohibits less favourable treatment of foreign relative to 
domestic goods, services or corporations. Of the more than 60 WTO 
agreements that apply these principles, many are pertinent to climate 
change, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU), as well as agreements on subsidies, government procure-
ment, and agriculture (Brewer, 2003, 2004, 2010; Cottier et al., 2009; 
Hufbauer et al., 2009; Epps and Green, 2010). Studies have suggested 
that ETSs can be designed to be compatible with WTO obligations 
(Werksman, 1999; Petsonk, 1999). 
Trade issues concerning CDM projects have received special attention 
(Werksman et  al., 2001; Rechsteiner et  al., 2009; Werksman, 2009). 
Although no trade or investment disputes have arisen yet in connec-
tion with CDM projects, there is the possibility that they will in the 
future as the number and economic signiﬁcance of CDM projects con-
tinues to increase. Signiﬁcant attention has also been given to product 
labelling and standards issues that can arise in relation to the WTO 
Agreement on TBT (Appleton, 2009), which could be pertinent to the 
use of labels concerning ‘food miles’ (ICTSD, 2007; World Bank, 2010). 
Although long-distance air transport of agricultural products itself is 
GHG-intensive, the agricultural practices of many exporting countries 
are less GHG-intensive than those of the importing countries, and 
determining the relative GHG emissions levels of imported versus 
domestic products thus requires complete lifecycle analyses of individ-
ual products and speciﬁc pairs of exporting-importing countries. 
Government procurement policies that entail buy-local practices con-
cerning climate-friendly goods and services have emerged as an issue 
under the principle of non-discrimination in the context of national 
economic stimulus programmes. The applicability of the WTO Agree-
ment on Government Procurement to such trade issues is limited 
because many countries have not agreed to it; among those that have, 
there are many government agencies whose programmes are not cov-
ered (van Asselt et al., 2006; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009; Malumfashi, 
2009; van Calster, 2009).
Government subsidies for renewable energy and energy-efﬁciency 
goods and services have also become issues in relation to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as well as the 
TRIMs agreement. Such issues have prompted WTO dispute cases, 
including one involving subsidies for producers of wind turbines (WTO, 
2010) and another involving feed-in tariffs (WTO, 2011). The applica-
tion of WTO subsidy rules could slow the development and diffusion 
of climate-friendly technologies, but it is not yet clear whether this 
has or will have an effect (see Bigdeli, 2009; Howse and Eliason, 2009; 
Howse, 2010 on subsidy issues). 
There are WTO-related issues related to tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
resulting from climate change policy. In general, non-tariff barriers 
tend to be more important barriers than tariffs at the climate-trade 
interface, but tariffs are still high in some industries and countries 
(Steenblik, 2006; World Bank, 2008a). Countries may seek to limit 
competitive disadvantage introduced by domestic climate policy by 
raising tariffs and introducing non-tariff barriers that restrict imports, 
or by other BAMs. One example of a BAM would be a country that 
has imposed a domestic carbon tax also (1) imposing the carbon tax 
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on imported goods and services at a rate proportional to the emis-
sions associated with their production and (2) offering reimburse-
ment to domestic exporters who sell a good or service outside of 
the jurisdiction of the carbon tax (Wooders et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 
2010; Monjon and Quirion, 2011). Barriers to transfers of technolo-
gies identiﬁed by IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (IPCC, 2011) as potential contribu-
tors to climate change mitigation have been issues in the on-going 
WTO Doha Round negotiations (Tamiotti et al., 2009). Domestic sub-
sidies such as those for biofuels have also been at issue in the Doha 
Round.
Border adjustment measures to offset international differences in 
costs — and thus possible international leakage (see Section 5.4.1) 
arising from international differences in mitigation policy — have 
become one of the most contentious and researched points of inter-
action (Babiker, 2005; de Cendra, 2006; Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007; 
Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Genasci, 2008; Frankel, 2008; Tamiotti and 
Kulacoglu, 2009; O’Brien, 2009; van Asselt and Brewer, 2010; Tamiotti, 
2011; Zhang, 2012). This issue draws particular attention to differences 
between production-based and consumption-based emissions in both 
developed and developing countries (Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1). BAMs 
include policy options ranging from: (1) tariffs on imports or subsidies 
on exports based on the amount of GHGs released in their produc-
tion to (2) ‘compensatory measures,’ as for instance the free-allocation 
emission permits in the EU ETS or export rebates to energy-intensive 
sectors. Theoretical arguments in favour of BAMs can be grouped into 
three classes, each discussed below: the reduction of economic inef-
ﬁciencies in the context of an externality, the reduction of carbon leak-
age, and increasing participation and compliance in a climate agree-
ment.
The economic research on BAMs stresses that the inclusion of more 
countries in climate policy, e. g., by linking permit trading schemes and 
including more sectors and countries, reduces economic inefﬁciencies 
relative to unilateral BAMs. While, BAMs can enhance the competitive-
ness of GHG- and trade-intensive industries within a given climate 
regime (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Böhringer et al., 2012a; Balistreri and 
Rutherford, 2012; Lanzi et al., 2012), welfare effects may be negative 
for consumers and countries facing BAMs on their exports. Overall 
welfare effects accounting for externalities are mainly perceived to be 
positive at an abstract theoretical level (Gros and Egenhofer, 2011); 
the evidence is more blurred at an empirical level and is sensitive to 
assumptions (The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012; Lanzi 
et al., 2012). Export rebates, the exclusion of energy and CO2-intensive 
industries from regulation, or the free-allocation of permits to these 
industries are recognized as causing efﬁciency losses (Lanzi et  al., 
2012). Most empirical studies also do not conﬁrm a need at the macro-
economic level for BAMs in the ﬁrst place: they tend to ﬁnd that cli-
mate policy is not a signiﬁcant trade issue at the macro-economic level 
of national economies, though there are competitiveness and leakage 
issues for a few industries which are both GHG-intensive and trade-
intensive. They hold that the main channel of impact of climate policies 
is through world energy prices and not through manufactured goods 
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Houser et al., 2008; Aldy and Pizer, 2009; 
The Carbon Trust, 2010). 
The economic modelling literature on the effectiveness of BAMs to 
reduce carbon leakage ﬁnds that carbon leakage rates tend to decline 
by 2 – 12 % following the introduction of a border adjustment tax 
(Böhringer et al., 2012a). The political literature on the appropriateness 
of using BAMs to address carbon leakage, on the other hand, tends to 
be divided into two perspectives. Developed countries and / or countries 
with some form of mitigation policy either already in place or consider-
ing this for the future argue that BAMs are necessary to avoid carbon 
controls driving production abroad. Arguments along this line have 
emerged in the European Union and the United States for instance (see 
Veel, 2009; The Carbon Trust, 2010; Fischer and Fox, 2012). Developing 
countries tend to oppose BAMs, as many are concerned about nega-
tive welfare effects for their countries and what they see as a violation 
of the principle of CBDRRC as agreed under the UNFCCC (Khor, 2010a; 
Droege, 2011a; Scott and Rajamani, 2012). Nevertheless, the technical 
difﬁculties of measuring production-induced or consumption-induced 
GHG emissions are signiﬁcant (Droege, 2011a), and addressing them 
may be associated with high administrative costs, possibly outweigh-
ing the potential beneﬁts (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2009).
Participation and compliance in climate agreements might be 
enhanced by BAMs. However, conceptual thinking on the question 
does not reveal a consensus, and direct evidence on the point is insuf-
ﬁcient to reach deﬁnitive conclusions (see Barrett, 2003, 2009, 2010; 
Victor, 2010, 2011). Because BAMs affect the distribution of abatment 
costs across countires, enacting a BAM could result in welfare loss, 
particularly for exporting developing countries, and even retaliatory 
countermeasures (de Cendra, 2006; Mattoo et  al., 2009; Böhringer 
et al., 2012b; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). For more discussion on 
the topic, see Section 13.3.3 on participation and Section 13.3.4 on 
compliance.
From the research on legal issues related to BAMs, four major con-
clusions emerge. First, BAMs may clash with WTO obligations, a point 
which is emphasized by many observers (Wooders et al., 2009; Con-
don, 2009; ICTSD, 2009; Holzer, 2010, 2011; Tamiotti, 2011; Du, 2011). 
Second, it is possible to design BAMs to be compatible with these obli-
gations, according to other observers (Condon, 2009; Droege, 2011a; 
b), particularly when BAMs are targeted to countries based on their 
production technology efﬁciency (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). Third, 
WTO obligations and their legal interpretation have evolved over time, 
allowing for the possibility to bring trade and climate policy goals 
more in line in the future (Kelemen, 2001; Neumayer, 2004). Finally, the 
use of BAMs for climate change purposes may be politically controver-
sial (Khor, 2010a). 
A ﬁnal WTO-related issue concerns the distinction between prod-
ucts and ‘process and production methods’ (PPMs). The legal notion 
of PPMs, as applied in the WTO, can be based on several aspects of 
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production processes and can have a variety of effects on climate 
change-related policies. (For extensive discussions of the technical 
legal issues and their relevance to climate change issues see Cottier 
et al., 2009).
13.8.2 Other international venues
Two GHG-emitting industries that are centrally involved in interna-
tional trade as modes of transportation are covered by separate inter-
national agreements outside the WTO system (see also Chapter 8). 
International aviation issues are covered by the Chicago Convention 
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while inter-
national maritime shipping issues have been addressed by the IMO 
(see Section 13.13.1.4 for performance assessments of the ICAO and 
IMO).
There has been increasing interest in recent years in both ICAO and 
IMO in industry practices concerning GHG emissions, with some efforts 
at international cooperation to address them. However, there has been 
international conﬂict about the European Union’s inclusion of inter-
national aviation within the EU ETS. The Kyoto Protocol in Article 2.2 
recognized ICAO as the venue for negotiations on matters concerning 
international aviation emissions, but in the absence of what was seen 
in the EU as adequate progress in the ICAO, the EU decided to include 
aviation in the EU ETS. This unilateral decision prompted strong reac-
tions (Mueller, 2012; Scott and Rajamani, 2012), and ﬂights in and out 
of the EU were temporarily exempted in April 2013 through the ICAO 
General Assembly scheduled for September-October 2013. Among 
the concerns expressed about the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
has been the assertion that it represents a violation of the principle 
of CBDRRC of the UNFCCC (Scott and Rajamani, 2012; Ireland, 2012), 
though this concern only applies to developing countries. There are also 
legal issues about the relationship of the EU ETS to the Chicago Con-
vention, which has traditionally been the international legal basis for 
aviation policies. Though studies indicate that the economic impacts of 
the EU ETS provisions are small relative to other airline expenses and 
ticket prices and that much of the cost can be passed on to consumers 
(Scheelhaase and Grimme, 2007; Anger and Köhler, 2010), political and 
legal issues have nevertheless made international cooperation difﬁcult. 
The IMO (2009) concluded that a signiﬁcant potential for CO2 reduc-
tion exists through technical and operational measures, many of which 
appear to be cost-effective; the IMO adopted an energy efﬁciency 
design index (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2011). A link 
of carbon controls of aviation and shipping to the EU ETS and / or a pos-
sible U. S. ETS is suggested by Haites (2009) with the view that carbon 
offsets under the CDM could also be used.
There are other international institutional contexts within which cli-
mate change-trade interaction issues have been addressed, namely, 
the World Bank, G8, G20, IEA, MEF, and OECD (Section 13.5).
13.8.3 Implications for policy options
In terms of WTO and / or UNFCCC involvement, there are logically four 
possible sets of options for institutional architectures at the multi-
lateral level for addressing climate change-trade interactions: WTO-
based, UNFCCC-based, joint UNFCCC-WTO, and stand-alone. In addi-
tion, there could be hybrid arrangements involving combinations of 
these four types. For instance, proposals for Sustainable Energy Trade 
Agreements (SETAs) could be addressed in a variety of venues (ICTSD, 
2011). 
Of the four options, WTO-based architectures have received the most 
attention in the literature. Alternatives include making revisions in 
existing WTO arrangements or undertaking new arrangements (Epps 
and Green, 2010). Possible changes in existing WTO arrangements 
include a ‘peace clause’ (Hufbauer et al., 2009) or waiver agreement 
(Howse and Eliason, 2009; Howse, 2010), whereby WTO members 
would agree — within some limits — not to challenge on WTO grounds, 
respectively, climate policies in general or climate-related subsidies in 
particular. An extensive list of other possible changes to existing WTO 
arrangements has been discussed by Epps and Green (2010), whose 
suggestions include: change GATT Article XX (which allows exceptions 
to members’ obligations, including measures for the ‘conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources’) so that climate measures are explic-
itly identiﬁed as qualifying for exceptional treatment; add a similar 
provision to the Subsidies Agreement; change the burden of proof or 
standard of review for the scientiﬁc evidence presented in climate 
change cases to Dispute Settlement panels; change Dispute Appellate 
Body rules to take into account the scientiﬁc uncertainties in climate 
change cases; establish a notiﬁcation process for members to inform 
other members of the adoption of climate policies with trade implica-
tions; and establish a Climate Change Committee, which could facili-
tate conﬂict resolution without resorting to the Dispute Resolution 
process. 
Many possibilities for a new Climate Change Agreement at the WTO 
have also been discussed by (Epps and Green, 2010). The elements of 
such an agreement could include: establishment of a Climate Change 
Committee (as above); establishment of a notiﬁcation procedure for 
climate change measures (as above); establishment of climate change 
mitigation as a legitimate objective; development of a ‘non-aggression 
clause’ that would prohibit unilateral actions, such as BAMs; adoption 
of transparency requirements for national climate change policymaking 
processes to determine their legitimacy in relation to climate change 
concerns and protect against disguised trade protectionism; adoption 
of environmental rationales for subsidies; reviews of members’ trade-
related climate measures to insure that they are substantive responses 
to climate issues; and clariﬁcation of the potential application of PPMs 
questions to climate change disputes. Although these ideas have been 
mentioned in the literature, they have not been formulated as speciﬁc 
proposals to the WTO.
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UNFCCC-based options have been discussed in the literature (Werks-
man et al., 2009) relating to the possible creation of a ‘level’ playing 
ﬁeld, such as through border charges on imports, or border rebates for 
exports, though views differ greatly, as indicated above in the discus-
sion of BAMs.
A potential joint UNFCCC-WTO agreement has not yet received much 
attention in the published literature (Epps and Green, 2010). However, 
there are already in effect arrangements whereby the UNFCCC sec-
retariat is an observer in meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade 
and Environment (CTE) and is invited on an ad hoc basis to meet-
ings of the Committee overseeing the speciﬁc trade and environment 
negotiations (CTESS) (Cossey and Marceau, 2009). In addition, WTO 
Secretariat staff members attend the annual UNFCCC COP meetings. 
Finally, a stand-alone arrangement could be developed (Epps and 
Green, 2010), a possibility that has not yet been analyzed in the pub-
lished literature. 
There are numerous and diverse unexplored opportunities for greater 
international cooperation in trade-climate policy interactions. While 
mutually destructive conﬂicts between the two systems have thus far 
been largely avoided, pre-emptive cooperation could protect against 
such developments in the future. Whether such cooperative arrange-
ments can be most effectively devised within the existing institutional 
architectures for trade and for climate change or through new archi-
tectures is an unsettled issue (Section 13.4).
13.9 Mechanisms for 
technology and 
knowledge development, 
transfer, and diffusion
Technology-related policies could conceivably play a signiﬁcant role in 
an international climate regime (de Coninck et al., 2008). These poli-
cies have the potential to lower the cost of climate change mitigation 
and increase the likelihood that countries will commit to reducing 
their GHG emissions. By lowering the relative cost of more environ-
mentally sound technologies, technology policy can increase incen-
tives for countries to comply with international climate obligations 
and could therefore play an important role in increasing the robust-
ness of long-run international frameworks (Barrett, 2003). Such poli-
cies might generate incentives for participation in international cli-
mate agreements by facilitating access to climate-change-mitigating 
technologies or funding to cover the additional costs of such tech-
nologies. 
The role of international cooperation in facilitating technological 
change, including access to, facilitation of, and transfer of technol-
ogy, is explicitly recognized in Article 4(1)(c) and (h), 4(5), 4(7), 4(8), 
and 4(9) of the UNFCCC. Article 4.5 states that “The developed coun-
try Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take 
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and ﬁnance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and 
know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties….” 
The performance of international institutional arrangements and the 
adequacy of ﬁnancing are subject to a variety of interpretations. (See 
Section 14.3.6.2 for a discussion of the UNFCCC CTCN, and see Section 
15.12 for a discussion of ﬁnancial issues.) 
Although international technology transfer issues for climate change 
mitigation or adaptation have become concerns in numerous coun-
tries, these concerns have been especially acute in developing coun-
tries. Concerns over technology transfer in developing countries are 
frequently embedded in broader capacity building, sustainable devel-
opment, and other equity issues (for discussions of the broader issues 
of CBDRRC and equity, see respectively Sections 13.2.1.2 and 13.4.2.4, 
and also Chapter  3 and Sections 4.1 and 4.2) (Brewer, 2008; GEA, 
2012; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012).
Technology-oriented agreements could include activities across the 
technology life cycle for knowledge sharing, coordinated or joint 
research and development of climate-change-mitigating technolo-
gies, technology transfer, and technology deployment policies (such 
as technology or performance standards and incentives for technol-
ogy development or adoption). International technology policy may 
play an important role in improving the efﬁciency of existing research 
and development (R&D) activities by increasing the international 
exchange of scientiﬁc and technical knowledge and by reducing 
duplicated R&D effort that could be shared across nations. (Newell, 
2010a).
13.9.1 Modes of international incentive 
schemes to encourage technology-
investment ﬂows
Absent additional market failures, underinvestment in innovative activ-
ity relative to socially optimal levels can occur due to several well-
understood general properties of innovation (see Section 15.6). At a 
global level, international carbon markets and the ﬂexibility mecha-
nisms they may employ, such as international linkage of domestic 
emission programmes, offsets, and the CDM, may be used to ﬁnance 
emission reductions in developing countries and transferring technol-
ogy between nations and regions (see Section 13.13 and Haščič and 
Johnstone, 2011). Clear rules for these markets and their associated 
ﬂexibility mechanisms may be established under international agree-
ments and domestic policies to aid the removal of unnecessary barriers 
to technology transfer and to facilitate investment ﬂows. 
Because private-sector investments constitute more than 85 % of 
global ﬁnancial ﬂows (UNFCCC, 2007b), international trade and for-
eign direct investment are the primary means by which new knowl-
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edge and technology are transferred between countries (World Bank, 
2008b). While domestic actions can improve the conditions to enable 
technology transfer investments (e. g., through regulatory ﬂexibility, 
transparency, and stability), international actions can also contribute. 
In particular, the literature has identiﬁed tariffs and non-tariff trade 
barriers as impediments to energy technology transfer (World Bank, 
2008b). An existing example is OECD regulation of export credits, with 
speciﬁc conditions to foster technology transfer for climate change 
mitigation (OECD, 2013).
In summary, national and supra-national policies that provide incen-
tives for climate change mitigation will likely play an essential role in 
stimulating public investment, ﬁnancial incentives, and regulations to 
promote innovation in the necessary new technologies for mitigation 
goals. Reducing fossil-fuel subsidies may have a similar effect (UNEP, 
2008).
13.9.2 Intellectual property rights and 
technology development and transfer
The strength of IP right protection, together with other conditions 
related to the rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market open-
ness affect technology transfer rates (Newell, 2010a) (see also Sections 
3.11 and 16.8).
The goal of IP protection is to foster both the development of new 
technologies (innovation), and the diffusion of new technologies 
across countries (technology transfer) and within countries (tech-
nology adoption). In theory, such protection achieves these ends by 
increasing and / or maintaining the private economic incentive to create 
and transfer technology. At the same time, protection of IP also works 
to slow the diffusion of new technologies, because it raises their cost 
and potentially limits their availability. To the extent that IP protection 
raises the cost and limits the availability around the world of mitiga-
tion technologies, the potential for new technologies to reduce the 
cost of mitigation will be hampered. Concern by developing countries 
that IP protection for low-carbon technology will make climate action 
excessively costly has been a contentious issue in the climate negotia-
tions (Government of India, 2013). On the other hand, IP protection 
may encourage ﬁrms to innovate more than they otherwise would, 
thus potentially increasing the supply and reducing the cost of new 
technology. 
In order to balance the possible incentive effects of IP protection 
against the adverse impact of such protection on costs and availabil-
ity, it is important to assess the empirical signiﬁcance of the incentive 
effects, both with respect to innovation and technology diffusion. The 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of IP policy on innovation is 
discussed in Section 15.6.2.1. 
Even if stronger IP protection does not foster creation and develop-
ment of new technologies, it may be beneﬁcial for mitigation if it fos-
ters transfer of technologies from developed to less developed coun-
tries. Theoretically, strong IP protection in developing countries may 
be necessary to limit the risk for foreign ﬁrms that transfer of their 
technology will lead to imitation and resulting proﬁt erosion. Look-
ing at technology transfer in general, empirical literature ﬁnds a role 
for strong IP protection in receiving countries in facilitating technol-
ogy transfer from advanced countries through exports, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and licensing for transfers from the OECD (Maskus 
and Penubarti, 1995); FDI to 16 countries originating in the United 
States, Germany and Japan (Lee and Mansﬁeld, 1996; Mansﬁeld, 
2000); and transfers from the United State (Smith, 1999). Regard-
ing recipients, Awokuse and Yin (2010) ﬁnd evidence for transfers to 
China, and Javorcik (2004) for FDI to 24 Eastern European transition 
economies. Branstetter et al. (2006) assessed FDI to 16 middle-income 
countries after those countries strengthened their IP protection and 
found indicators for United States technology transfer increasing sub-
sequently.
The empirical evidence suggests that the effects of IP strength on tech-
nology licensing parallel those for FDI. The Branstetter et  al. (2006) 
results discussed above included royalty payments among the mea-
sures of technology transfer that increased after IP strengthening. 
Smith (2001) ﬁnds that the association between strong IP and licenses 
is stronger than the relationship between IP and exports. In general, 
the evidence indicates a systematic impact of IP protection on technol-
ogy transfer through exports, FDI, and technology licensing for middle-
income countries for which the risk of imitation in the absence of such 
protection is relatively high. It is unclear whether or not these effects 
extend to the least developed countries whose absorptive capacity 
and ability to appropriate foreign technology in the absence of strong 
IP protections is less (Hall and Helmers, 2010). It is also important to 
note that IP rules are but one of many factors affecting FDI decisions. 
Others, particularly more general aspects of the legal and institutional 
environment that affect the riskiness of investments, may be more sig-
niﬁcant (Fosfuri, 2004). 
Literature on the role of IP rights in the development of low-carbon 
technologies remains limited (Reichman et  al., 2008). For example, 
Barton (2007) analyzes existing solar, wind, and biofuel technologies, 
and Lewis (2007, 2011) and Pueuo et al. (2011) ﬁnd that IP protection 
has induced innovation in wind technologies without compromising 
technology transfer. However, problems could arise if new, very broad 
patents were granted that impede the development of future, more 
efﬁcient technologies (though even then, IP rights may provide ﬂex-
ibility). Compulsory licensing has been proposed as a mechanism to 
encourage technology transfer. Such an action would compensate a 
patent holder while overcoming market power inhibitions on voluntary 
licensing (Reichman and Hasenzahl, 2003). Despite short-run technol-
ogy transfer beneﬁts, compulsory licensing of mitigation technologies 
may not be desirable in the long-run, and current international law 
may limit the circumstances under which compulsory licensing can be 
used to achieve climate change mitigation objectives (Fair, 2009; Mai-
tra, 2010).
WGIII_ch13_DTP.indd   1036 20.11.2014   12:35:02
1037
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
In summary, there is inadequate evidence in the literature regarding 
the impact of IP policy on transfer of GHG-mitigating technologies to 
draw robust conclusions. If the experience from other technology sec-
tors is indicative, maintenance of effective protection of IP may be a 
factor in determining the transfer of mitigation technology to middle-
income countries, although other aspects of the legal and institutional 
environments are likely to be at least as important. There is little empir-
ical evidence that protection of IP rights is a major factor affecting 
technology transfer to the least developed countries.
13.9.3 International collaboration to encourage 
knowledge development
International cooperation on climate change mitigation has been linked 
to technology transfer policy, as transferring knowledge and equip-
ment internationally, and ensuring that technologies are deployed in 
appropriate national contexts, may require additional international 
action (Newell, 2010a). International cooperation on climate-relevant 
technology policy can include efforts to share technological knowl-
edge, collaborate or coordinate R&D, and directly facilitate and ﬁnance 
technology transfer.
13.9.3.1 Knowledge sharing, R&D coordination, and joint 
collaboration
International cooperation on knowledge-sharing and R&D coordina-
tion can include information exchange, coordinated or harmonized 
research agendas, measurement and technology standards, and coor-
dinated or cooperative R&D (IEA, 2008; de Coninck et al., 2008; GEA, 
2012). Examples of such existing forms of cooperation include the Car-
bon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the former Asia Paciﬁc Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate, the U. S.-China Clean Energy 
Research Center, and the International Partnership for a Hydrogen 
Economy. Empirically, a higher degree of collaboration has been more 
frequently observed in research areas of more fundamental science 
without larger commercial interests (for example, the ITER fusion reac-
tor and the CERN supercollider) (de Coninck et al., 2008). In addition 
to enhancing the cross-border ﬂow of scientiﬁc and technical informa-
tion, joint R&D can increase the cost-effectiveness of R&D through 
complementary expertise and reduced duplication of effort (Newell, 
2010a). 
The IEA has coordinated the development of more than 40 Imple-
menting Agreements. Under these agreements, IEA member countries 
may engage either in task-sharing programmes pursued within par-
ticipating countries and funded by individual country contributions, or 
in cost-sharing programmes funded by countries but performed by a 
single contractor. All existing Implementing Agreements incorporate 
some degree of task sharing while about half incorporate cost sharing 
(Newell, 2010a).
13.9.3.2 International cooperation on domestic climate 
technology R&D funding
Public sector investment in energy- and climate-related R&D has 
decreased since the early 1980s, although there has been a relative 
increase in recent years (Newell, 2010a, 2011). Newell (2010a), using 
the precedent of European Union cooperation on setting R&D spending 
goals, has proposed an international agreement that would increase 
domestic R&D funding for climate technologies (either in absolute 
terms, percentage increases from historic levels, or relative to GDP) in 
an analogous fashion to internationally agreed emission targets. Also, 
at a G8 meeting, in the context of a consideration of how to address 
climate change, there was agreement to seek to double public invest-
ment in R&D between 2009 and 2015 (G8, 2009).See Torvanger and 
Meadowcroft (2011) and Fischer et al. (2012) on issues in the design 
and support of climate friendly technologies. International coordina-
tion of R&D portfolios may reduce the duplication of R&D effort, cover 
a broader technological base, and enhance the exchange of informa-
tion gained through national-level R&D processes. This coordination 
could cover the allocation of effort by government scientists and engi-
neers, the targeting of extramural research funding to speciﬁc projects, 
and public-private partnerships. Engaging developing economies in 
developing and deploying new technologies may require further tech-
nology development to meet the needs of domestic institutions and 
norms.
Bringing newly developed technologies to full commercialization often 
presents challenges, and for some technologies, such as carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS) (de Coninck et al., 2009), the private sector 
may not have sufﬁcient incentives to commercialize new technologies 
in the absence of international cooperation. Since some of the eco-
nomic risk the private sector faces reﬂects uncertainty about the incen-
tives that future climate policies would create, governments may have 
a role in ﬁnancing technology demonstration projects (Newell, 2007). 
The case for such demonstration projects may be stronger in develop-
ing and emerging economies, where incomplete capital markets may 
undermine investment in commercializing these technologies.
13.10 Capacity building
Several articles in the UNFCCC (4.1(i), 4.5, 6 and 9.2(d)) and the Kyoto 
Protocol (Article 10(e)) acknowledge the role of capacity building in 
promoting collective action on climate change. While the texts give 
special attention to building capacity in developing countries, they also 
recognize a general need for all countries to improve policy, planning, 
and education on climate issues. 
A variety of public, private, and NGO initiatives have undertaken 
capacity building efforts both within and outside of the UNFCCC, 
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focusing primarily on three issues: (1) adaptation policy and planning; 
(2) mitigation policy and planning; and (3) measurement, reporting, 
and veriﬁcation of mitigation actions. Capacity building efforts with 
respect to technology transfer are addressed in Section 13.9. Section 
4.6.1 considers adaptive capacity and mitigative capacity jointly as 
dimensions of ‘response capacity’ and Section 15.10 considers capacity 
building in a national context.
Capacity building for adaptation includes (i) risk management 
approaches to address adverse effects of climate change, (ii) main-
tenance and revision of a database on local coping strategies, and 
(iii)  maintenance and revision of the adaptation practices interface 
(Yohe, 2001; UNFCCC, 2009b). The process of preparing the National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for and by LDCs identiﬁes 
their most ‘urgent’ adaptation needs. However, capacity building for 
adaptation is likely insufﬁcient because the costs in such regards are 
rarely estimated (Smith et al., 2011; see also WGII, 3.6.4). At the com-
munity level, adaptation projects require time and patience and can be 
successful if they raise awareness, develop and use partnerships, com-
bine reactive and anticipatory approaches, and are in line with local 
culture and context (Engels, 2008; Dumaru, 2010).
Capacity building for mitigation includes technical assistance and 
policy planning support. In CDM, capacity building has focused 
on the establishment of Designated National Authorities (DNAs), 
the training of private and public personnel, and project support 
(Michaelowa, 2005; Winkler et  al., 2007; Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). Efforts aimed at capacity building for NAMAs and REDD-plus 
are expected (Bosetti and Rose, 2011). NAMAs are a potentially 
important means of action by developing countries that emerged in 
the negotiations under the Bali Roadmap (UNFCCC, 2007); and have 
been assessed in the literature (Wang-Helmreich, et al., 2011; Upad-
hyaya,, 2012; Tyler et  al., 2013). NAMAs are discussed in detail in 
Section 15.2.
Monitoring and evaluation activities are important to ensure effective 
implementation of a capacity-building framework, helping to under-
stand gaps and needs in capacity building, share best practices, and 
promote resource efﬁciency (UNFCCC, 2009c). There are few empirical 
assessments of current capacity building approaches in relation to cli-
mate change (Virji et al., 2012).
13.11 Investment and ﬁnance
Since AR4, international cooperation on climate policy has increas-
ingly focused on mobilizing public and private investment and 
ﬁnance for mitigation and adaptation activities. Such coopera-
tion has included the setup of market mechanisms to generate 
private investment as well as public transfers through dedicated 
institutions (Michaelowa, 2012b). The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 
included a provision to jointly mobilize 100 billion USD per year by 
2020 to address the needs of developing countries, in the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation 
(UNFCCC, 2009a). In order to reach this goal, the High-level Advisory 
Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) (AGF, 2010) identiﬁed four 
potential sources of ﬁnance: public sources (funds mobilized under 
the UNFCCC), development bank instruments, carbon market ﬁnance, 
and private capital. 
In the follow-up to the Copenhagen conference, the term ‘climate 
ﬁnance’ has been coined for ﬁnancial ﬂows to developing countries, 
but there exists no internationally agreed deﬁnition (Buchner et  al., 
2011). Stadelmann et al. (2011b) provide a discussion of what could 
be counted and how the baseline for international climate ﬁnance 
could be set to provide ‘new and additional’ funds. See Section 16.2.2 
for a description of the potential ﬁnancing need and Section 16.5 for 
a description of possible public funding sources.
13.11.1 Public ﬁnance ﬂows
13.11.1.1 Public funding vehicles under the UNFCCC
The largest share of UNFCCC-organized climate ﬁnance goes to miti-
gation: Abadie et al. (2013) provide reasons for this, such as the dif-
ferences between mitigation and adaptation regarding public good 
characteristics and the lack of information regarding context-speciﬁc 
climate impacts. The UNFCCC mobilizes ﬁnancial ﬂows to developing 
countries and countries in transition through four primary vehicles: (1) 
the GEF, which focuses on mitigation (GEF, 2011); (2) the LDCF and 
SCCF, which focus on adaptation; (3) the Adaptation Fund, which also 
focuses on adaptation; and (4) the GCF, which will focus on both miti-
gation and adaptation when it becomes operational. The GEF is the 
secretariat for all funds other than the GCF. This section reviews the 
literature on these four mechanisms (see also Section 16.5; UNFCCC, 
2012a).
The Adaptation Fund is ﬁnanced through a 2 % in-kind levy on emis-
sions credits generated by CDM projects, though parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol have contributed additional funding (Liverman and Billett, 
2010; Horstmann, 2011; Ratajczak-Juszko, 2012). All other UNFCCC 
funding vehicles are based on voluntary government contributions 
that can be counted as ofﬁcial development assistance. Ayers and 
Huq (2009) maintain that the Adaptation Fund’s governance struc-
ture avoids many of the issues of ownership and accountability faced 
by other funds. Harmeling and Kaloga (2011) examine the inﬂuence 
of competing interests on funding decisions by the Adaptation Fund 
Board. Under the Fund, Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs) have 
had the most success in securing funding, followed by National Imple-
menting Entities (NIEs), but none by Regional Implementing Entities 
(RIEs). This disparity has led to calls for transparency in project assess-
ment (Harmeling and Kaloga, 2011). Grasso and Sacchi (2011) discuss 
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issues of justice in Adaptation Fund ﬁnancing decisions to date. Further 
research into the distribution of adaptation ﬁnance across countries, 
sectors, and communities is required to assess the equity, efﬁciency, 
effectiveness, and environmental impacts of the operation of the Adap-
tation Fund (Persson, 2011).
The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC has decision-making 
power regarding the representation of country groups on the govern-
ing boards of the UNFCCC’s funding vehicles, voting rules, the choice of 
secretariat and the choice of trustee (e. g., who oversees the ﬁnances 
and ensures funds go where they are supposed to go). Due to its com-
plex structure, the GEF faces challenges coordinating with UNFCCC 
decisions (COWI and IIED, 2009; Ayers and Huq, 2009). Recipient coun-
tries have a majority on the board of the Adaptation Fund, while the 
decision-making bodies for the other UNFCCC ﬁnancing institutions 
have equal representation for developing and industrialized countries. 
The Adaptation Fund has allowed the possibility of ‘direct access’ by 
host country institutions, which has been used sparingly to date (Rata-
jczak-Juszko, 2012). The GEF is also starting to experiment with this 
approach (GEF, 2011).
Funding per country eligible under the Adaptation Fund is limited to 10 
million USD, essentially leading to a situation where each country gets 
ﬁnancing for a single project. Stadelmann et al. (2013) show that this 
does not lead to projects ranking high on equity and efﬁciency criteria. 
The GEF operates funding ﬂoors and caps for each country (currently 2 
million USD and 11 % of the total volume available, respectively) (GEF, 
2010). Between these thresholds, a complex allocation formula is used 
whose variables consist of GDP, project portfolio performance, country 
environmental policy and institutional performance, GHG-emissions 
level, development of carbon intensity, forestry emissions, and changes 
in deforestation.
A step change with regards to the international coordination of pub-
lic ﬁnance ﬂows was the collective commitment by industrialized 
countries in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 to provide resources 
approaching 30 billion USD as ‘Fast Start Finance’ (FSF) during the 
period 2010 – 2012 for mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-
tries (UNFCCC, 2009a). Fast Start Finance was to provide ‘new and 
additional’ resources, ﬂowing through existing multilateral, regional, 
and bilateral channels. Although few countries disclose details of their 
FSF, studies show that FSF ranges from small grants to large loans 
for infrastructure development (Fransen et  al., 2012; Nakhooda and 
Fransen, 2012; Kuramochi et al., 2012). While the FSF commitment for 
2010 – 2012 has been exceeded, transparency regarding allocation cri-
teria and actual disbursement is low (Ciplet et al., 2013). Ofﬁcial devel-
opment assistance (ODA) made up a large share of total funding (Ball-
esteros et al., 2010) and several studies argue that the use of ODA as 
a substitute for new climate ﬁnance mechanisms could divert funding 
away from other important imperatives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 
2007; Ayers and Huq, 2009; Gupta and van der Grijp, 2010). See also 
Section 16.2.1.1.
13.11.1.2 Multilateral development banks
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have played a signiﬁcant role 
in mobilizing, coordinating, and overseeing the growth of climate-
related ﬁnancial ﬂows. The World Bank provides services as trustee or 
interim trustee for all the UNFCCC-related funds noted above. A group 
of MDBs manages and governs the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), 
which were set up in 2008, are not supervised by the UNFCCC, and are 
ﬁnanced through voluntary government contributions. The Clean Tech-
nology Fund supports investments in low-carbon technologies, and the 
Strategic Climate Fund is an umbrella for improving resilience against 
climate change, reducing deforestation and renewable energy support 
for low-income countries. 
Tirpak and Adams (2008) see increases in MDBs’ funding and shifts to 
low-GHG technologies being fragile owing to variability and low lev-
els of funding. Bowen (2011) proposes expansion of the capital base 
of multilateral ﬁnancial institutions in order to increase concessional 
ﬁnancing (ﬁnance made available at lower than market costs) of miti-
gation and adaptation activities.
Over the last two decades, recipients have gained more decision-
making power in the institutions under the UNFCCC, while multi-
lateral ﬁnancial institutions have not followed this trend. Financing 
is typically not given directly to the project recipients but provided 
through implementing agencies, mostly multilateral ﬁnancial institu-
tions or UN agencies that fulﬁl predeﬁned ﬁduciary standards. Direct 
access, as implemented by the Adaptation Fund, is seen by some as 
the most appropriate model for climate ﬁnance (UNDP, 2011). How-
ever, peer-reviewed literature comparing the effectiveness of the 
two approaches is lacking. At the same time, national development 
banks (e. g., China Development Bank, Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES)), Bilateral Finance Institutions, and a planned multilateral 
fund of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) coun-
tries have also provided or may provide substantial funding (Höhne 
et al., 2012a; Robles, 2012)
13.11.2 Mobilizing private investment and 
ﬁnancial ﬂows
Another emerging focus of international climate cooperation is on 
mobilizing private investment to ﬁnance mitigation and adaptation. 
As discussed in Sections 13.4.1.4 and 13.13.1.1, carbon credits from 
market mechanisms generate revenues for private sector players, thus 
leveraging potentially large investments in mitigation. Such leverage 
is seen as important by Urpelainen (2012), who presents a game-
theoretical model where capacity building leverages private mitiga-
tion investment. A number of international initiatives have supported 
capacity building for market mechanisms (Okubo and Michaelowa, 
2010). Also, the multilateral ﬁnancing institutions discussed in Sec-
tion 13.11.1 will ‘leverage’ private ﬁnance to complement their public 
funding.
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The potential for leveraging to lead to double- and multiple-counting 
has led to suggestions that internationally agreed methodologies to 
account for leveraging are needed (Clapp et al., 2012), which would 
be of help in consistent reporting of ﬁnance against the goal agreed 
under the UNFCCC. Stadelmann et al. (2011a) ﬁnd that the leverage 
factors, that is the ratio between mobilized private funding and mobi-
lized public ﬁnance, for the Climate Technology Fund under the CIFs 
and the GEF reach self-reported levels of 8.4 and 6.2, respectively. 
However, an analysis of over 200 CDM and close to 400 GEF projects, 
Stadelmann et al. (2011a) ﬁnd a leverage ratio of just 3.0 – 4.5. More-
over, high-leverage factors may mean that the underlying project is not 
additional, i. e., not contributing to mitigation. Finally, instead of lever-
aging in the private sector through capacity building, the World Bank 
engagement in the Kyoto mechanisms has at least partially crowded 
out private sector activities, as shown empirically by Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2011).
Besides market mechanisms, other instruments such as grants, loans 
at concessional rates, provision of equity through ﬁnancial institutions, 
or guarantees can mobilize private funds. This can happen directly on 
the company level or be channelled through national governments 
(Neuhoff et  al., 2010). While they can be implemented on any level 
of aggregation, the level of incentive provided could be coordinated 
internationally, e. g., by basing it on a previously agreed ‘social cost of 
carbon’ (Hourcade et al., 2012). The success of the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency shows that costs of guarantees are likely to be 
low if multilateral and bilateral ﬁnancial institutions with strong ﬁnan-
cial ratings provide them (Brown et al., 2011; Buchner et al., 2011).
13.12 The role of public and 
private sectors and public-
private partnerships
International responses to climate change ultimately depend on pri-
vate sector action. Large multinational corporations produce about 
half of the global world product and global GHG emissions (Morgera, 
2004). Hence, private companies will need to generate investment and 
innovation necessary to pursue a low-carbon economy (Forsyth, 2005). 
Given that damages from climate change are a (negative) externality, 
a gap remains between the need for GHG reduction and the commit-
ments of the largest international companies (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 
2011). While some business sectors may have an interest advancing 
policy to mitigate climate change (Pulver, 2007; Falkner, 2008; Pinkse 
and Kolk, 2009; Meckling, 2011), in practice the public sector typically 
guides, supports, and motivates private sectors to contribute to a low-
carbon economy. These types of public sector interactions with the 
private sector can operate through government regulations (whether 
market-based or conventional), but may also be facilitated through 
public-private partnerships, the focus of this section.
13.12.1 Public-private partnerships
One channel for such guidance is through public-private partnerships 
focused on climate change, which have multiplied and grown in recent 
years (Bäckstrand, 2008; Pattberg, 2010; Andonova, 2010; Kolk et al., 
2010). Public-private partnerships involve governments, businesses, 
and sometimes NGOs. Examples include the Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efﬁciency Partnership (REEEP) (Parthan et al., 2010); the Meth-
ane to Markets initiative (now renamed the Global Methane Initia-
tive) (de Coninck et al., 2008); the former Asia Paciﬁc Partnership on 
Climate and Energy (which was largely organized through sector-spe-
ciﬁc partnerships) (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt, 2009; McGee 
and Taplin, 2009; Okazaki and Yamaguchi, 2011); the Global Superior 
Energy Performance Partnership (taking sector-speciﬁc activities from 
the regional scale to the global scale) (Fujiwara, 2012; Okazaki et al., 
2012; see also Section 14.3.3); the CDM (where some projects can 
take the character of public-private partnerships) (Streck, 2004; Green, 
2008; Newell, 2009); the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (Lecocq, 
2003; Andonova, 2010); the UN Fund for International Partnerships 
(39 % of whose environmental partnerships are in energy- or climate 
change-related projects) (Andonova, 2010); the UN Global Compact’s 
‘Caring for Climate’ initiative (Abbott, 2011); the Green Power Mar-
ket Development Group (Andonova, 2009); and the Munich Climate 
Insurance Initiative (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). These partnerships can 
facilitate development and commercial deployment of low-carbon 
technologies as governments remove barriers to the entry and pro-
vide stakeholders with new business frameworks. Industries also dem-
onstrate leadership through active involvement with regards to their 
technologies, investments, and know-how (IEA, 2010).
Some international public-private partnerships concentrate on the 
development of speciﬁc technologies. Others focus on rural renew-
able energy or low-carbon energy development in general. Others 
center their attention on carbon market development. Few focus 
on adaptation, although the insurance sector is involved in such 
initiatives (Pinkse and Kolk, 2011). Effective partnerships are insti-
tutionalized with representatives of major stakeholders, a perma-
nent secretariat, resources and a dedicated mission (Pattberg et al., 
2012). Company willingness to engage in adaptation depends on 
their capacity, their past exposure to disasters, and the link between 
their business planning horizons and climate impact uncertainty 
(Agrawala et  al., 2011). Some also need to ensure that they are 
able to adapt to changing climatic circumstances (Linnenluecke and 
Grifﬁths, 2010; Vine, 2012).
13.12.2 Private sector-led governance initiatives
Private sector actors have also engaged in direct attempts to govern 
aspects of climate change transnationally. First, some institutional 
investors now ask companies to report on their GHG emissions, strate-
gies to reduce them, and more broadly on climate risk exposures (Kolk 
et al., 2008; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Harmes, 2011; MacLeod and 
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Park, 2011). The most important example of this is the Carbon Disclo-
sure Project, whose signatories controlled 70 trillion USD in assets in 
2011 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). The private sector is playing a 
role in developing systems for carbon accounting (Lovell and MacKen-
zie, 2011).
Second, like NGOs (see Section 13.5.2), private-sector actors have 
developed initiatives to govern voluntary carbon markets, either 
through certiﬁcation standards for offset markets or by developing 
trading exchanges, registries, and protocols for reporting GHGs (Green, 
2010, 2013; Hoffmann, 2011). Many of the certiﬁcation schemes 
are either developed by private-sector actors (such as the Voluntary 
Carbon Standard, developed by the International Emissions Trading 
Association, the Climate Group, and the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development) or by such actors in collaboration with envi-
ronmental NGOs (such as the Social Carbon standard). 
13.12.3 Motivations for public-private sector 
collaboration and private sector 
governance
For private sector actors, partnerships with governments or NGOs on 
climate may create direct economic beneﬁts through ﬁnancial support, 
learning opportunities, risk sharing, or market access (Pinkse, 2007; 
Perusse et  al., 2009). Since direct regulation of ﬁrms at the interna-
tional level is unavailable, states have incentives to pursue partner-
ships to affect transnational private sector activities. International 
organizations pursue partnerships for similar reasons (Andonova, 
2010). Partnerships or private governance may create club goods for 
participants (Andonova, 2009). Sometimes, ﬁrms are motivated more 
by concerns for public relations (Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). Private sec-
tor ﬁnance can be stimulated by a ﬁve-step approach: strategic goal 
setting and policy alignment, an enabling process and incentives for 
low-carbon and climate-resilient (LCR) investment, ﬁnancial policies 
and instruments, harnessing resources and building capacity for a LCR 
economy, and promoting green business and consumer behaviour 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2012).
13.13 Performance assessment 
on policies and 
institutions including 
market mechanisms
This section surveys and synthesizes quantitative and qualitative 
assessments of existing and proposed forms of international coop-
eration to address climate change mitigation that have appeared in 
the literature since AR4. Adaptation is not treated here, as there have 
been few international cooperative initiatives focused on adaptation, 
although these are now starting to emerge (Section 13.5.1.1).
Existing cooperation is considered in Section 13.13.1 with reference 
to the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol, the CDM, agreements under the 
UNFCCC pertaining to the post-2012 period, and agreements and 
other forms of international cooperation outside of the UNFCCC. Sec-
tion 13.13.2 considers the literature that assesses various proposed 
forms of future international cooperation described in Section 13.4.3. 
Throughout, we synthesize assessments in terms of the four criteria 
discussed in Section 13.2: environmental effectiveness, aggregate eco-
nomic performance, distributional impacts, and institutional feasibility. 
Table 13.3 summarizes the key ﬁndings of this section’s performance 
assessment.
In applying the evaluation criteria to evaluate existing and proposed 
forms of international cooperation, ﬁve general caveats apply. First, 
an ex-ante evaluation of a policy may overestimate the costs and / or 
the beneﬁts of that policy for several reasons, such as overestimating 
the extent of its implementation (Harrington et al., 2000; Harrington, 
2006), failing to account for over-reporting by regulated parties (Bai-
ley et al., 2002), and underestimating learning related to technologi-
cal development (Norman et al, 2008). Second, ex-ante evaluation may 
over- or under-estimate the effectiveness of proposed cooperation, 
because interactions between proposed policies and other existing 
policies may be difﬁcult to predict. These interactions can be coun-
terproductive, inconsequential, or beneﬁcial (Fankhauser et al., 2010; 
Goulder and Stavins, 2011; Levinson, 2012). Third, while evaluation 
of proposed policies can be informed by lessons learned from regime 
complexes in other contexts (see Section 13.5), such lessons may come 
with extrapolation bias, since it may not be appropriate to generalize 
to climate change ﬁndings from other contexts. Fourth, in comparing 
existing policies using these criteria, it can be helpful to keep in mind 
that as institutions evolve, the performance of particular policies may 
also change. Fifth and ﬁnally, the overall performance of the inter-
national regime depends also on national and regional policies (see 
Chapters 14 and 15, in particular Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5). 
13.13.1 Performance assessment of existing 
cooperation
13.13.1.1 Assessment of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, 
and its ﬂexible mechanisms
The UNFCCC established a framework and a set of principles and goals 
for the international response to climate change. Under Article 2, the 
parties agreed to the objective of “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system,” an objective which was 
not quantiﬁed and was subject to several caveats. Under Article 4(2)
(a), the Annex I parties committed to adopt measures (which could be 
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Table 13.3 | Summary of performance assessments of existing cooperation of proposed cooperation on climate change.
Mode of International 
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental 
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic 
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Existing 
Cooperation 
[13.13.1]
UNFCCC Aggregate GHG emissions in 
Annex I countries declined by 
6.0 to 9.2 % below 1990 levels 
by 2000, a larger reduction 
than the apparent ‘aim’ of 
returning to 1990 levels by 
2000.
Authorized joint fulﬁlment 
of commitments, multi-gas 
approach, sources and sinks, 
and domestic policy choice. 
Cost and beneﬁt estimates 
depend on baseline, discount 
rate, participation, leakage, co-
beneﬁts, adverse side-effects, 
and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between Annex I (developed) 
and non-Annex I countries. 
Principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility.’ 
Commitment to ‘equitable and 
appropriate contributions by 
each [party].’
Ratiﬁed (or equivalent) by 195 
countries and regional organi-
zations. Compliance depends 
on national communications.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) Aggregate GHG emissions in 
Annex I countries were reduced 
by 8.5 to 13.6 % below 1990 
levels by 2011, more than the 
ﬁrst commitment period (CP1) 
collective reduction target of 
5.2 %. Reductions occurred 
mainly in EITs; emissions 
increased in some others. 
Incomplete participation in CP1 
(even lower in CP2).
Cost-effectiveness improved 
by ﬂexible mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation (JI), CDM, 
International Emissions 
Trading (IET)) and domestic 
policy choice. Cost and beneﬁt 
estimates depend on baseline, 
discount rate, participation, 
leakage, co-beneﬁts, adverse 
side-effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between developed and devel-
oping countries, but dichoto-
mous distinction correlates 
only partly (and decreasingly) 
with historical emissions trends 
and with changing economic 
circumstances. Intertemporal 
equity affected by short-term 
actions.
Ratiﬁed (or equivalent) by 
192 countries and regional 
organizations, but took 7 
years to enter into force. 
Compliance depends on 
national communications, plus 
KP compliance system. Later 
added approaches to enhance 
measurement, reporting, and 
veriﬁcation (MRV).
The Kyoto Mechanisms About 1.4 billion tCO2eq credits 
under the CDM, 0.8 billion 
under JI, and 0.2 billion under 
IET (through October 2013). 
Additionality of CDM projects 
remains an issue but regulatory 
reform underway.
CDM mobilized low-cost 
options, particularly industrial 
gases, reducing costs. Under-
performance of some project 
types. Some evidence that 
technology is transferred to 
non-Annex I countries.
Limited direct investment from 
Annex I countries. Domestic 
investment dominates, leading 
to concentration of CDM 
projects in few countries. 
Limited contributions to local 
sustainable development.
Helped enable political 
feasibility of Kyoto Protocol. 
Has multi-layered governance. 
Largest carbon markets to date. 
Has built institutional capacity 
in developing countries.
Further Agreements under the 
UNFCCC
Pledges to limit GHG emissions 
made by all major emitters 
under Cancún Agreements. 
Unlikely sufﬁcient to limit 
temperature change to 2°C 
cost-effectively. Depends on 
treatment of measures beyond 
current pledges for mitigation 
and ﬁnance. Durban Platform 
calls for new agreement by 
2015, to take effect in 2020, 
engaging all parties.
Efﬁciency not assessed. 
Cost-effectiveness might be 
improved by market-based 
policy instruments, inclusion of 
forestry sector, commitments 
by more nations than Annex I 
countries (as envisioned in 
Durban Platform).
Depends on sources of ﬁnanc-
ing, particularly for actions of 
developing countries.
Cancún Conference of the 
Parties (COP) decision; 97 
countries made pledges of 
emission reduction targets or 
actions for 2020.
Agreements 
outside the 
UNFCCC
G8, G20, 
Major
Economies 
Forum on 
Energy and 
Climate (MEF)
G8 and MEF have recom-
mended GHG emissions 
reductions by all major emitters. 
G20 may spur GHG emissions 
reductions by phasing out of 
fossil fuel subsidies.
Action by all major emitters 
may reduce leakage and 
improve cost-effectiveness, 
if implemented using ﬂex-
ible mechanisms. Potential 
efﬁciency gains through 
subsidy removal. Too early to 
assess economic performance 
empirically.
Has not mobilized climate 
ﬁnance. Removing fuel 
subsidies would be progressive 
but have negative effects on 
oil-exporting countries and on 
those with very low incomes 
unless other help for the poor-
est is provided.
Lower participation of countries 
than UNFCCC, yet covers 70 % 
of global emissions. Opens 
possibility for forum-shopping, 
based on issue preferences.
Montreal 
Protocol on 
Ozone-
Depleting 
Substances 
(ODS)
Spurred GHG emissions reduc-
tions through ODS phaseouts 
approximately 5 times the mag-
nitude of Kyoto CP1 targets. 
Contribution may be negated 
by high-GWP substitutes, 
though efforts to phase out 
HFCs are growing.
Cost-effectiveness supported 
by multi-gas approach. Some 
countries used market-based 
mechanisms to implement 
domestically.
Later compliance period for 
phaseouts by developing coun-
tries. Montreal Protocol Fund 
provided ﬁnance to developing 
countries.
Universal participation. but the 
timing of required actions vary 
for developed and developing 
countries.
Voluntary 
Carbon 
Market
Covers 0.13 billion tCO2eq, but 
certiﬁcation remains an issue.
Credit prices are heteroge-
neous, indicating market 
inefﬁciencies.
[No literature cited.] Fragmented and non-transpar-
ent market.
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implemented jointly) to limit net emissions (covering both sources and 
sinks of all GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol), “recogniz-
ing that the return by the end of the present decade [the year 2000] 
to earlier levels” would contribute to modifying long-term trends con-
sistent with the treaty’s objective. Under Article 4(2)(b), Annex I parties 
committed to periodically communicate information on their emissions, 
“with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels.” 
According to UN data, aggregate GHG emissions in Annex  I coun-
tries declined by 9.2 % from 1990 – 2000 (if land use and forestry are 
included; or by 6.0 % if they are not; the base year for some coun-
tries is in the mid- or late 1980s) (UNFCCC, 2013c, Proﬁle for Annex I 
Parties). This is a larger reduction than the apparent two-step ‘aim’ 
implied in Article 4(2)(a) and (b) of the UNFCCC to return emissions 
to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Much of this reduction, however, 
was due to factors other than measures adopted under the UNFCCC, 
such as the economic downturn in Annex I ‘economies in transition’ 
(EITs) — Russia, former Soviet Republics, and Eastern Europe — during 
the 1990s.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol adopted the ﬁrst binding, quantitative miti-
gation commitments for developed countries. The 38 countries listed 
in its Annex B (industrialized countries, EITs, and the European Union 
separately from its member states) made aggregate commitments to 
collectively reduce their GHG emissions by 4.2 % relative to 1990 lev-
els (5.2 % relative to the country-speciﬁc base years used for establish-
ing national committments) by the Protocol’s ﬁrst commitment period, 
2008 – 2012 (UNFCCC, 1998, 2012b). Other parties to the Kyoto Proto-
col are not constrained (but can participate in other ways; in particular, 
see discussion of CDM in Section 13.13.1.2). The Protocol also con-
tained a number of new mechanisms, including IET, JI, and the CDM, 
that aimed to help reduce GHG emissions cost-effectively. 
The aggregate emissions by Annex  I countries have been reduced 
below the Kyoto Protocol’s collective 5.2 % reduction target, but, as 
with the UNFCCC, much of the reduction was due to factors other than 
Kyoto Protocol. (The list of countries in the Protocol’s Annex B is nearly 
identical to the list of countries in the Convention’s Annex I during the 
historical periods referenced in this section, and the difference in aggre-
gate emissions between the two does not affect the analysis here.) 
According to UNFCCC GHG inventories, aggregate GHG emissions 
from all Annex  I countries were reduced by 13.6 % from 1990 – 2011 
(if land use and forestry-sector changes are taken into account, and 
8.5 % if they are not). Not counting the United States — because it was 
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol — the reduction from 1990 – 2011 in 
the remaining Annex  I aggregate GHG emissions was 22.9 % if land 
use and forestry sectors changes are taken into account and 16.6 % if 
they are not. Not counting the EITs, the remaining Annex I countries’ 
aggregate GHG emissions increased by 2.1 % and 3.2 % from 1990 to 
2011 (with and without land use and forestry, respectively) (UNFCCC, 
2012b).
Although emissions have decreased among Annex B parties, the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the Protocol’s ﬁrst commitment period has 
been less than it could have been, for several reasons. First, not all 
Annex B parties have participated. The United States, until recently 
the country with the largest share of global emissions (Gregg et al., 
2008), did not ratify the Protocol (see also Section 13.3.1). Therefore, 
its target emissions reduction of 7 %, which would have amounted 
to over 40 % of the difference in total Annex B committed emissions 
commitments and base year emissions levels (UNFCCC, 2012b), 
was not binding. In addition, Canada withdrew from the Protocol in 
December 2011 (effective December 2012). Russia, Japan, and New 
Zealand opted not to participate in the second commitment period 
(2013 – 2020).
Mode of International 
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental 
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic 
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Proposed 
Cooperation
[13.13.2]
Proposed 
architectures
Strong multi-
lateralism
Tradeoff between ambition 
(deep) and participation 
(broad).
More cost-effective with 
greater reliance on market 
mechanisms.
Multilateralism facilitates 
integrating distributional 
impacts into negotiations and 
may apply equity-based criteria 
as outlined in Ch. 4
Depends on number of parties; 
degree of ambition.
Harmonized 
national 
policies
Depends on net aggregate 
change in ambition across 
countries resulting from 
harmonization.
More cost-effective with 
greater reliance on market 
mechanisms.
Depends on speciﬁc national 
policies.
Depends on similarity of 
national policies; more similar 
may support harmonization but 
domestic circumstances may 
vary. National enforcement.
Decentralized 
architectures, 
coordinated 
national 
policies
Effectiveness depends on 
quality of standards and credits 
across countries.
Often (though not necessarily) 
refers to linkage of national 
cap-and-trade systems, in 
which case cost-effective.
Depends on speciﬁc national 
policies.
Depends on similarity of 
national policies. National 
enforcement.
Effort (burden) sharing 
arrangements
Refer to Sections 4.6.2 for discussion of the principles on which effort (burden) sharing arrangements may be based, and Section 6.3.6.6 
for quantitative evaluation.
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Second, the Annex B EITs were credited for emissions reductions that 
would have occurred without the Protocol due to their signiﬁcant 
economic contraction during the 1990s. These loose targets may 
have been necessary to engage them as parties (Stewart and Wie-
ner, 2003). In principle, these countries were allowed to sell resultant 
surplus emissions-reduction credits to other Annex B parties, which 
might have further reduced environmental effectiveness. However, 
in practice, other parties bought few AAUs relative to the stock 
available from EITs during the ﬁrst commitment period (perhaps 
because the United States decision not to ratify reduced demand 
for such allowances), and thus environmental effectiveness was 
not affected as much as it could have been (Brandt and Svendsen, 
2002; Böhringer, 2003; IPCC, 2007, p.  778; Crowley, 2007; Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012). 
Current model projections imply that emission reductions achieved by 
Annex B parties during the ﬁrst and second commitment periods of 
the Kyoto Protocol are not likely to be sufﬁcient to achieve environ-
mental performance that limits global average temperature increases 
to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (Rogelj et al., 2011; Höhne et al., 
2012b) (see also Section 6.4 for a discussion of scenarios that relate 
short-term environmental performance to long-term GHG stabiliza-
tion and tempterature change goals). A key reason is that, since 1990, 
the Annex B countries’ share of global GHG emissions has declined 
signiﬁcantly, from approximately 56 % of global emissions in 1990 
to approximately 39 % in 2010. Simultaneously, overall global GHG 
emissions have risen signiﬁcantly; global emissions in 2010 were 
approximately 31 % higher than in 1990 (JRC / PBL, 2013) (see Section 
5.2). 
The criterion of economic performance encompasses both efﬁciency 
and cost-effectiveness (see Sections 3.7.1 and 13.2.) Assessments of 
the efﬁciency of the Kyoto Protocol depend on respective estimates 
of the costs and beneﬁts of mitigation and assumptions regarding 
the appropriate discount rate (see Sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.6.2 on dis-
counting). Contrasting assumptions regarding these values are the key 
determinants in explaining the differences between assessments that 
have found the Protocol inefﬁcient (e. g., Nordhaus, 2007), and those 
that ﬁnd it cost-effective, but insufﬁcient (e. g., Stern, 2007; Weitzman, 
2007). These latter researchers also tend to emphasize the non-zero 
probability of catastrophic climate outcomes. The Kyoto Protocol also 
fostered monitoring and reporting of emissions, and capacity build-
ing in developing countries, which may facilitate further cost-effective 
action in the future (Hare et al., 2010).
With respect to cost-effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol’s three market-
based instruments (the CDM, JI, and IET) intended to lower the cost 
of the global regime (see Section 13.4.2.3 for a description of these 
mechanisms). Most research on the Kyoto mechanisms has focused on 
the CDM, primarily because transaction volumes of CDM credits have 
been so much greater than JI credits or AAUs. Performance assessment 
of the CDM is discussed separately in Section 13.13.1.2.
International Emissions Trading could, in theory, reduce abate-
ment costs by as much as 50 % if trades took place among Annex 
B countries (Blanford et al., 2010; Bosetti et al., 2010; Jacoby et al., 
2010). However, in practice, trading under this mechanism has been 
limited, partly due to the surplus problem discussed above (Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012) and the absence of the United States. As of July 
2013, 0.2 billion tCO2eq have been traded through IET (Point Carbon, 
2013). The few trades that were made generally required reinvest-
ment of the revenues into projects that reduce GHG emissions, under 
so-called ‘Green Investment Schemes.’ The economic performance of 
IET also depends on what type of actor is doing the trading. Early 
expectations were that the main traders would be states (national 
governments), and that states would not operate as efﬁcient trad-
ers, because they are not cost-minimizers (e. g., Hahn and Stavins, 
1999). In practice, increasing shares of trades have been made by 
private sector ﬁrms, which may increase cost-effectiveness (Aldrich 
and Koerner, 2012). 
Joint Implementation also has the potential to improve the cost-effec-
tiveness of Annex B countries’ activities under the Protocol (Böhringer, 
2003; Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010). A large majority of JI projects 
have been in the transition economies, especially Russia and Ukraine, 
given the low cost of emissions reductions there relative to other 
Annex B countries (Korppoo and Moe, 2008). From 2008 through July 
2013, JI had led to the issuance of over 0.8 billion emission reduction 
unit (ERU) credits (UNFCCC, 2013d), each equivalent to one tCO2eq of 
reported emission abatement. Over half of this volume was issued by 
Ukraine and Russia, especially in 2012 in response to the limitation 
on carrying over surplus AAUs to the second commitment period. The 
actual distribution of JI projects is not consistent with the theoretical 
potential, as some countries, such as Ukraine, proactively supported JI, 
while in others, including Russia, JI lacked political support, and efﬁ-
cient frameworks took several years to establish. In Western Europe, 
a number of companies in the chemical industry generated emission 
credits for their own use in the EU ETS, demonstrating the cost-reduc-
tion potential (Shishlov et  al., 2012). Countries without a surplus of 
emission units usually applied strict rules to capture part of the emis-
sion reductions achieved by JI projects (Michaelowa and O’brien, 2006; 
Shishlov et al., 2012).
In addition to the three Kyoto ﬂexibility mechanisms, the Protocol 
provides ﬂexibility with regard to how Annex B parties may achieve 
their targets; they may employ domestic or regional policies of their 
own choice. One result has been the development of domestic emis-
sions trading programmes in several countries and regions (Paterson 
et  al., 2014). Regional and national emissions trading programmes 
include those in the EU (the EU ETS), Australia, and New Zealand, 
as well as subnational trading programmes in the United States 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California / WCI) 
and in China (seven regional pilot programmes launched in 2013). 
See Figure 13.4 above and Sections 14.4.2 and 15.5; (Convery and 
Redmond, 2007; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Ellerman and Joskow, 
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2008; Ellerman, 2010; Ellerman et  al., 2010; Olmstead and Stavins, 
2012; Newell et al., 2013).
Distributional impacts of the Kyoto Protocol have been examined 
both cross-sectionally (mainly geographically) and temporally. Income 
patterns and trends as well as distribution of GHG emissions have 
changed signiﬁcantly since the 1990s, when the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol listed Annex  I / Annex B countries; some countries outside 
these lists have become wealthier and larger emitters than some 
countries on these lists (U. S. Department of Energy, 2012; WRI, 2012; 
Aldy and Stavins, 2012). For example, in 1990, China’s total CO2 emis-
sions were about half of United States emissions, but by 2010, China 
emitted more than 50 % more CO2 than the United States. Over this 
same time period, China’s per capita CO2 emissions experienced an 
almost three-fold increase, rising to nearly equal the level in the EU, 
but still about 36 % of the United States level (IEA, 2012; PBL, 2012, 
see Annex II.9; Olivier et al., 2012; JRC / PBL, 2013). Non-Annex I coun-
tries as a group have a share in the cumulative global greenhouse 
emissions for the period 1850 to 2010 close to 50 %, a share that is 
increasing (den Elzen et al., 2013b) (see Section 5.2.1 for more detail 
on historical emissions).
Meanwhile, income inequality and variations in capacity remain sub-
stantial both within and across countries. While GDP per capita in 
some non-Annex I countries has increased and some have joined the 
OECD, incomes of G8 countries remain higher than those of major 
emerging economies such as the BASIC countries (World Bank, 2013). 
Poverty is much more extensive and income at lower absolute levels 
in the latter, compared to the former (Milanovic, 2012). Inequality in 
income remains related to inequalities in emissions (Padilla and Ser-
rano, 2006; Chakravarty et al., 2009). 
More broadly, although the Kyoto Protocol’s quantitative mitigation 
requirements are limited to Annex B countries, the economic impacts of 
these requirements may spill over to non-Annex B countries (Böhringer 
and Rutherford, 2004). In terms of intertemporal distributional equity, 
some have noted that climate change mitigation that requires emis-
sions reductions in the short term for uncertain long-term beneﬁts, 
also involves inter-generational distributional impacts (Schelling, 1997; 
Leach, 2009).
Among Annex B countries, the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions-target allo-
cation is generally progressive, one common measure of distributional 
equity, exhibiting positive correlation between gross domestic prod-
uct per capita and the degree of targeted emissions reduction below 
business-as-usual levels. For a 10 % increase in per capita GDP, Annex 
B countries’ emissions reduction targets are, on average, about 1.4 % 
more stringent (Frankel, 1999, 2005).
In terms of institutional feasibility, it is notable that the Kyoto Proto-
col has been ratiﬁed (or the equivalent) by 191 countries (plus the EU 
separately) (Falkner et al., 2010). As noted above, participation among 
Annex I countries in emissions-reduction commitments dropped signif-
icantly from the ﬁrst (2008 – 2012) to the second (2013 – 2020) commit-
ment periods, though the stringency of the emission-reduction com-
mitments of those countries still participating increased for the second 
period. More broadly, the high rate of ratiﬁcation is likely due in part 
to the lack of emissions-reduction commitments asked of non-Annex B 
countries (Lutter, 2000).
Allowing Annex B countries the ﬂexibility to choose policies to meet 
their national emissions commitments may have contributed to insti-
tutional feasibility. However, compromises made during the negotia-
tion of the Protocol that enabled its institutional and political viability 
may have reduced its environmental effectiveness (Victor, 2004; Helm, 
2010; Falkner et al., 2010). This serves as an example of the tradeoff 
across ambition, participation, and compliance discussed in Section 
13.2.2.5.
Additionally, obstacles for enforcement have hurt the Protocol’s insti-
tutional feasibility. Despite the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system 
(Oberthür and Ott, 1999; Hare et  al., 2010; Brunnée et  al., 2012), it 
is difﬁcult in practice to enforce the Kyoto Protocol’s targets because 
of the lack of a legal authority with enforcement powers, and the 
weakness of possible sanctions relative to the costs of compliance. 
This is, of course, true of most international agreements (van Kooten, 
2003; Böhringer, 2003; Barrett, 2008b) (see also Sections 13.3.2 and 
13.4.2.1.).
13.13.1.2 Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism
The CDM aims to reduce mitigation costs for Annex B countries and 
contribute to sustainable development in non-Annex B countries 
(UNFCCC, 1998) (Article 12). This mechanism led to the issuance of 
nearly 1.4 billion emission credits from over 7300 registered projects 
by October 2013 (see Section 13.7.2; UNFCCC, 2014). This performance 
was surprising, given that the CDM suffered from many disadvantages 
relative to the other ﬂexibility mechanisms (Woerdman, 2000).
The environmental effectiveness of the CDM depends on three key 
factors: whether a credited project actually reduces more emissions 
than would have been reduced in its absence (which may depend 
on whether the project developers are indeed motivated primarily by 
expected revenue from the sale of the emission credits) (‘additional-
ity’); the validity of the baseline from which emission reductions are 
calculated; and indirect emissions impacts (‘leakage’) caused by the 
projects. 
The issue of additionality (IPCC, 2007, pp. 779 – 780) continues to gen-
erate controversy, despite an increasing elaboration of additionality 
tests by CDM regulators (Michaelowa et al., 2009). On the one hand, 
(Schneider, 2009) found that key assumptions regarding additionality 
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were often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence, in 
a sample of 93 projects. On the other hand, (Lewis, 2010) ﬁnds a clear 
contribution of the CDM to the rapid upswing of the renewable energy 
sector in China.
Clean Development Mechanism projects in energy efﬁciency, trans-
port and buildings have faced challenges in baseline determination, 
monitoring, and transaction costs (Sirohi and Michaelowa, 2008; 
Michaelowa et  al., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). Kollmuss 
et al. (2010) suggest that it may be possible to prevent baseline gam-
ing through a clear regulatory framework. Heeding this advice, CDM 
regulators have increased the conservativeness of approved method-
ologies, after rejecting a signiﬁcant share of baseline methodology 
proposals (Michaelowa et al., 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). 
Recent attempts by CDM regulators to standardize baselines have trig-
gered a debate regarding their impacts on environmental effectiveness 
and transaction costs. Making the choice between standardized and 
project-speciﬁc baselines voluntary (Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa, 
2013), as well as “simple, highly aggregated performance standards” 
(Hayashi and Michaelowa, 2013) could reduce environmental effec-
tiveness. 
With regard to leakage, (Vöhringer et al., 2006) argue that emission 
leakage due to market price effects is unavoidable (as it is for mitiga-
tion within Annex B countries), while Kallbekken et  al. (2007) stress 
that regardless of the baseline used, the CDM will reduce carbon 
leakage through the reduction in the difference in marginal mitiga-
tion costs between countries. Schneider (2011) shows that for HFC-23 
reduction projects, baseline gaming enabled production of the under-
lying commodity to shift from industrialized to developing countries 
(Wara, 2008).
With regard to cost-effectiveness, the CDM offers the potential for cost 
savings where abatement costs are lower in developing countries. The 
large volume of credits and projects in the CDM indicates its cost-sav-
ing potential. Still, Castro (2012) found that many low-cost opportuni-
ties had not been taken up by CDM projects. 
The long-term contribution of the CDM to cost-effectiveness depends 
in part on its ability to promote technological change in develop-
ing countries either through technology transfer from industrialized 
to developing countries (see Section 16.8 for an overview of the 
technology transfer component of CDM), or by stimulating innova-
tion within developing countries (Reichman et  al. 2008). Roughly 
a third of CDM projects involve technology transfer (Haites et  al., 
2006). Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the likelihood of technol-
ogy transfer is higher for CDM projects operated by subsidiaries of 
companies from industrialized countries. Seres et al. (2009) ﬁnd that 
36 % of 3296 registered and proposed projects accounting for 59 % 
of the annual emission reductions claim to involve technology trans-
fer, conﬁrming Dechezleprêtre et al.’s (2008) results. But all of these 
technology transfer studies limit themselves to assessment of project 
documents, which are not subject to rigorous and independent veriﬁ-
cation. Project developers have an incentive to overstate technology 
transfer. Wang (2010) is an exception, and underpins his analyses of 
many project documents with background interviews and assesses 
government policies. He ﬁnds that in all but one of the industrial gas 
projects in China, technology transfer occurred, but only in about a 
quarter of wind and coal mine methane projects. Okazaki and Yama-
guchi (2011) fear that transactions costs, imposed by additionality cri-
teria and Executive Board delays, can discourage technology transfer 
through the CDM.
Distributional impacts of the CDM relate to contributions to sustain-
able development, as well as the distribution of rents generated by 
the sale of emission credits. Olsen (2007) provides a summary of the 
early literature that did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for sustainable 
development induced by CDM projects. Several researchers (Sutter 
and Parreño, 2007; Gupta et  al., 2008; Headon, 2009; Boyd et  al., 
2009; Alexeew et al., 2010) see the process of host country respon-
sibility for sustainable development and competition between host 
countries for CDM investment as a reason for the lack of sustain-
ability beneﬁts of CDM projects in some countries, as Designated 
National Authorities (national CDM-management bodies) may not 
adequately scrutinize the environmental or social beneﬁts of proj-
ects. Parnphhumeesup and Kerr (2011) ﬁnd that experts and the local 
population weight sustainability criteria differently in the context of 
biopower projects in Thailand. Ellis et  al. (2007) found wide varia-
tion in the contribution to local sustainable development by project 
type, with greater contributions in small-scale renewable energy and 
energy efﬁciency than in large-scale industrial CDM projects. Using 
a sample of 39 projects, Nussbaumer (2009) ﬁnds that CDM projects 
certiﬁed by ‘The Gold Standard’ — referring both to the organization 
and the certiﬁcation scheme by that name — slightly outperform 
other CDM projects with respect to sustainable-development ben-
eﬁts. A similar result is found by Drupp (2011) for a sample of 18 
Gold Standard projects compared with 30 projects certiﬁed through 
other means. Torvanger et al. (2013) propose dividing the CDM into 
two tracks, one for GHG offsets and one for sustainable develop-
ment (though investors in the second track would need some new 
incentive). 
The distribution of CDM projects has been concentrated in a rela-
tively small number of developing countries (Yamada and Fujimori, 
2012; see also Section 14.3.6.4). Given that companies in developing 
countries ﬁnance CDM projects out of their own resources and even-
tually sell the credits as a new export product, with the CDM consul-
tant receiving a share (Michaelowa, 2007), a substantial amount of 
the rents remain in the host country. At the same time, the demand 
for CERs is evidence that it reduces costs compared to domestic 
reductions by developed countries. The fear, even if unfounded, of 
losing this export revenue may be a deterrent against taking up 
national emissions commitments (Castro, 2012), although in practice 
many such countries are developing policies aimed at emissions limi-
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tations. Therefore, it has been proposed to discount CDM credits to 
provide an incentive for taking up stricter national targets (Schneider, 
2009).
In terms of institutional feasibility, baselines, additionality, and emis-
sions-reductions are subject to third-party audit. However, due to the 
inadequate quality of many audits, regulators have been forced to 
introduce multi-layered procedures that have led to high transaction 
costs. Flues et  al. (2010) show econometrically that regulatory deci-
sions about project registration and baseline methodology approval 
have been inﬂ uenced by political economy considerations.
There is ongoing debate in the literature about the efﬁ cacy of CDM 
governance (Green, 2008; Lund, 2010; Michaelowa, 2011; Okazaki and 
Yamaguchi, 2011; Böhm and Dhabi, 2011; Newell, 2012). The UNFCCC 
commissioned an evaluation of the CDM in the CDM Policy Dialogue, 
which issued a report in September 2012 recommending several 
reforms of CDM governance (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012). Michaelowa 
(2009) and Schneider (2009) propose a shift from the current 1:1 off-
setting system to a system that only credits part of the reductions. 
This would improve additionality on the aggregate level and provide 
an incentive for advanced developing countries to accept their own 
emission reduction commitments. Giving preferential treatment in pro-
cedures and methodology to certain project categories, certain sectors, 
notably forestry (Thomas et al., 2010; CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012), or 
certain regions (Nguyen et al., 2010; Bakker et al., 2011) might expand 
the reach of CDM. 
The price of CDM credits has declined, due largely to decreased 
demand from the EU ETS and others, following the 2008 recession, as 
well as changes in EU ETS rules regarding the use of CDM credits (see 
Section 13.6.1). In response, the CDM Policy Dialogue (2012) proposed 
creation of a central bank for carbon markets to bolster credit prices, 
as well as further standardization of baseline and additionality deter-
mination to reduce transaction costs. The beneﬁ ts of these two recom-
mendations are disputed in the literature (Hayashi and Michaelowa, 
2013; Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa, 2013).
13.13.1.3 Assessment of further agreements under the 
UNFCCC
As discussed in 13.5.1.1, since AR4, negotiations under the UNFCCC 
have produced the system of pledges in the Copenhagen Accord and 
the Cancún Agreements, as well as the development of the GCF and 
an agreement to negotiate a new agreement by 2015. In terms of 
Figure 13.5 | Blue box plots show historic global GHG emissions and emissions in 2020 from business-as-usual projections and projections including Cancún pledges. Four cases 
are considered which combine assumptions about pledges (unconditional or conditional) and rules for complying with pledges (lenient or strict)*. The ranges of 2020 emissions 
(20th percentile, median, and 80th percentile) are taken directly from the UNEP Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2012) and represent ﬁ ndings from various modelling groups consider-
ing scenarios that begin mitigation immediately. The arrows indicate the difference between the median emissions projection in each case and the median emission level projected 
to maintain temperature change below 2 °C with a greater than 66 % probability. The ranges (20th to 80th percentiles) of 2020 emissions that maintain temperature change below 
2 °C can be compared to those from cost-effective immediate mitigation scenarios from the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database: greater than 66 % probability: 36 – 47 GtCO2eq / yr; 
50 – 66 % probability: 43 – 47 GtCO2eq / yr (see Chapter 6 and Annex II.10 for details, including MAGICC calculations). Differences in these ranges depend, for example, on assump-
tions about the availability of negative emissions technologies (see, e.g, Figure 6.31). Note that the analysis reconciles pledges for all countries against a business-as-usual counter-
factual based on what has been described in the literature, even though developed country pledges for 2020 are absolute (against a historical base year) and developing country 
pledges relative (with rare exceptions; see Section 13.5.1).
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environmental performance, these agreements acknowledged that 
deep reductions in GHG emissions would be required to limit global 
average temperature increases to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and 
recognized the possibility strengthening this target to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 
2010). Different goals will imply different reductions in climate change 
impacts (see WGII AR5) and different mitigation costs (see Section 6.3).
There is broad agreement in the literature that global emissions 
reductions through 2020 implied by the Cancún pledges are incon-
sistent with cost-effective mitigation scenarios, which are based on 
the immediate onset of mitigation that maintain temperature change 
below 2 °C with a greater than 50 % probability (see Section 6.4 for 
detail on these scenarios). The difference between the emissions in 
2020 in immediate mitigation scenarios and the Cancún pledges has 
been referred to as the ‘2oC emissions gap’ (Rogelj et al., 2010; Dellink 
et  al., 2011; den Elzen et  al., 2011b; Höhne et  al., 2012b). However, 
there are a number of delayed mitigation scenarios that delay mitiga-
tion and still meet this temperature goal and have emissions in the 
range of the Cancún pledges in 2020 (see Section 6.4). Analyses that 
have quantiﬁed the Cancún pledges exhibit substantial differences in 
results, owing in part to uncertainties in current and projected emis-
sions estimates and interpretations of reduction proposals, and in part 
to different methodologies (UNEP, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b; Höhne 
et al., 2012b) (Figure 13.5). For example, one source of differences in 
analyses is due to changing rules: At COP-17 in Durban in 2011, parties 
agreed to new rules for using land use credits for the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Second Commitment Period (UNFCCC, 2012c; Grassi et al., 2012), and 
at COP-18 in Doha in 2012, for surplus Kyoto allowances (Chen et al., 
2013; UNFCCC, 2012d).
Studies suggest that the emissions gap between current Cancún 
pledges and a an immediate mitigation trajectory consistent with 
maintaining temperature change below 2oC with a 50 % or greater 
chance could be narrowed by implementing more stringent pledges, 
applying stricter accounting rules for credits from forests (Grassi et al., 
2012) and surplus emission units (den Elzen et  al., 2012), avoiding 
double-counting of offsets for both developed-country commitments 
and developing countries’ Cancún pledges (UNEP, 2013b), increas-
ing support for action in developing countries (Winkler et al., 2009), 
and implementing measures beyond current pledges (den Elzen et al., 
2011b; Blok et al., 2012; Weischer et al., 2012; UNEP, 2013b).
In terms of aggregate economic performance, some analyses have esti-
mated the direct costs of the Cancún pledges (den Elzen et al., 2011a), 
as well as broader economic effects (Mckibbin et  al., 2011; Dellink 
et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2011). For example, Dellink et al. (2011) 
estimate costs of action at around 0.3 % of GDP for both Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries and 0.5 – 0.6 % of global real income. However, 
there have been no published comparisons of the beneﬁts and costs 
of the Cancún pledges, and thus no quantitative assessments of eco-
nomic efﬁciency. 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, the Cancún Agreements endorsed an 
on-going role for domestic and international market-based mecha-
nisms, among various approaches, to improve cost-effectiveness. They 
also made a potential step forward on the cost-effectiveness criterion 
by emphasizing the role of mitigation actions in the forestry sector 
(UNFCCC, 2010; Grassi et al., 2012), which could be integrated with 
other actions through market mechanisms. Including forestry in mar-
ket mechanisms could reduce global mitigation costs by taking advan-
tage of low-cost mitigation opportunities in that sector (Eliasch, 2008; 
Busch et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2011; UNEP, 2013b) (see also Section 
13.5.1.1).
Assessing distributional impacts accurately depends both on the 
mitigation costs for developing-country emission reductions and the 
sources of ﬁnancing for such reductions. The distributional equity 
of recent emission-reduction pledges could be increased through 
ﬁnancing of reductions in non-Annex I countries. By one study’s esti-
mate, between 2.1 – 3.3 GtCO2eq could be reduced in non-Annex  I 
countries with 50 billion USD in ﬁnancing, half of the ﬁnancing 
agreed to under the Copenhagen Accord (Carraro and Massetti, 
2012). Studies of the climate change mitigation ‘ﬁnancing gap’ have 
suggested potential approaches to providing ﬁnancial resources 
(Ballesteros et al., 2010; AGF, 2010; Haites, 2011) (see also Sections 
16.2 and 13.11). 
Assessments of climate agreements following the Copenhagen, Can-
cún, and Durban UN climate conferences reﬂect differing interpreta-
tions of recent negotiations with regard to institutional feasibility 
(Dubash, 2009; Rajamani, 2010, 2012a; Werksman and Herbertson, 
2010; Müller, 2010). Copenhagen (2009) was assessed as a failure 
by those who expected a new climate treaty and a second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Others saw the political agreement 
reached among a small group of world leaders (eventually espoused 
by more than ﬁfty) as a major step forward, even though not legally 
binding, especially because it moved toward a future agreement on 
emissions reductions by all major emitting countries, rather than 
continuing to divide developed from developing countries (Ladislaw, 
2010). Others noted more speciﬁc effects, such as the change in the 
organization of carbon markets (Bernstein et al., 2010). The literature 
suggests that views diverge on the Cancún Agreements: some see 
them as a step forward in the multilateral process (Grubb, 2011) 
potentially towards a subsequent legal agreement (Bodansky and Dir-
inger, 2010), while others suggest that the move to a voluntary pledge 
system has weakened the multilateral climate regime (Khor, 2010b). 
The participation of 97 countries in the form of emission reduction 
pledges (42 countries) or mitigation actions (55 countries) speaks to 
the institutional feasibility of the Cancún Agreements (see Section 
13.5.1.1). The Durban Platform in 2011 further de-emphasized the 
distinction between developing and developed countries, with regard 
to mitigation commitments, and mandated a new treaty by 2015, to 
take effect by 2020, mobilizing emissions reductions by all countries 
(UNFCCC, 2011a). 
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13.13.1.4 Assessment of envisioned international 
cooperation outside of the UNFCCC
A wide variety of international institutions outside of the UNFCCC 
have some role in international climate change policy. These are 
described in Section 13.5 and depicted graphically in Figure 13.1, 
above. They include activities at the international, regional, national, 
subnational, and local scales, and they include public, private and civil 
society actors. Here, we discuss those institutions for which there exist 
published assessments of performance for at least one of the criteria 
from Section 13.2.2. 
The breadth of group membership poses a potential tradeoff between 
global participation and other aspects of institutional feasibility (see 
Sections 13.2.2.4, 13.3.3, and 13.5.1). To the extent that a group’s 
membership includes only a subset of countries, this may facilitate 
negotiations and implementation, thereby improvinginstitutional 
feasibility (Houser, 2010), but this may reduce environmental and 
economic performance due to incomplete global coverage — omit-
ting others’ emissions, yielding leakage, and forgoing low-cost oppor-
tunities for abatement (Wiener, 1999; see also Sections 13.13.1 and 
13.5.1.2). Moreover, bringing climate discussions into smaller interna-
tional forums has been criticized by some as attempts to circumvent 
the UNFCCC and reduce its legitimacy (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012). 
Because the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol provides for emissions com-
mitments only by Annex B countries (which account for a declining 
share of global emissions, with increased risk of leakage), some of the 
smaller groups discussed in this subsection have tried to engage major 
developing countries as well, to reduce leakage and increase environ-
mental effectiveness.
The G8
The G8 includes eight major industrialized countries (United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia), 
plus the European Union. At the 2007 G8 summit, member countries 
agreed (though without a binding commitment) to set a goal of a 50 % 
reduction in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2050, conditional 
on major developing countries making signiﬁcant reductions. A com-
parison of four models of global emission pathways (including the G8 
plus China, India, and other major developing countries, a group which 
resembles the MEF or G20 more than the G8), to achieve concentra-
tion levels of 550, 450, or 400 ppm by 2100, found that aggregate 
global costs through 2100 would be below 0.8 % of global GDP to 
achieve 550 ppm and about 2.5 % for 400 ppm (but highly sensitive to 
the availability of CCS and biofuels) (Edenhofer et al., 2010); see also 
Section 6.3.2.1.
Analysts have examined the economic impacts of achieving reduc-
tions approximating the G8 pledge on individual countries, such as the 
United Kingdom (Dagoumas and Barker, 2010) and the United States 
(Paltsev et  al., 2008).The former ﬁnds no simple tradeoff between 
emission reductions and economic growth in the United Kingdom. Of 
the more aggressive reductions modelled for the United States, Palt-
sev et  al. (2008) ﬁnds carbon prices rising to between 120 and 210 
USD by 2050, a level of cost that “would not seriously affect US GDP 
growth but would imply large-scale changes in its energy system.” 
Paltsev et  al. (2009) found somewhat higher costs, noting moreover 
that the details of policy design and incomplete sectoral coverage 
could raise these costs further. Meanwhile, actions by the G8 countries 
alone (excluding major developing countries) would address a declin-
ing share of global emissions and would be subject to leakage to non-
G8 members. 
The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
The MEF, described in Section 13.5.1.3, is a forum for the discussion of 
policy options and international collaboration with regard to climate 
and energy, not a forum for negotiation. There are no published assess-
ments of the MEF’s effectiveness. Massetti (2011) considers a scheme 
that achieves the MEF’s informal, aspirational objective of “reducing 
global emissions by 50 % in 2050” (similar to the G8 goal, described 
above) through hypothetical 80 % reductions by high-income MEF 
countries and 25 – 30 % reductions by low-income countries, and ﬁnds 
costs would exceed 1.5 % of GDP.
The G20
The G20, described in Section 13.5.1.3, came to a political agree-
ment at its 2009 Pittsburgh meeting to “phase out and rationalize 
over the medium term inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies while providing 
targeted support for the poorest” (G20, 2009). This was not followed 
by a legally binding agreement. In terms of environmental effective-
ness, this effort could signiﬁcantly affect GHG emissions, if countries 
in fact implemented it; by one modelled estimate, complete phaseout 
of such subsidies by 2020, could reduce CO2 emissions by 4.7 % (IEA, 
2011). Analysis suggests that, of the economies identiﬁed by the IEA 
as having fossil-fuel consumption subsidies, almost half had either 
implemented fossil-fuel subsidy reforms or announced related plans by 
2011 (IEA et al., 2011). However, other analysts suggest that progress 
towards this goal can be attributed to changes in reporting and sub-
sidy estimation, and that no fossil fuel subsidies have been eliminated 
under this pledge (Koplow, 2012). 
Studies have conﬁrmed that countries reforming fossil fuel consumer 
subsidies would realize positive economic beneﬁts (IEA et  al., 2011). 
However, “these economic beneﬁts would be offset by trade impacts 
if other countries also removed their subsidies and thus reduced their 
demand for fossil-fuel imports” (IEA et al., 2011). The G20 initiative on 
fossil fuel subsidies could have positive distributional impacts within 
some countries, however. Since fossil fuel subsidies tend to beneﬁt high-
income households more than the poor in developing countries, their 
removal would be progressive in such nations (World Bank, 2008c). 
Some note that the creation of the G20 and its elevation to a pre-
mier global international economic forum during the ﬁnancial crisis in 
2008 (Houser, 2010) has led to more open and dynamic negotiations 
between industrialized and developing countries (Hurrell and Sen-
gupta, 2012), suggesting a potentially positive route forward. 
WGIII_ch13_DTP.indd   1049 20.11.2014   12:35:05
1050
International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
13
Chapter 13
The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol is one agreement outside of the UNFCCC 
that has achieved nearly universal participation and has made a sig-
niﬁcant contribution to reducing GHG emissions (Molina et al., 2009; 
Velders et  al., 2007). (The UNFCCC does not address GHGs already 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol.) In its effort to reduce emissions 
of ozone-depleting substances (ODS), the Montreal Protocol initially 
phased down chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs), which harm the ozone 
layer and also have very high global warming potential (GWP), and in 
2007 decided to accelerate the phase-down schedule for HCFCs — an 
interim replacement for CFCs with a somewhat lower, but still very 
signiﬁcant, GWP. The latter decision was affected by climate consid-
erations (Bodansky, 2011a). Even before the HCFC decision, one esti-
mate suggested that the Montreal Protocol’s overall net contribution 
to climate change mitigation had been approximately 5 times what 
the Kyoto Protocol would achieve under its ﬁrst commitment period 
(Velders et al., 2007, 2012). However, this comparison may be unfair 
because the progress in reducing ozone depleting gases relative to 
GHGs may be due to the major ozone depleting gases being less cen-
tral to economic activities than the major GHGs. In addition, the time-
periods in which the two agreements have been operating makes 
comparison difﬁcult. 
Hydroﬂuorocarbons are being widely adopted as a longer-term substi-
tute for CFCs. Many of these have extremely high GWP, and their use 
will partially negate climate gains otherwise achieved by the Montreal 
Protocol (Moncel and van Asselt, 2012). Zaelke et al. (2012) suggest 
that a combination of reductions of HFCs and signiﬁcant cuts in CO2, 
the largest contributor to climate change, can signiﬁcantly increase the 
chances of remaining below the 2 °C limit. Proposals have been made 
in the Montreal Protocol process to phase down HFCs (even though 
these gases are not ozone-depleting substances), but as of mid-2013, 
parties to the Montreal Protocol had not agreed to an HFC phasedown. 
However, in June 2013 the presidents of the United States and China 
announced a joint initiative to phase down HFCs.
In terms of distributional equity, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which 
placed no restrictions on developing country emissions, the Mon-
treal Protocol applied equally-stringent emission requirements on 
all countries. However, the Montreal Protocol allowed for a 10-year 
‘grace period’ for countries with low per capita CFC consumption to 
meet their implementation requirements, consistent with the principle 
of CBDRRC. The Montreal Protocol also established mechanisms for 
ﬁnancing and provided technical support to assist developing coun-
tries in reducing their ODS emissions; the most notable mechanism is 
the Multilateral Fund, which has transferred more than 3 billion USD to 
assist developing country ODS mitigation (Molina et al., 2009). 
The International Maritime Organisation and the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 2.2, Annex I parties agreed to pursue 
GHG limitations from maritime and air transport through the IMO and 
ICAO. 
Approximately 3.3 % of global CO2 emissions in 2007 were attribut-
able to shipping (IMO, 2009). In 2011, the IMO adopted the ﬁrst man-
datory standards for a sector relating to GHG emissions, instituting a 
performance-based energy-efﬁciency regulation for large ships “for 
which the building contract is placed on or after January 1, 2013” 
(Bodansky, 2011c). This regulation applies uniformly to all countries, 
extending participation in GHG emissions regulation. These standards 
were adopted by majority vote (over some objections), and include a 
provision to promote technical cooperation and assistance, especially 
for developing countries (Bodansky, 2011c), to address equity con-
cerns, enhancing institutional feasibility.
The ICAO adopted a resolution on climate change in 2010. In contrast to 
the IMO, the ICAO’s climate change goals are ‘voluntary and aspirational.’ 
Perceived inadequate progress by the ICAO toward aviation emissions 
reduction goals may have prompted the inclusion of aviation emissions 
in the EU-ETS in January 2012 (Bodansky, 2011c) (see Section 13.8.2). 
Agreements among non-state actors and agreements among 
sub-national actors
It is unclear whether agreements among non-state (NGOs, private 
sector) or sub-national actors (transnational city networks) have been 
effective in reducing emissions. Partly this is because of their nov-
elty and partly because the units of measurement for such effective-
ness are considerably more complex than for interstate agreements 
(Pinkse and Kolk, 2009). For subnational efforts, the question of attri-
bution requires better disaggregation, to understand whether reduc-
tions are additional to national effort, or only contribute to delivering 
national pledges. While these sub-national efforts may make a small 
contribution to climate action, they may be valuable in inﬂuencing 
nation states or helping them meet commitments (Osofsky, 2012). 
Other measures of impacts do exist. In private sector initiatives, the 
Carbon Disclosure Project has high rates of reporting, with about 91 % 
of Global 500 companies surveyed in 2011 disclosing GHG emissions 
(Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011). There is little evidence of substan-
tial changes in investor behaviour, with disagreement as to the poten-
tial for such changes in the future (Kolk et  al., 2008; Harmes, 2011; 
MacLeod and Park, 2011). Some assessments have focused on how 
transnational city initiatives promote technology uptake within cities 
(Hoffmann, 2011) or on how they create a combination of competition 
and learning among member cities.
The voluntary carbon market (VCM) (see Section 13.5.2) had grown to 
131 million tCO2eq (about one-tenth of the size of the CDM), with a 
value of 424 million USD, by 2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). In 2004, 
virtually no VCM projects underwent third-party veriﬁed certiﬁcation, 
but by 2010, this ﬁgure had reached 90 % and the VCM has created a 
varied landscape of emission-offset providers, registries, and standards 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2011).
For some, the VCM is complementary to the CDM, and provides for 
learning about new ways of developing emissions reduction projects 
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(Benessaiah, 2012). However, Dhanda and Hartman (2011) ﬁnd that 
the voluntary market is not transparent and suffers from large swings 
of demand for speciﬁc project types. Offset prices for the same project 
type differs by up to two orders of magnitude. As noted, competing 
registries and standard providers proliferate, and additionality of a sig-
niﬁcant share of projects is doubtful. Some regard voluntary certiﬁca-
tion systems as primarily public relations exercises (Bumpus and Liver-
man, 2008). An earlier assessment by Corbera et al. (2009) concluded 
that the voluntary market does not perform better than the CDM. How-
ever, performance in the VCM seems to improve with the increased use 
of third-party certiﬁcation systems (Hamilton et al., 2008; Capoor and 
Ambrosi, 2009; Newell and Paterson, 2010). 
There is evidence that the importance of partnerships between the 
private sector and government depends on their relationship to more 
traditional state-led governance. Partnerships may work once govern-
ment regulations send strong signals to investors (Pfeifer and Sullivan, 
2008). Rules developed in private sector agreements may then become 
incorporated in government regulations (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011), 
and private carbon market offset standards may be introduced into 
regulated carbon markets (Hoffmann, 2011).
13.13.2 Performance assessment of proposed 
international climate policy 
architectures
This section describes proposed global climate policy architectures (sur-
veyed in Section 13.4), focusing on those that have been described for 
the ﬁrst time since AR4, and older proposals for which new research on 
anticipated performance is available. Earlier proposals are listed in Table 
13.2 of Gupta et al. (2007). The performance assessment of proposed 
architectures is difﬁcult because it depends on both the architecture 
and the speciﬁc design elements of its regulatory targets and mecha-
nisms. 
For analytical purposes, this chapter classiﬁes proposals using the 
taxonomy developed in Section 13.4.3 and Table 13.2: (a) strong mul-
tilateralism, (b) harmonized national policies, and (c) decentralized 
architectures and coordinated national policies. Combinations of these 
categories have also been proposed and assessed. For example, strong 
multilateralism can be advanced by ‘clubs’ of selected ambitious coun-
tries (Weischer et al., 2012)or by non-state actors (Blok et al., 2012).
13.13.2.1 Strong multilateralism
The anticipated performance of various proposals for strong multi-
lateralism has been assessed in the literature. In addition, another 
body of research has examined the ends (but not the policy architec-
ture) associated with various aggregate goals in terms of country- 
or region-level emission targets based on speciﬁc notions of distri-
butional equity, so-called ‘burden sharing approaches’ (see Section 
13.2, as well as Sections 4.6.2 and 6.3.6.6 for quantitative assess-
ments). 
Comprehensive proposals for strong multilateralism have in some 
cases been closely related to the targets-and-timetables approach of 
the Kyoto Protocol. This approach aims to be based on the UNFCCC 
principle of CBDRRC while introducing a more nuanced differentia-
tion and broader base of participation, along with some details of the 
means of implementation. This is well reﬂected in the literature on 
reduction proposals with national emission targets and emissions trad-
ing (see Table 13.2 in Gupta et al. (2007) for literature prior to AR4). 
Since AR4, this literature has studied gradually-increasing emission-
reduction commitments linked to indicators such as per capita income 
(Cao, 2010a; Frankel, 2010; Bosetti and Frankel, 2011), differentiating 
groups of countries (den Elzen et al., 2007; Rajamani, 2013), common 
but differentiated convergence (Luderer et  al., 2012), and per capita 
targets (Agarwala, 2010).
Distributional impacts vary signiﬁcantly with underlying criteria for 
effort sharing. For example, proposals that use ‘responsibility and 
capability’ as a criterion for allocating effort would result in relatively 
more stringent implied actions for ‘early’ emitters, assigning them 
lower allocations. Proposals based on the criterion of ‘mitigation 
potential’ would be less stringent for ‘early’ emitters, capturing the 
mitigation potential in developing countries, assumed to be relatively 
low-cost (Höhne et  al., 2013). Especially for low-stabilization levels, 
the approaches differ in the extent to which they rely on contributions 
from all countries, from emissions reductions within their borders, and 
on international assistance between countries. Section 4.6.2 details 
many more possible criteria for effort sharing, and Section 6.3.6.6 
quantiﬁes the implications of these various effort sharing criteria in 
terms of regional emission allocations and costs. 
Sectoral approaches are generally not anticipated to perform optimally 
in terms of environmental effectiveness or economic performance 
when compared with economy-wide approaches; therefore, sectoral 
approaches can be thought of as second-best policies (Bradley et al., 
2007; Schmidt et al., 2008; den Elzen et al., 2008; Meckling and Chung, 
2009). Sectors that are homogenous and already globally integrated, 
such as aviation, may lend themselves better to international coopera-
tion than those that are heterogeneous. Omitting some sectors makes 
it more difﬁcult to achieve emissions or stabilization goals and also 
reduces cost-effectiveness, relative to economy-wide approaches, as 
required emissions reductions must be made within-sector, failing to 
take advantage of the lower of heterogeneous marginal abatement 
costs across sectors. Transaction costs may also be higher with sectoral 
approaches, including, for example, greater challenges to negotiation 
(Bradley et al., 2007).
However, these approaches could potentially help mitigate leak-
age within particular industries (Bradley et al., 2007; Sawa, 2010). In 
terms of institutional feasibility, sectoral approaches may encourage 
the participation of a wider range of countries than economy-wide 
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approaches, because sectoral agreements can be more politically 
manageable in domestic policy processes (Bradley et al., 2007; Sawa, 
2010). Developing countries may also be more likely to participate 
meaningfully in sectoral processes than economy-wide agreements 
limiting emissions (Meckling and Chung, 2009). 
Several researchers have suggested that a ‘regime complex’ is emerg-
ing (see Sections 13.3 and 13.5), with the strong implication that com-
ponent regimes may display a range of architectures — from strong 
multilateralism through more decentralized systems (Carraro et  al., 
2007; Biermann et al., 2009; Barrett, 2010; Keohane and Victor, 2011). 
The portfolio of treaties approach is similar in some ways to the sec-
toral approaches described above. However, the approach described in 
(Barrett, 2010) includes much more signiﬁcant enforcement possibili-
ties, potentially increasing environmental effectiveness, while poten-
tially reducing institutional feasibility. 
13.13.2.2 Harmonized national policies
In principle, a wide variety of national climate policies can be harmo-
nized across countries. This holds for cap-and-trade systems (e. g., a 
global emissions permit trading system (Ellerman, 2010)), as we dis-
cuss in the context of linkage below, as well as for national carbon or 
other GHG taxes. The most-studied approach in terms of performance 
assessments has been harmonized carbon taxes. Their environmental 
performance would depend upon the level of the tax, but relative to 
non-market-based approaches, this approach would be cost-effective. 
The impact of a carbon tax on economic efﬁciency will depend, in part, 
on how tax revenues are used (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 
1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Cooper, 2010). 
Estimates in the recent literature of the environmental effectiveness 
and economic performance of proposed carbon taxes vary dramati-
cally depending upon assumptions (Edmonds et al., 2008; Clarke et al., 
2009; van Vuuren et al., 2009; Bosetti et al., 2010; Luderer et al., 2012). 
The distributional impacts of a carbon tax include negative impacts 
on the fossil fuel industry as a whole, with stronger impacts for fuels 
with higher carbon emissions per unit of energy. For example, impacts 
on coal would be much greater than on natural gas (Cooper, 2010). 
Impacts of national carbon taxes on consumers would likely be some-
what regressive in high-income countries but progressive in low-
income countries (see Section 15.5 for detail). Tax revenues could be 
used by individual countries to address these domestic distributional 
concerns (See e. g.,Winkler and Marquard, 2011; Alton et al., 2012).
Under a harmonized national carbon tax regime, fossil-fuel-exporting 
countries might experience negative impacts, and net importers could 
experience decreasing prices due to reduced demand, while some 
regions could experience increased bio-energy exports (Persson et  al., 
2006; OECD, 2008; Cooper, 2010; Leimbach et al., 2010). International 
transfers drawing on revenues of such a tax could, in theory, be used 
to address these concerns or to encourage participation by developing 
countries (Nordhaus, 2006). As with emissions trading (Frankel, 2010), 
the extent of developing country participation in an international carbon 
tax scheme could be based upon income thresholds (Nordhaus, 2006).
The institutional feasibility of a global carbon tax has not been thor-
oughly considered in the literature. The relatively large number of stud-
ies on a global carbon tax is at least partly due to the fact that eco-
nomic modellers often model a global carbon tax as a proxy for other 
mitigation policy instruments that would impose shadow prices on the 
carbon content of fossil fuels and / or CO2 emissions.
Many hybrid market-based approaches to mitigation, combining trad-
able emissions permits with some characteristics of a carbon tax, have 
been proposed and examined in the recent literature (Pizer, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2009; FELL et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2010; Grüll and 
Taschini, 2011). In principle, these hybrid approaches can provide bet-
ter aggregate economic performance, lowering compliance costs and 
reducing price volatility, at the potential expense of environmental 
effectiveness in the form of uncertain changes in aggregate emissions 
(Grüll and Taschini, 2011). However, recent research suggests that ‘soft’ 
price collars, which provide a modest reserve of additional emission 
allowances at the price ceiling, may achieve most of the expected com-
pliance cost savings provided by ‘hard’ collars (unlimited supplies of 
additional allowances), while maintaining a more predictable cap on 
emissions (Fell et  al., 2012). In terms of distributional equity, hybrid 
systems may reduce expected compliance costs for regulated ﬁrms, 
though they may increase regulatory costs (Grüll and Taschini, 2011). 
This characteristic may also increase political feasibility.
13.13.2.3 Decentralized architectures and coordinated 
national policies
In principle, many types of national climate policies could be linked to 
each other. In the literature to date, most discussion is of linked carbon 
markets. The recent literature on these suggests that economic perfor-
mance of existing GHG allowance trading systems could be enhanced 
through linkage, which would reduce abatement costs and improve 
market liquidity (Haites and Mehling, 2009; Mehling and Haites, 2009; 
Sterk and Kruger, 2009; Anger et al., 2009; Jaffe et al., 2009; Jaffe and 
Stavins, 2010; Grüll and Taschini, 2011; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012; 
Ranson and Stavins, 2013).
In terms of environmental performance, linkage can increase or reduce 
emissions leakage, depending on the stringency of caps, and the qual-
ity of offset credits within linked systems. 
Linkages among cap-and-trade systems as well as linkages with and 
among emission-reduction-credit systems would create winners and 
losers, generating distributional impacts relative to un-linked systems, 
depending upon impacts on allowance prices and whether partici-
pating entities are net buyers or net sellers of emissions (Jaffe and 
Stavins, 2010). While it does preserve the ability of countries to meet 
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their commitments through means of their own choice, consistent 
with the Kyoto Protocol, linkage also poses some challenges for insti-
tutional feasibility, since it reduces domestic control over prices, emis-
sions, and other aspects of policy design and impact (Buchner and 
Carraro, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2009; Jaffe and Stavins, 2010; Ranson and 
Stavins, 2013). Linking may not beneﬁt all participating countries due 
to potential market distortions and the rebalancing of production and 
consumption patterns in multiple markets (i. e., general equilibrium 
effects) (Marschinski et al., 2012). In one analysis that modelled the 
heterogeneous costs and beneﬁts of participation in a climate coali-
tion using a game-theoretic framework, incentives to deviate from 
cooperation could not be compensated by transfers (Bosetti et  al., 
2013).
Institutional-feasibility challenges may be more signiﬁcant for linked 
heterogeneous policy instruments (such as taxes and emissions permit 
systems, or taxes and technology standards) relative to linked regimes 
that use similar instruments (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012). For exam-
ple, unrestricted linkage would effectively turn a permit trading system 
into a tax, pegging the permit price to the other country’s tax rate, and 
allowing aggregate emissions above the permit system’s established 
cap (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).
Climate policy architectures that can be characterized as technology-
oriented agreements may seek to share and coordinate knowledge and 
enhance technology research, development, demonstration, and transfer. 
Some literature suggests that such agreements may increase the efﬁ-
ciency and environmental effectiveness of international climate coopera-
tion, but will have limited environmental effectiveness operating alone 
(de Coninck et al., 2008). Though technology-oriented policies can pro-
mote the development of new technologies, environmental effectiveness 
hinges on the need for other policies to provide incentives for adoption 
(Fischer, 2008; Newell, 2010b). For example, (Bosetti et al., 2009b) show 
that R&D alone is insufﬁcient to stabilize CO2 levels without an accom-
panying carbon tax or functionally equivalent policy instrument. See Sec-
tion 13.9.3 for details of international cooperation on technology.
13.14 Gaps in  knowledge 
and data
Current understanding of agreements and instruments for interna-
tional cooperation continues to evolve. At the time of this publication, 
there are a number of gaps in the scholarly literature of international 
cooperation for climate change mitigation, as identiﬁed below: 
Ě There exist few comparisons of proposals in terms of any or all 
of the four criteria used in this report. Research that would be 
particularly useful would be comparisons of aggregate cost, or 
disaggregated regional- or country-level costs per year, with incor-
poration of uncertainty.
Ě There exist few assessments of the emerging range of new inter-
governmental and transnational arrangements, including ‘hybrid’ 
approaches and approaches that interact across the landscape of 
climate agreements, which might enable better assessment of the 
sum of efforts.
Ě Current understanding of the complementarities and tradeoffs 
between policies affecting mitigation and adaptation is incomplete.
Ě Current understanding of how international cooperation on cli-
mate change can help achieve co-beneﬁts and development goals 
of countries and what policies and practices work and do not work 
in capacity building projects is incomplete.
Ě Current understanding of the factors that affect national decisions 
to join and form international agreements and how international 
cooperation can directly inﬂuence achievement of various perfor-
mance criteria is incomplete.
13.15 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 13.1 Given that GHG emissions abatement 
must ultimately be carried out by 
individuals and ﬁrms within countries, 
why is international cooperation 
necessary?
International cooperation is important to achieve signiﬁcant emis-
sions reductions for a number of reasons. First, climate protection is a 
public good that requires collective action, because ﬁrms and individ-
uals will not otherwise bear the private costs needed to achieve the 
global beneﬁts of abatement (see Section 13.2.1.1). Second, because 
GHGs mix globally in the atmosphere, anthropogenic climate change 
is a global commons problem. Third, international cooperation helps 
to give every country an opportunity to ascertain how responsibilities 
are to be divided among them, based on principles adopted in inter-
national agreements (see Section 13.3). This is important because 
individual countries are the entities with jurisdiction over individuals 
and ﬁrms, whose actions ultimately determine if emissions are abated. 
Fourth, international cooperation allows for linkages across policies 
at different scale, notably through harmonizing national and regional 
policies, as well as linkages across issues, and through enhanced 
cooperation may reduce mitigation costs, create opportunities for 
sharing the beneﬁts of adaptation, increase credibility of price signals, 
and expand market size and liquidity. Fifth, international cooperation 
may help bring together international science and knowledge, which 
may improve the performance of cooperatively-developed policy 
instruments. 
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FAQ 13.2 What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of including all countries 
in international cooperation on climate 
change (an ‘inclusive’ approach) and 
limiting participation (an ‘exclusive’ 
approach)?
The literature suggests that there are tradeoffs between ‘inclusive’ 
approaches to negotiation and agreement (i. e., approaches with 
broad participation, as in the UNFCCC) and ‘exclusive’ approaches 
(i. e., limiting participation according to chosen criteria — for exam-
ple, including only the largest emitters, or groups focused on speciﬁc 
issues). Regarding an ‘inclusive’ approach, the universal membership 
of the UNFCCC is an indicator of its high degree of legitimacy among 
states as a central institution to develop international climate policy. 
However, the scholarly literature offers differing views over whether 
or not the outcomes of recent negotiations strengthen or weaken the 
multilateral climate regime (Section 13.13.1.3). A number of other 
multilateral forums have emerged as potentially valuable in advanc-
ing the international process through an ‘exclusive’ approach. These 
smaller groups can advance the overall process through informal con-
sultations, technical analysis and information sharing, and implemen-
tation of UNFCCC decisions or guidance (e. g., with regard to climate 
ﬁnance). They might also be more effective in advancing agreement 
among the largest emitters, but so far have not been able to do so. 
Examples include the MEF, the G20 and G8, and the city-level C-40 
Climate Leadership Group. Section 13.5 goes into more detail, and Fig-
ure 13.1 illustrates the overall landscape of climate change-relevant 
agreements and institutions.
FAQ 13.3 What are the options for designing 
policies to make progress on 
international cooperation on climate 
change mitigation? 
There are a number of potential structures for formalized international 
cooperation on climate change mitigation, referred to in the text as pol-
icy ‘architectures’ (see Section 13.4). Architectures vary by the degree 
to which their authority is centralized and can be roughly categorized 
into three groups: strong multilateralism, harmonized national policies, 
and decentralized architectures (see Section 13.4.1). An example of 
strong multilateralism is a targets-and-timetables approach, which sets 
aggregate quantitative emissions-reduction targets over a ﬁxed period 
of time and allocates responsibility for this reduction among countries, 
based on principles jointly accepted. The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol is 
an example of a strong multilateral approach. The second architecture 
is harmonized national policies. An example in principle (though not 
put into practice) might be multilaterally harmonized domestic carbon 
taxes. An example of the third architecture, decentralized approaches 
and coordinated national policies, would be linkage among domestic 
cap-and-trade systems, driven not through a multilateral agreement 
but largely by bilateral arrangements. The literature suggests that each 
of the various proposed policy architectures for global climate change 
has advantages and disadvantages with regard to four evaluation cri-
teria: environmental effectiveness, aggregate economic performance, 
distributional equity, and institutional feasibility. Section 13.4.1.4 goes 
into more detail.
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